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ABSTRACT
The central argument of my dissertation is that national labor relation institutions where
transnational private regulatory efforts are implemented influence the extent and manner
of public-private regulatory complementarities. The analytical framework I use to
examine the processes of regulatory complementarities is informed by the political
economy of gradual change in the comparative institutionalism literature. The labor
relation institutions of particular relevance include tripartite and industrial relation
institutions, as well as political affiliations between state and workers' organizations,
although to a more limited extent. On one hand, these institutions influence the incentives
for domestic unions to use transnational private regulatory efforts in strategic manners to
promote regulatory improvements. On other hand, they shape the ability of domestic
unions and transnational actors to use state regulation as a source of legitimacy for their
demands for improvements. I further argue that these favorable conditions are more
common in national contexts with market oriented, rather than state-directed and
coordinated labor relation institutions. I use the electronics sector from Hungary,
Romania and Slovenia during the 2000s as the empirical window to examine divergent
pathways of regulatory interactions. The empirical analysis illustrates that while labor
relation institutions facilitated the emergence of regulatory complementarities in the
market-oriented institutional context of Hungary, these institutions were less favorable to
similar developments in the state-directed context of Romania and coordinated
institutional setting of Slovenia. Additionally, the implementation style of transnational
private regulation set opportunities for two types of regulatory developments: union and
compliance driven regulatory complementarities. An additional essential claim of the
dissertation is that instead of approaching public-private regulatory complementarities as
functional synergies that emerge automatically, to rather understand them as political
processes that are closely connected to national institutions. Finally, regulatory
complementarities are more likely to emerge around labor concerns that are prevalent and
politically salient in a national context.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
This thesis examines the conditions that enable complementary interactions across
private transnational and public national regulatory arrangements to bring about
improvements in regulation of workers integrated in global production chains. Three
large electronics manufacturing facilities located in Hungary, Romania and Slovenia that
supply big brand companies from Western Europe all had precarious working conditions
in the mid 2000s regarding temporary employment, collective redundancies and
overtime. While the transnational regulatory initiatives of the large corporations these
facilities manufacture for, produced considerable improvements in the regulation of
working conditions and employment relations at the Hungarian facility, their contribution
was significantly less at the Romanian factory and completely absent at the Slovenian
site. Neither national public regulation, nor transnational corporate efforts on their own
can explain these and other divergences. My dissertation shows that regulatory
improvements in global production chains are often contingent on complementary
interactions across private and public regulations, and describes the conditions and
processes that facilitate their emergence.
Over the last decade, institutional complementary has become a central focus of a
growing body of literature as it is commonly associated with both superior economic
performance, as well as social inclusion and stability (Amable, 2000; Hall&Soskice,
2001; Hall&Gingerich, 2009; Hoepner, 2005; Crouch et al, 2005; Streeck, 2005; Hancke,
2007; Schneider&Karcher, 2010). Institutions are considered to be complementary when
the viability of one institutional form is conditioned by the existence of other institutions
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(Hall&Soskice, 2001). Scholars from various disciplines have therefore tried to
distinguish between assortments of institutions that are "just mixed" and those that
embody truly compensatory features to bring about complementarities. While most of
these studies focused primarily on the impact of institutional complementarities on
economic performance (Hall&Soskice, 2001; Crouch et al, 2005; Cernat, 2006;
Kenworthy, 2006; Hall&Gingerich, 2009), there has been growing interest in the
relevance of institutional complementarities for social outcomes (Streeck, 2005; Crouch
et al, 2005; Ahlering&Deakin, 2007; Schneider&Karcher, 2010).
While most of the literature explores complementarity across domestic institutions
within a particular national context, I broaden this concept to consider interactions across
national and transnational institutional arrangements. The predominant focus of my study
is therefore on complementary interactions emerging across national public regulation, on
one end, and private transnational regulation, on the other. National public regulation
refers primarily to labor laws and collective agreements set in place within a particular
national setting (Kaufman, 2006). Transnational private regulation, on other hand, refers
to the body of rules, practices and processes initiated by private corporations to ensure
social responsibility across their manufacturing sites located in emerging economies
(Cafaggi, 2010)1. While each of these regulatory frameworks is acknowledged to be
essential to safeguard workers from negative externalities of global markets on their own,
few studies have considered the interactions across them.
Many times, public national and private transnational regulatory frameworks layer
on top of each other without any influence on their individual effectiveness. Other times,
1 These initiatives are also referred to as transnational corporate social responsibility initiatives, socially
responsible private regulation, transnational corporate social responsibility, social private regulation, etc
(Shamir, 2011).
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they crowd each other out. Sometimes, however, they mutually enhance each other's
effectiveness, generating improvements in regulation of working conditions and
employment relations in global supply chains. At one electronics facility from Hungary,
for example, the local union used the transnational corporate responsibility program of
the lead corporation to put pressure on facility management to provide more equitable
compensation and stable terms of employment for temporary agency employees. At
another electronic facility, the private auditors of the lead buyer corporation used
references to state laws to legitimize demands for higher remuneration for agency
workers and increase pressure on local management to comply.
In this dissertation I suggest that the extent and processes of regulatory
complementarities in different national contexts are best understood from the perspective
of labor relation institutions, and I develop an analytical framework to examine their
empirical relevance. National labor relation institutions that have traditionally been
considered essential for safeguarding workers from economic pressures include tripartite
institutions, industrial relations institutions, and political affiliations between unions and
national governments (Kaufman, 2006; Cox&Mason, 2000; Kohl&Platzer, 2003;
Avdagic, 2005; Bohle, 2006). These are some of the main institutions through which the
state, labor unions and employers' organizations coordinate with each other regarding the
content and implementation of labor regulation. A predominant mode of coordination
often cuts across labor relation institutions that are associated with ideal types of
institutional configurations. While decentralized and uncoordinated labor relation
institutions are characteristic of liberal market economies, coordinated and centralized
institutions are associated with coordinated market economies, with some cases in
13
between (Hall&Soskice, 2001; Cernat, 2006; Knell&Shrolek, 2006, Kaufman, 2006;
Aguilera, 2006; Feldmann, 2006). State directed institutional arrangements are often
identified as a third ideal type, with highly centralized labor relation institutions that are
poorly coordinated and governed mainly through state interventions (Levy, 2005;
Brammer et al, 2012; Bohle &Greskovits, 2013).
Contrary to common expectations that social responsibility efforts of corporations
are most complementary with coordinated types of political economies (Brammer et al,
2012, Kang&Moon, 2012), I claim that the decentralized and uncoordinated labor
relations institutions typical of liberal market economies provide more favorable
conditions for public-private regulatory complementarities. Moreover, while the
predominant comparative political economy literature assumes that institutional
complementarities emerge through coherence and reinforcement (Hall&Soskice, 2001;
Hall&Gingerich, 2009; Campbell, 2007), I argue that the predominant mechanism
driving regulatory complementarities in global production regimes is that of
compensation. National labor relation institutions have important role in fostering or
undermining processes through which deficiencies of domestic state regulations and
collective arrangements 2 are balanced out by transnational private regulation. Their
influence on these complementary processes can be exerted through two main
mechanisms. Firstly, they can set incentives for local actors to use alternative labor
regulatory arrangements to promote their strategic interests with respect to labor
regulation. Secondly, they can also influence the ability of domestic and transnational
actors to use national public regulation to legitimize private demands and pressure for
2 While there is considerable overlap across state regulation with respect to formal content of national labor
laws, there is significant variation in political will and administrative capacity to drive their implementation
(Rice&Patrick, 2008).
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regulatory improvements.
Private transnational regulatory institutions, on their end, also exert an influence on
the extent and processes of regulatory complementarities. Transnational private
regulatory initiatives differ considerably in the institutional forms underlying their main
mechanisms of implementation, with a common distinction across stakeholder
engagement and compliance driven corporate approaches (Jenkins, 2005; Brammer et al,
2012). While some private transnational initiatives rely more extensively on engagement
with local stakeholders - such as local unions, civil society and governmental
organizations - to promote better working conditions throughout their manufacturing
sites; other corporations rely more on monitoring and corrective actions to achieve the
same goal (Jenkins, 2001; Hughes et al, 2008). The style of implementation of corporate
governance approaches - stakeholder engagement or compliance oriented, present
different types of opportunities for regulatory complementarities to be built within a
particular national setting.
Public and private regulatory interactions are analyzed in the context of the
electronics industry in three national settings from Eastern Central Europe. The
electronics industry has a lead role in global manufacturing (Sturgeon&Kawakami, 2010)
and has been repeatedly criticized for its poor labor practices (GoodElectronics, 2009;
Smith et al, 2006). Several Eastern European economies, with different national
institutional constellations, have grown increasingly dependent on manufacturing for
major electronics companies from both North America and Western Europe during their
transition from centrally planned to market economies (Luthje&Sproll, 2004). Media
revelations of the abusive labor and environmental practices among the manufacturing
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sites from around the world, including Eastern Central Europe (makeITfair, 2009,
Bormann&Plank, 2010), provoked public concern and labeling the industry as "the 21s'
century poster child for sweatshops and an environmental despoiler" (Brown, 2009).
Public and private measures to address these concerns have been prevalent throughout the
industry. Considering the dependence of Eastern Central European economies on global
production networks in general and the importance of the electronics industry in
particular, along with the significant institutional heterogeneity in the region, these
characteristics make the electronics industry from Eastern Central Europe an ideal area to
study.
This chapter sets out with a brief review of two dominant approaches towards
understanding labor regulation in globally integrated emerging economies: corporate and
state regulation. An alternative approach is then proposed that builds on recent attempts
to connect these two streams of literature on labor regulation. The following section sets
theoretical guidelines to understand the emergence of public-private regulatory
complementarities in global production regimes and presents an analytical framework to
examine them empirically. I then discuss the research design and methodology to study
the emergence of regulatory complementarities in the electronics sector of three Eastern
Central European countries - Hungary, Romania and Slovenia. Finally, I conclude with
an overview of the dissertation.
Different Approaches Towards Labor Regulation in Emerging Economies
Over the last decade, several studies from various social disciplines explored
different methods to strengthen labor regulation in emerging economies. Typically, these
16
studies on how to effectively safeguard labor in globally integrated transition and
developing societies, led to two apparently contradictory approaches: transnational
regulation by global corporations and public regulation by national governments and
workers' organizations. A significant share of the studies argue that strengthening weak
regulation in developing countries requires additional transnational institutions to close
the governance gap at the global level and to substitute for deficient national regulation.
In contrast with this approach, other studies examine the conditions under which
domestic institutions and organizations can be used to achieve stronger labor regulation.
These two streams of literature rarely connect with each other by considering both
transnational and domestic institutions in an interactive manner.
1. Transnational corporate initiatives to promote social responsibility in the
global economy
Over the last decade, initiatives by global firms to regulate social and
environmental practices in emerging economies where most manufacturing activities are
located have become increasingly common (Vogel, 2008; Utting, 2005). The social
responsibilities of corporations have been the focus of a broader debate on business-
society relations in general, and transnational corporations and society in particular, for
decades (Crane et al, 2008), but became particularly salient over the late 1990s and early
2000s. The increasing internationalization of production and the prevalence of poor
working conditions in several industries resulted in strong reactions among civil society
organizations and labor unions from mostly Western industrialized nations
(Wilkinson&Hughes, 2000; Trubek et al, 2000; von Roozendaal, 2002; Utting, 2005;
Bendell, 2005; Doh&Guay, 2006; Egels-Zanden&Hyllman, 2006). In response to global
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social activism, many transnational companies adopted regulatory initiatives to protect
their reputations and avoid additional state regulation (Mele, 2008; Campbell, 2007;
Bartley, 2007). The increasing prevalence of these efforts over the last decade reflects the
extension of regulatory authority in the global economy beyond governments, to large
corporations (Kobrin, 2009; Vogel, 2008; Utting, 2005). Lead corporations include large
retailers, brand marketers, branded manufacturers from advanced industrial economies -
that exert considerable control and power over manufacturing sites from emerging
economies (Barrientos et al, 2011).
Transnational governance institutions of large corporations came to be seen by
many as the solution for improving labor standards and employment conditions in global
industries (Hughes et al, 2008). The number of studies that examine the effectiveness of
corporate social responsibility programs to improve social standards in global production
regimes grew considerably over the last decade. Notwithstanding considerable skepticism
about the potential of these efforts to address labor concerns in the global economy
(Egels-Zanden&Hyllman, 2007; Yu, 2007), several studies demonstrate their potential to
bring about improvements under specific conditions. Most of the studies point to a
connection between the mode of implementation of these standards and their
effectiveness, arguing that engagement with other stakeholders (Anner, 2011; Evans,
2007, O'Rourke, 2006; Rodriguez-Garavito, 2005; Batruch, 2011), focus on specific
issue areas (Rodriguez-Garavito, 2005; Anner, 2011; Barrientos, 2008), transparency of
methods and results (O'Rourke, 2006; Cook& Mosdale, 2007), setting the right type of
"sticks and carrots" (Sabel et al, 2000; Cook&Mosdale, 2007), commitment and
capability building efforts by brand corporations (Locke et al, 2007; Locke et al, 2009);
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economic upgrading (Knorringa, 2006), can facilitate improvements in social standards.
While several studies explore the effectiveness of transnational private regulation
within specific national contexts, few of them pay attention to the ways in which local
institutions influence implementation of these transnational measures (Bartley, 2007).
This tendency can be attributed to a general belief that globalization severely undermined
the ability of national governments and unions to sustain social protection and promote
sustainable development (Tsogas, 2001; Utting, 2005; Ghose, 2003). On one hand,
globalization of the world economy has often been associated with declining capacity or
political will of national governments to protect citizens from the negative externalities of
global market forces (von Roozendaal, 2002; Rice&Patrick, 2008). Trade unions and the
International Labor Organization (ILO), for example, expressed concerns that
governments actively created bad working conditions and low wages, or that they
refrained from penalizing these practices, to attract more investments in export oriented
activities (Bronfenbenner, 2007; Ghose, 2003). On other hand, there has also been
growing public concern about the numerous challenges unions face around the world, and
the gradual decline in their political and regulatory powers (Brown et al, 2009; Compa,
2011; von Rozeendaal, 2002; Munck, 2002). These assumptions influenced global
governance studies to a great extent by suggesting that state regulation and industrial
relations systems are deficient to an extent that they can be largely ignored (von
Roozendaal, 2002).
2. Domestic labour regulation through state and industrial relations
institutions
Notwithstanding the significant challenges that states and unions from developing
19
countries face in the global economy, they are not completely overwhelmed by
international capital in general, and transnational corporations in particular (Edwards and
Elger; 2000; Weddington, 2000; Upchurch, 2000; Bronfenbenner, 2007; Ghose, 2003;
Piazza, 2005; Freeman, 2009). A growing body of literature, emerging mostly from the
fields of political science, sociology and industrial relations, has recently directed its
attention towards understanding the role of domestic institutions in shaping labor regimes
in emerging economies and has been emphasizing the potential of institutional reforms to
improve labor regulation. This approach gained more popularity in recent years due to a
decline in the legitimacy of Washington Consensus style policies and the neoliberal
agenda of labor market deregulation, and an increasing shift towards more economic and
social regulation in emerging markets (Piore&Schrank, 2008).
An increasing number of studies emphasize the importance of state institutions in
driving better labor regulation in Latin American countries. A recent study on labor and
environmental regulation in Argentina analyzes the ways in which linkages between
bureaucrats and civil society organizations can sometimes facilitate resource sharing and
the construction of favorable conditions to drive enforcement (Amengual, 2011). Other
studies point to the important role state bureaucrats can play in improving social
regulation, without undermining the goal of economic development (Piore&Schrank,
2008; Schrank, 2009; Coslovsky, 2010; Pires, 2008; Amengual, 2011). A study of social
regulation in the Dominican Republic, for example, points to an increasing commitment
of Dominican policy makers and bureaucrats to a Franco-Iberian model of labor
enforcement, in which skilled labor inspectors use their discretion to balance social
welfare and economic growth (Schrank, 2009). These tendencies have been less
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prominent in other regions of the world that follow alternative models of labor
enforcement. The Anglo-Saxon model that focuses more rigidly on enforcing compliance
with laws is generally associated with less promising outcomes. Inspectors are often
overwhelmed by increasing fragmentation and complexity of employment legislation,
and fall short from enforcing the substance of the regulations in place (Teague, 2009).
The recent literature on labor regulation in Eastern Central European countries
emphasizes the importance of national political and economic institutions of labor
governance. Considering the extensive state structures and bureaucratic systems that were
inherited from the socialist regime in Eastern Europe, a primary focus of scholars of this
region has been on the national institutions that shape access to and influence on state
authority (Gryzmala-Busse&Luong, 2002). Several studies explore the role of tripartite
institutions, established in the region mostly at the influence of international
organizations such as the European Union (EU) and the International Labor Organization
(ILO), to influence labor policies and trends in the region (Hethy, 1995; Pollart, 2000;
Ost, 2000; Cox&Mason, 2000b; Orenstein, 2001; lankova, 2002; Frege, 2004; Avdagic,
2005). Most studies point out that tripartite institutions from Eastern Europe failed to
become the strong institutions of interest coordination that tripartite institutions were in
Western Europe (Ost, 2000; Cox&Mason, 2000a). Nonetheless, there is considerable
variation in the effectiveness of labor unions to use tripartite institutions to
counterbalance pressures to liberalize and decentralize employment regulation in the
region (Pollart, 2000; Avdagic, 2005).
Other studies examine the effectiveness of regional efforts to extend labor
regulation beyond the state towards an integrated system that includes also collective
21
bargaining at multiple levels in the economy. Research studies on industrial relation
systems often reveal declining union representation and collective bargaining coverage,
gradual decentralization of collective agreements (Pollart, 2000; Bohle, 2006; Ost, 2009;
Neumann, 2002;Martin&Martin, 2004; Aguilera, 2006; Meardi, 2007). There is also
acknowledgement of the considerable diversity across countries from Eastern Central
Europe as well as from other emerging regions, in the dominant levels of collective
bargaining, density of union representation and their ability to influence employment
practices (Frege, 2002; Stanojevic, 2003; Stockhammer, 2009; Trif, 2004, 2007; Grdesic,
2008; Bohle&Greskovits, 2012). Efforts to evaluate the influence of international
organizations in general, and of the European Union (EU) in particular, on industrial
relations and tripartite institutions led to contradictory results. While some studies point
to the positive influences of the European Union (EU) on strengthening collective rights
and institution building (Cook, 2010), others argue that it has intensified pressures to
liberalize national labor regulatory regimes (Bohle&Greskovits, 2006).
Domestic state and industrial relations institutions have also become a primary
focus of studies of labor regulation in Asian economies. Within the context of gradual
economic liberalization it has become increasingly evident that new state regulatory
regimes, collective worker representation and industrial relations institutions will be
needed to mitigate the excesses of the increasingly capitalist economy (Gallagher, 2004).
Major reforms of labor laws in China are illustrative in this sense, even though several
studies emphasize the deficiencies of state and collective representation institutions that
could elicit compliance with the new reforms (Cooke, 2009; Friedman&Lee, 2010).
Research conducted on other parts of Asia, including the Philippines, Malaysia and
22
Indonesia, have also pointed to the importance and complexity of networks of domestic
institutions and actors that form labor control regimes (Kelly, 2001; 2002).
3. An alternative approach
The dominant approaches in the literature suggest that improving regulation of
working conditions and employment relations in globally integrated emerging economies
depend on private, or public regulation. There is, however, an increasing recognition that
the solution of labor regulation in transnational production regimes lays in a combination
of transnational private and domestic public regulatory institutions (Locke et al, 2012;
Locke et al, 2007; Bartley, 2005; 2011). On one end, studies of transnational private
regulation need to consider the complex political and institutional infrastructure of
domestic regulatory regimes in emerging economies. Studies of domestic labor
regulation, on their end, have to take into account the growing influence of transnational
private institutions.
Systematic analysis of the interactions across private and public approaches
towards labor regulation is still at its early stages, but existing studies suggest that it is a
fruitful area for more research. Empirical studies of an apparel factory in the Dominican
Republic (Amengual, 2010), and of electronics facilities in Mexico and the Czech
Republic (Locke et al, 2012), illustrated that private and public, transnational and
national institutions can interact with each other in complementary manners. The
Amengual (2010) study provides detailed empirical analysis of regulation in practice at
one apparel factory in the Dominican Republic, and points to examples of
complementarities across state labor inspection and private audits by a major client
company. As private regulators required factories to provide their workers with written
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legal contracts, for example, the formal contracts made it easier for labor inspectors to
resolve other types of labor concerns. This study revealed that complementary regulation
occurs when the actions of state and private regulators are mutually supportive of one
another's efforts and bring different tools - comparative advantage - to the task of
regulating. The Locke et al (2013) study extends beyond a single study case to
comparative analysis of regulatory developments at two electronics facilities located in
two different national settings - Mexico and the Czech Republic. Notwithstanding a set
of similarities across the two facilities and their integration in the transnational regulatory
effort of the same lead corporation, improvements came about through very divergent
pathways as private regulatory efforts interacted with domestic institutions. This study
illustrates the relevance of domestic political economy institutions for the implementation
of transnational corporate social responsibility initiatives.
Building on these efforts, my dissertation examines in a more systematic manner
the institutional conditions and mechanisms that enable and drive complementary
interactions across private corporate and public national regulation. Considering the local
institutional context in which public domestic and transnational corporate regulatory
efforts intersect with each other is important. Instead of treating national contexts as
generic constants of fragile states and ineffective trade unions, I take their complexities
into account through an analytical framework that factors in main divergences across
national institutions. Furthermore, instead of deeming transnational private governance as
panacea for labor standards throughout the world, or labeling as uniformly weak
instruments of regulation, I consider their variation in styles of implementation. The
following section sets theoretical guidelines on the institutional conditions for private-
24
public regulatory complementarities and presents a framework to guide empirical
analysis in subsequent chapters.
The Power of Public-Private Regulatory Complementarities: An Analytical
Framework
Public-private regulatory complementarities - or simply regulatory
complementarities - refer to interactions through which national regulation enhances the
effectiveness of transnational corporate regulation, and vice versa, enabling superior
labor regulation in transnational production regimes. This is in line with the definition of
complementarities that is most commonly used in the contemporary political economy
literature on institutions (Hall&Soskice, 2001). Shedding more light on regulatory
complementarities requires analytical guidelines to identify and evaluate synergistic
interactions across private and public regulation, and then to examine the institutional
conditions and processes that facilitate their emergence. This section therefore lays out an
institutional analytical framework for a more systematic understanding of
complementarities across transnational corporate governance and national public
regulatory efforts. The next section then proceeds with outlining the research design and
methodology to implement this analytical framework through empirical analysis of
regulatory developments in the electronics manufacturing sectors of three national
settings in Eastern Central Europe.
In this dissertation, I advance an institutional approach to understand the
emergence of regulatory complementarities that draws on key literatures from
comparative political economy and business studies. Considering the prominent view that
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complementary institutions are associated with positive performance in terms of both
economic and social outcomes, the concept have been approached by different bodies of
literature in the social sciences. Some of these streams of literature include the regulation
school (Jessop, 2002; Boyer, 2005); the development literature focusing on co-production
of regulation (Evans, 1996; Ostrom, 1996); global governance literature (Ostrom, 2010;
Reinicke, 2007; Benner et al, 2004). A particularly influential body of literature in the
realm of institutional studies in the social sciences in general, and in comparative political
economy in particular, is the varieties of capitalism literature (Hall and Sosckice in 2001;
Knell&Shrolek, 2005; Cernat, 2006; Feldmann, 2006; Hancke et al, 2007; Hall and
Gingerich, 2009; Schneider&Karcher, 2012; Bohle&Greskovits, 2012). The varieties of
capitalism literature provides a framework to consider and understand the institutional
similarities and differences across developed economies that are relevant for coordination
of firms with respect to industrial relations, employees, corporate governance, vocational
training and relations with other firms.
While the theoretical framework of my dissertation is informed by the varieties of
capitalism literature in terms of identifying different configurations of national labor
relations institutions that are relevant for the emergence of public-private regulatory
complementarities, it draws more directly on two other streams of literatures that grew
out as reactions to the varieties of capitalism literature. Recent efforts to adopt an
institutional approach towards studying corporate governance of corporations in
advanced political economies generated a whole series of studies that consider the
relevance of national institutional constellations for the extent and type of social
responsibility efforts of corporations (Brammer et al, 2012; Kang et al, 2012; Kinderman,
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2012). I draw on this literature to set up some initial guidelines regarding the conditions
that facilitate the emergence of complementarities across corporate responsibility
initiatives of transnational corporations with national institutional settings where they are
implemented. To analyze the gradual endogenous processes of change that drive the
regulatory complementarities when transnational corporate regulatory efforts are
implemented in various national settings, I rely on studies from comparative political
economy of gradual transformations undergoing in advanced capitalist societies. In
response to prevailing emphasis on institutional stability or discontinuous change, a series
of studies developed a theoretical framework that is suited to consider a whole variety
and complex types of gradual processes of change taking place in advanced political
economies (Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Levy, 2005; Thelen, 2004, 2002). In my efforts to
understand regulatory improvements and stagnation across various national settings and
electronics facilities from Eastern Europe, I build on this framework to tease out the
mechanisms underlying the emergence of regulatory complementarities in less advanced
political economies.
Considering the heavy focus on institutional conditions that enable gradual change
driving regulatory complementarities, a definition of institutions seems in order.
Institutions in this dissertation are understood in a relatively broad sense that includes
both formal and informal institutions that define the rules of the game (North, 1990). The
main focus is on labor relation institutions that provide an arena for strategic interactions
and reconciliation over conflicts regarding regulation of labor practices in national
contexts. While the formal aspects of political and economic institutions are similar
across transition economies from Eastern Central Europe, they often vary considerably in
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the manners in which they operate in practice (Schimmelfenning&Sedelmeier, 2004).
Tripartite institutions were established in most Eastern Central European countries but
operate very differently throughout the region (Avdagic, 2005). While sector level
industrial relation institutions are in place throughout the region, they are simply empty
shells in several countries (Meardi, 2007; Aguilera&Dabu, 2006). National laws
generally require unions to be free of political ties in most countries from Eastern Central
Europe, yet regular connections persist in different national contexts (Keil&Keil, 2002).
These differences will be teased out through a more historical approach towards the
effectiveness of labor unions to utilize these institutions to influence labor regulation and
practices within their national settings. The informal aspect of institutions does not,
however, extend to culture, customs and norms. While these dimensions also exert
influence on both labor practices and compliance with formal institutions, they do not
represent the main focus of this dissertation.
1. Varieties of national labor relation institutions
The distinctions across labor relation institutions are informed by the varieties of
capitalism literature. This literature provides a framework to understand institutional
similarities and differences across political economies by reference to the dominant
mechanisms of coordination that firms rely on (Hall&Soskice, 2001). The literature
initially focused on advanced political economies and identified only two main forms of
coordination: market and strategic interactions. This distinction resulted in a typology of
liberal and coordinated market economies. This framework was soon extended to include
other parts of the world including Eastern Europe (Knell&Shrolec, 2005; Cernat, 2006;
Feldmann, 2006; Nolke&Vliegenthart, 2009; Bohle&Greskovits, 2012), Latin America
28
(Schneider&Karcher, 2010) and Asia (Amable, 2003); and identified additional types of
coordination mechanisms (Levy, 2005; Schneider, 2009; Nolke&Vliegenthart, 2009).
Notwithstanding the more extensive focus of this expanding body of literature on
several institutional dimensions3, in this thesis I focus primarily on typologies of labor
relation institutions due to a variety of reasons. Firstly, the focus of this thesis on labor
regulation and social protection of workers calls for a reevaluation of the relevant
institutional dimensions. Secondly, considering that labor represents an important source
of comparative advantage that often drives integration of emerging nations into the global
economy, it makes more sense to bring employees and their institutions to the foreground
of analysis. Thirdly, variations across labor relation institutions represent core dimensions
that differentiate emerging economies among themselves. The main variations considered
in MhiS dIssEtaU11 LIeIore focus on natio 1a politiCa1 and Coom ic i .titutIos that
provide platforms of interactions across workers' organizations, employers' associations
and the state. Labor relations institutions, including tripartite institutions, industrial
relations and political connections across unions and political agents, are essential
platforms of coordination regarding labor policies and practices within a national setting.
The typology that is particularly adequate to consider variations across labor
relation institutions includes: market oriented, coordinated, and state directed national
institutions. This classification is based on the extent and type of coordination
mechanisms across governments, employee and employer' representatives. The
institutional dimensions of particular interest include tripartite institutions that serve as
3 These generally included inter-firm relations, employee relations, corporate governance, industrial
relations, education and vocational training institutions (Hall&Soskice, 2001).
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primary coordination platforms across state and social stakeholders regarding public
policies and institutions; industrial relations institutions that provide arenas for strategic
interactions across employers' associations and labor organizations; and political
affiliations across workers' organizations and state to influence labor policies and their
implementation. This typology includes ideal types that do not fit any national context
perfectly but simply identifies some dominant features. Moreover, these categories are
not perfectly exhaustive, they serve as starting points to simplify to some extent the
complexity we find across national labor relations institutions around the world.
Market oriented labor relations institutions in this dissertation refer to
constellations of institutions with weak coordination and decentralized relations across
governmental agencies, employers' and employees' organizations. Tripartite institutions
are generally weak arenas of coordination across state and social stakeholders. Industrial
relations are fragmented and decentralized. Political connections across governments and
unions are generally seen as divergent from market friendly institutions. State directed
labor relations institutions refer to national labor relations that are centralized through the
important role of the government but not coherently coordinated with social stakeholders.
Tripartite institutions are generally dominated by the state and enable only weak
coordination with social stakeholders. Industrial relations are centralized and
characterized by regular state interferences. Connections across state and labor unions
through political affiliations and clientelistic ties are generally common. Finally,
coordinated institutions of labor relations, are associated with strong coordination across
government and social stakeholders. Tripartite institutions are strong and enable
negotiation and bargaining across state and social stakeholders, with binding outcomes.
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Industrial relations institutions are also generally strong at both national and sector levels,
and integrated with political coordination institutions. Political connections across
employee and state representatives, to the extent they exist, consist mainly in transparent
and formal affiliations across unions and social democratic parties. The main
characteristics of these three types of institutional constellations are summarized on table
1.1.
Table nr. 1.1.: National Labor Relations Institutions
Market oriented State directed Coordinated labor
labor relation labor relations relations institutions
institutions institutions
Main features Uncoordinated, Uncoordinated, Coordinated,
(extensiveness of decentralized centralized centralized
coordination)
Main mechanism of Market State Strategic interactions
coordination
Tripartite Institutions Weak Weak Strong
Industrial relations Decentralized and Centralized and Coordinated across
institutions uncoordinated uncoordinated different levels
Political connections Weak Strong Strong
across government
and employee
representatives
These institutional dimensions of labor relation systems are to some extent
connected together through a common logic of coordination that is often consciously
pursued through a national development strategy. Within the context of market oriented
labor relations institutions, for example, weak tripartite and industrial relations
institutions are connected through a strong emphasis on adopting market friendly
institutions and rules. In the case of state directed labor relation institutions, state
interference connects weak tripartite institutions where non-governmental stakeholders
are often disregarded, and strong industrial relations institutions where the state
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participates as a bargaining partner or interferes with the negotiations across employers
and employee representatives. Weak tripartite institutions can coexist along both strong
and weak industrial relations institutions because their origins and evolutions often have
different historical backgrounds and were connected to different political contestations.
The focus of the analysis of institutional complementarities is, however, not on perfecting
this typology of labor relation institutions, but rather on understanding interactions that
emerge across transnational regulatory initiatives and domestic regulation within these
national contexts of labor relation institutions.
2. Regulatory complementarities in different types of national institutional
contexts
In this section I suggest that regulatory complementarities are more common in
the context of market oriented national labor relations institutions as they provide
favorable conditions for private corporate and public national regulatory approaches to
counterbalance their individual deficiencies. This is contrary to common understandings
shared by major approaches in comparative political economy and business studies that
institutional complementarities are the result of a mechanism of reinforcement or
coherence across principles of coordination or accumulation underlying various
institutional dimensions (Hall&Soskice, 2001; Amable, 2003; Boyer, 2005). Labor
relations and corporate governance institutions are, for example, considered
complementary with each other when they reinforce similar type of coordination in the
economy. More extensive coordination across labor unions and employers representatives
in labor relation institutions reinforces stable relations of firms with unions and investors
entailed by stakeholder oriented corporate governance institutions, and the other way
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around. Trough the mutual re-enforcements of the same type of relations in key market
dimensions, these two types of institutions increase each other's effectiveness and
contribute to the coherence and stability of a system (Hall&Gingerich, 2009; Campbell,
2011).
Institutional studies of social responsibility efforts of corporations broadened the
spectrum of possible mechanisms driving complementarities but the emphasis on
reinforcement or mirroring nonetheless persisted (Brammer et al, 2012; Koos, 2012;
Campbell, 2007; 2012; Kinderman, 2012). Several studies pointed out that although
historically corporate social responsibility emerged through the defeat of more
insitutionalized forms of social solidarity in market oriented economies (Kinderman,
2012), over time, it became more tightly linked to formal institutions of stakeholder
participations or state intervention in advanced economies (Kang&Moon, 2012; Brammer
et al, 2012). A study by Kang and Moon (2012), for example that explores the affinity of
corporate social responsibility with liberal, coordinated and state-directed types of
capitalist market economies, suggests that more corporatist or state-centered forms of
social solidarity have a strong influence on the extent of and forms of corporate social
responsibility (Kang&Moon, 2012).
While most of these studies focus on social responsibility initiatives of
corporations in the domestic contexts of advanced political economies, this thesis shifts
attention to emerging markets and complementarities across transnational and national
institutions. In the context of fragmentation and global integration of production,
whereby emerging economies have become integrated into the production regimes of
major corporations from advanced economies, transnational corporate governance efforts
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are increasingly relevant for social and economic outcomes in less advanced political
economies. Governments of developing and transition economies often times forgo hard
laws and other coercive institutions in favor of a "market friendly environment" for
international investments and export activities (Frynas, 2005; Banerjee, 2009).
Notwithstanding these deficiencies in the rule of law and implementation of domestic
regulation in many emerging economies, transnational corporate regulatory approaches
do not compensate automatically for failures of domestic institutions to regulate working
conditions and employment relations effectively. Transnational regulatory institutions on
their end lack the necessary will, legitimacy, information and/or local expertise to
safeguard workers in emerging economies. Compensation across the deficiencies of
private and public regulatory initiatives, therefore, has to be built to enable regulatory
complementarities and generate improvements in labor regulation.
The initiatives and possibilities to construct regulatory complementarities through
balancing out the deficiencies of regulatory initiatives, are generally stronger in market
oriented national institutional settings, somewhat weaker in state directed national
settings and almost completely absent in the context of coordinated national labor
relations institutions. The next paragraphs provide an institutional framework to analyze
the emergence of processes driving the regulatory complementarities across national
settings.
3. Processes of regulatory complementarities as gradual transformations
Complementary interactions across private transnational and public national
regulation are understood as gradual transformations to counterbalance trends of
liberalization in less advanced societies that are integrated into transnational production
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regimes. The main mechanism driving the emergence of regulatory complementarities
consists in the efforts of various actors embedded in private and/or public regulatory
frameworks to balance weaknesses in enforcement power and/or legitimacy of individual
systems of regulation. Alternative regulatory institutions that are poorly enacted on their
own, are sometimes redirected and interweaved by various sets of actors when deployed
jointly within a particular setting. These conversions in the actual enactments of
regulatory approaches that differ slightly from their formal design and initially intended
functionality are similar to the conversion mechanism identified by Streeck and Thelen
(2005) as one of the main modes of gradual institutional transformations in advanced
political economies . As dominant contemporary comparative institutional approaches -
the literatures on varieties of welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1990) and capitalist
systems (Hall&Soskice, 2001), seemed ill-equipped to capture significant changes
towards liberalization taking place within advanced industrialized economies, a series of
studies shifted their attention towards institutional change (Streeck&Thelen, 2005;
Thelen, 2004, 2002). In contrast with abrupt and punctuated institutional changes that are
more commonly explored in the political economy literature (Pierson, 2000), this new
approach emphasizes mostly small, gradual and endogenous changes that can be very
transformative in nature.
Both advanced industrialized and emerging economies have experienced a series
of transformations in the neoliberal direction over the last decades (Bohle&Greskovits,
2006; Hancke, 2007). However, as the famous economic historian Karl Polanyi pointed
out, liberalization always sets in motion countermeasures taken by society against the
4 In "Beyond Continuity", Streeck and Thelen identify five broad modes of gradual transformative change
that capture a white set of complex developments emerging in advanced political economies. These include
displacement, layering, drift, conversion, and exhaustion (Streeck and Thelen, 2005).
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destructive effects of free and expanding markets (Polanyi, 1945). My analysis of gradual
and experimental efforts to build a counter-movement through regulatory
complementarities therefore draws on the analytical framework developed by the
literature examining gradual and incremental change emerging in advanced political
economies. Of particular interest is the mechanism of conversion defined and understood
by Streeck and Thelen (2005) as the mode of change through which institutions are
redirected to new goals, functions or purposes as a result of new environmental
challenges.
Within the framework of the thesis, however, the mechanism of conversion is
slightly reinterpreted as it refers mostly to redeployment of institutions not necessarily
towards new goals or purposes, but rather towards new actors and enactment processes
than what they were initially designed and intended for. As individual regulatory
frameworks are generally deficient along dimensions such as clarity, legitimacy, will to
implement, capacity to implement, etc, alternative regulatory institutions can then be used
as instruments to compensate for institutional failures. These compensation efforts
however are often contingent on redirection of alternative regulatory institutions from
their initial intent or form of implementation.
I argue that national labor institutions play an important role in the instrumental
conversion and building of regulatory complementarities. Labor relation institutions are
relevant in two important ways. Firstly, they shape the incentives for local actors
involved in national regulation, particularly workers' representatives and governments, to
engage with transnational private regulation to address labor concerns. When local actors
are constrained to engage through traditional institutional channels - tripartite, industrial
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relations and political connections, to influence labor policies and practices, they are
more likely to use and redirect alternative institutions to promote their particular interests
related to labor regulation. This implies that regulatory complementarities will be
targeted towards areas of particular concern for domestic actors and political contestation
among them. Secondly, national labor relation institutions also have implications on the
ability of corporate agents of social responsibility to rely on national institutions through
their implementation process. The type of inclusion of trade unions in tripartite
institutions and industrial relations institutions has implications on the content, legitimacy
and coherence of domestic regulation that can then be redirected towards legitimizing
claims and pressures of private regulators to address prevalent labor concerns within the
national economy.
Considering the strategic efforts of domestic and transnational actors to connect
alternative frameworks to compensate for institutional failures that are political in nature,
these processes of change and interaction come relatively close to the conception of
institutional complementarities as political processes (Schneider&Karcher, 2010).
Moreover, political contestation regarding the regulation of particular areas of
employment practices to balance security and flexibility within the national context is
also of particular import as it defines the main focus of the strategic efforts of public and
private actors to build complementarities. This is often contingent on the economic and
political institutions in place during key phases of integration into global production
regimes. In summary, complementarities within this framework are political in three
senses. Firstly, state institutions set the incentives for strategic efforts to build
complementarities by domestic actors. Secondly, state institutions intermediate the ability
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of transnational agents to build complementarities. Thirdly, the historical political context
defines the focus of these efforts.
Finally, variations across transnational regulatory initiatives also have some
implications on the emergence of regulatory complementarities across different national
settings of labor relation institutions, although to a more limited degree. Stakeholder
engagement and compliance oriented transnational corporate approaches present different
opportunities for domestic and transnational actors to use them as enforcement
instruments of state and corporate regulation. This distinction has become particularly
important with respect to the implementation of transnational initiatives. Business
directed transnational private governance efforts rely more extensively on monitoring and
enforcement by private auditors and are therefore sometimes referred to as compliance
oriented regulatory initiatives. Engagement oriented private governance efforts, on other
hand, are more committed to inclusion of local stakeholders to oversee and facilitate the
implementation of their programs. To some extent, these differences have been
associated with the type of integration in global supply chains and the nationality of the
lead corporations (Wilkinson&Hughes, 2008).
Both modes of implementation have the potential to bring about public-private
regulatory complementarities, but to a different degree and through different processes.
Engagement oriented governance institutions can be accessed more easily and redirected
in their use to strengthen local demands to address particular labor concerns. Compliance
oriented governance institutions, on other hand, can more easily compensate for
deficiencies in the administrative power or political will of national governments and
become instruments of enforcement. The style of implementation of private governance
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institutions generally enhances or undermines the primary effect of the national
institutions on the extent of private-public regulatory complementarities. In this sense, the
differential effect of engagement oriented transnational regulatory initiatives related to
more monitoring oriented approaches, will be much greater in market oriented than in
coordinated institutional contexts.
4. Research hypotheses
The analytical framework I developed in the previous sections suggests that
national labor relation institutions influence the extent and mechanisms of regulatory
complementarities. In this section, I advance specific hypotheses concerning the causal
pathways and extents of regulatory complementarities in different institutional contexts.
Hypothesis 1: I argue that private-public regulatory complementarities will be
most extensive when private transnational regulations are implemented in market
oriented labor relations systems. Within these contexts, labor relations institutions
provide some consistency and legitimacy to state regulation but their strength to influence
national regulation is undermined by a strong emphasis in national regulatory politics on
market objectives. Market oriented labor relation institutions, however, set incentives for
domestic actors to use transnational private regulatory approaches as alternative
institutional platforms to strengthen regulation of working conditions and employment
relations. Moreover, market oriented institutions also shape the abilities of workers'
organizations and private auditors to use domestic regulation to compensate for the
regulatory deficiencies of private institutions.
Hypothesis 2: Complementary interactions across private and public regulatory
initiatives are more limited when transnational corporate transnational governance
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approaches are implemented in state directed labor relations systems. Regulatory
complementarities emerge mostly when inconsistencies of state and collective
frameworks set incentives for domestic actors to promote labor regulation through using
private corporate social responsibility programs. However, state directed institutional
contexts often fail to provide legitimacy and consistency to national public regulation and
undermine the ability of domestic regulation to enhance the combined effectiveness of
public and private regulation.
Hypothesis 3: Public-private, national-transnational regulatory complementarities
are limited in the contexts of strongly institutionalized state-society interactions,
characteristic to coordinated labor relations systems. Within these national settings,
tripartite institutions, political affiliations between unions and national governments, and
industrial bargaining, remain the main institutional platforms to promote better working
conditions and employment relations for workers. Incentives for domestic actors to use
alternative institutional platforms are limited. Implementation of corporate driven
transnational efforts to regulate working conditions and employment relations are also
more challenging in context of densely institutionalized coordination across employers
and labor unions.
Additionally to the primary influence of national labor relation institutions, the
method of implementation of transnational corporate governance initiatives can further
enhance (or undermine) the extent of regulatory complementarities in the different
national settings.
Hypothesis a: Transnational corporate regulatory initiatives that rely more
extensively on engagement with local stakeholder will further enhance the extent of
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regulatory complementarities, relative to compliance or business driven private
regulatory approaches. Complementarities are enhanced when the lack of coordination
across state, employers and unions in the domestic context, is counterbalanced by
coordination across lead corporations and local unions through stakeholder engagement
oriented corporate governance structure.
Hypothesis b: The differential effect of engagement oriented transnational
governance institutions relative to the monitoring oriented ones is also more extensive in
market oriented labor relations institutions, than in state directed or coordinated contexts.
5. Evaluating the extent of public-private regulatory complementarities
In order to identify and evaluate different levels of regulatory complementarities I
use a set of criteria that relate to both the outcomes and processes of regulatory
developments. The process related criteria entails that both private transnational and
public national regulatory approaches play some type of clearly identifiable role in the
specific change in working conditions and employment relations. The combined
participation of both private and public regulation is inherent to the definition of
regulatory complementarities. The process criteria is therefore necessary condition for a
regulatory development to be identified as regulatory complementarity. The clearly
identifiable roles of individual regulatory approaches can include: providing legitimacy to
the direction of change, providing expertise on how to achieve a change, generating
pressure and imposing sanctions, etc. Moreover, it can be presumed with relatively high
certainty that in the absence of a specific element, the particular development would have
been difficult to achieve. In the absence of clear counterfactuals, this last aspect is
evaluated based on familiarity with circumstances and by examining the process
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underlying a specific change.
One way to evaluate the level of regulatory interactions is to use an ordinal scale of
low to significant levels of regulatory complementarities that considers the scope and
distinctive character of regulatory developments that result from the interactions across
private and public regulatory approaches. Labor regulation can generally take four forms
(Botero et al, 2004): endows workers with some minimal rights and reduces
discrimination; sets limits on the employment contract with respect to its form, costs of
termination, extensiveness of working hours; empowers unions and protect their
activities; and/or provides insurance and protection for vulnerable groups such as the
unemployed, seniors, the sick. I consider regulatory developments that include more than
one of these forms of regulation to be more extensive relative to regulatory developments
limited to only one of these possible outcomes. For example, a regulatory development
that entails reduced discrimination against a particularly vulnerable group of people
through their empowerment by representation is generally valued more than reducing
discrimination without any influence on their collective representation. The other
outcome criterion entails the distinctiveness of the change that was produced relative to
the general trend or to other similar cases. For example, an improvement in
representation of agency workers is valued all the more if that does not generally take
place in a specific national context. These criteria are then used in an evaluation scheme
of regulatory complementarity that is presented in Table 1.2.
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Table nr. 1.2. Evaluating the extent of public-private regulatory complementarity
Criterion Outcome
Significant regulatory The scope of the outcome entails more than
complementarity two forms of regulation
- The outcome is relatively distinctive relative
to the national trend
Limited regulatory * The scope of outcome entails at least two
complementarity forms of regulation
0 The outcome is relatively distinctive related
to other similar cases
Low regulatory * The scope of outcome entails at least one
complementarity form of regulation
- The outcome is pretty general
Note: These evaluations are based on the necessary condition that both private and public regulatory
approaches play a role in bringing about change.
This evaluation method has two important advantages. Firstly, it allows me to
consider working conditions that are generally impossible to quantify, such as
discrimination across different groups of workers, inclusion of workers in decision
making processes, etc. Secondly, it allows comparisons across different sets of issues.
The latter is particularly useful as the focus of the study is on regulatory improvements
for three different forms of employment flexibility practices, including reliance on
temporary workers, collective redundancies, and working time. These represent areas of
particular concern in global production networks in general (Gereffi et al, 2005;
Barrientos, 2008; Baranowska, 2008), including electronics manufacturing in Eastern
Europe (Goodelectronics, 2009; makeITfair, 2009; Bormann, 2010). However,
international trends are not translated into the same forms of employment flexibility in all
national economies but are mediated through national institutional arrangements and
refracted into divergent struggles over particular practices (Locke&Thelen, 1995). Global
market pressures to engage in volatile manufacturing at relatively high quality and low
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cost translated into different types of labor arrangements as they were mediated through
the larger configuration of political economy institutions. The development paths and
enabling institutions adopted by different emerging political economies are therefore
essential in translating the influences of integration in global production networks into
different employment arrangements to balance between flexibility and security in the
national economy.
Research Design and Methodology
1. Electronics manufacturing in Hungary, Romania and Slovenia
This dissertation draws on extensive field research conducted in three Eastern
Central European countries - Hungary, Romania and Slovenia - on the regulation of
working conditions and employment relations in the electronics manufacturing sector.
Manufacturing of electronics products thrives on flexible and cheap workforce so that
these items and associated services would be quickly accessible and economically
affordable for consumers. As a result, most of manufacturing activities shifted to
emerging markets that provide relatively cheap and flexible labor in different parts of the
world, and are in the proximity of major end-markets. Manufacturing workers from
Eastern Central Europe and other regions are exposed to strong pressures to produce at
great speed, at low cost and with great flexibility, often resulting in exploitative working
conditions and employment relations practices around the world (Bormann&Plank, 2010,
GoodElectronics, 2009; makeITfair, 2009; Smith et al, 2006).
Eastern Central Europe has become increasingly integrated in the global
electronics industry since the mid 1990s and today it represents one of the main
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manufacturing regions, along with Latin America and Southeast Asia (Bormann&Plank,
2010; Luthje&Sproll, 2004, 2002; Rojec&Jaklic, 2002; Radosevic, 2002).
Notwithstanding differences in the industrial development strategies and institutional
configurations set up by national governments from Eastern Europe during the first
transition decade, most countries eventually became highly integrated in the global
electronics industry by the end of the 2000s. By 2010, for example, electronics
manufacturing and associated services represented a significant share of total
manufacturing in all three countries included in the study, representing approximately 32
percent of total manufacturing in Hungary, 15 percent in Romania, and 19 percent in
Slovenias. By the second part of the 2000s, manufacturing sites of leading brand
companies such as Nokia, Bosch or Hewlett Packard, and electronics manufacturing
corporations, such as Foxconn, Jabil or Flextronics, employed several thousands of
workers at different sites located in Hungary, Romania and Slovenia, with important
implications on working conditions and employer relations in these countries.
Industry pressures to manufacture with great flexibility and at relatively low cost
resulted in precarious employment practices in all three countries by the mid 2000s. In
Hungary, electronics manufacturing facilities relied on the extensive use of temporary
agency employees, sometimes representing as high as 50 percent of the total workforce.
Compensation for contracted employees was generally 20 percent lower than for standard
employees. Most of these workers remained employed on temporary basis even after
several years of service at the same facility. In Romania, electronics facilities fired large
groups of workers on regular basis to meet fluctuations in the volume of production.
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5 Please see Table IA in the Appendix.
Dismissed workers were sometimes not compensated properly, or were replaced by
temporary employees soon after getting fired. In Slovenia, flexible working time
arrangements such as overtime and weekend work became common, along with an
increasing share of temporary employees. Temporary employees were often underpaid
and faced high levels of job insecurity.
These differences in the exact forms of manifestation of precarious flexible
employment practices in the three national settings pertain to a great extent to the
different institutional conditions during integration in the global electronics industry.
Labor relations institutions of Hungary throughout the first two decades of transition
corresponded relatively well to the ideal market oriented type. Hungary liberalized its
foreign trade and opened up to foreign investment early on in its transition process to
actively promote its foreign capital and market oriented development strategy. Its reforms
of political and economic institutions during the 1990s were guided by a strong emphasis
on developing a market friendly environment for foreign investors. By the mid 2000s, the
tripartite forum in Hungary had become a weak institutional platform with no real
negotiations across the state and social stakeholders. Density of trade unions had also
declined considerably over the years resulting in one of the lowest representation rates in
Eastern Central Europe in the late 2000s. Industrial relations system had become more
fragmented and decentralized. Connections across political parties and labor unions had
declined over the years and ceased altogether in 2006.
Labor relations institutions of Romania, on other hand, resembled more closely
the main features of state directed institutions. Strong interference by the state in the
economy, political uncertainty and incoherent policies in Romania, had acted as
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deterrents of foreign capital for years after the collapse of socialism in the region.
Romania emerged as a major attraction for investments in the electronic industry only
later in the 2000s after its accession to the European Union. The Romanian state
dominated tripartite institutions and had a strong presence in national level industrial
bargaining that unified public and private negotiations. Coordination across national and
company level industrial relations, the two dominant levels of collective bargaining, was
relatively low. Clientelistic connections across government officials and unions have
declined over the decades, but are still relatively stronger than in most countries from the
region.
Finally, Slovenia had promoted its domestic industrial capabilities during the first
transition decade and opened up to foreign direct investments only later on. Its national
institutions continued to emphasize the inclusion of labor in political and economic
decision making to support its own industrial capabilities. The coordinated labor relation
institutions persisted even beyond greater integration into global production regimes
during the early 2000s. The main tripartite institution of Slovenia is still one of the
strongest in the region and relies on extensive coordination across the state and social
stakeholders. Coordination across national tripartite negotiations, industry and company
level industrial relations are relatively strong. While labor relations institutions from
these three countries do not represent an ideal type, they are relatively close to these
models.
2. Research methodology
Within this empirical context of structural similarity and institutional
heterogeneity in three Eastern Central European economies, I use a set of contextualized
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case comparisons of electronics facilities as the main research methodology to shed light
on the conditions and processes driving regulatory complementarities. Contextualized
case comparisons combine the principles of contextual analysis and of comparative case
studies to investigate the interactions across national and industry level institutions, as
well as micro-level processes emerging at their intersection (Almond et al, 2008; Ferner
et al, 2005; Ferner, 2001). Contextualized case studies fit well the national institutional
framework of the study and are appropriate for analysis at multiple levels of
embeddedness of electronics manufacturing plants that operate within a specific national
context and manufacture for major multinational corporations from abroad.
The comparative aspect of contextualized case comparisons includes both within
and across country comparisons of regulatory developments at the facility levels. After an
analysis of national labor relation institutions, I conduct detailed case studies of
regulatory processes and developments at two electronics facilities in each national
setting. Comparisons are then drawn across the two facilities on how developments relate
to national labor relation institutions. The within country analysis is then complemented
with cross-national comparisons of the extent and processes of regulatory
complementarities in the three national contexts. The main focus here is on identifying
major similarities and differences in the interactions and institutional preconditions across
the three contexts.
The six facilities included in the study were selected based on a set of criteria that
is appropriate for within and across case comparisons. These facilities are similar with
each other in size, production profile, technical capabilities, export orientation of their
activities, and foreign ownership of the facilities. In addition to the principle of
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similarities, the selection of the facilities was also based on differences in the regulatory
institutions they are integrated into. In each national setting the two facilities were
selected based on differences in the transnational corporate social responsibility
institutions they are included into, with one facility integrated into a stakeholder
engagement and the other governed by a compliance oriented corporate approach.
Finally, to the extent that it was possible, the two different transnational private
regulatory approaches were held constant across the three national settings. The
electronics facilities from Hungary and Romania manufacture for the same lead
corporations, Corporation Electronics 1 with stakeholder engagement oriented
transnational regulatory approach, and Corporation Electronics 2 with compliance
oriented social responsibility efforts. In the Slovenian context, however, the two facilities
included in the study supply for two other lead corporations, Corporation Electronics 3
and 4. The transnational regulatory approach of Corporation 3 and 4 are, however, similar
in style of implementation to the corporate social responsibility programs of Corporation
Electronics 1 and 2, respectively. All four corporations are affiliated with the Electronics
Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC), a coalition of the world's leading electronics
companies working together to improve social, ethical and environmental responsibility
in the global industry. While Corporations 1 and 3 put greater emphasis on involvement
of local stakeholders, Corporations 2 and 4 rely mostly on auditing and compliance to
promote corporate social responsibility throughout their manufacturing sites from Eastern
Central Europe. A list of the cases can be seen on Table nr.1.3.
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Table nr 1.3. List of empirical cases
Country Lead corporation Code of facility
Hungary Corporation Electronics 1 Facility HEl
Hungary Corporation Electronics 2 Facility HE2
Romania Corporation Electronics 1 Facility RE 1
Romania Corporation Electronics 2 Facility RE2
Slovenia Corporation Electronics 3 Facility SEl
Slovenia Corporation Electronics 4 Facility SE2
The extent of regulatory complementarities at each facility is evaluated according
to the methodology described under the analytical framework. The issue areas that I pay
particular attention to in order to analyze and evaluate the institutional complementarities
within each context focus on: temporary agency employment in Hungary, collective
dismissals in Romania, flexible working time and temporary employment in Slovenia.
These practices are common throughout the global electronics industry but their
manifestation differs based on the national context where manufacturing is located. The
focus on different types of practices in the three national settings is consistent with a
common approach in comparative political economy that emphasizes the different
manifestations of similar challenges in divergent institutional contexts (Locke&Thelen,
1995). To shed more light on these cross-national differences in prevalent labor concerns
across Hungary, Romania and Slovenia, the facility level developments are
contextualized in their macro national settings and connected to the broader economic
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and institutional foundations of fostering competitiveness in the global economy through
labor regulation.
3. Data
The data I use to identify the extent and processes of regulatory
complementarities at each facility draws mainly on a diversity of primary and secondary
data collected over 3 years of field research conducted in Eastern Central Europe. During
this time period, ranging from the summer of 2009 until the fall of 2012, I visited a
significant share of the electronic suppliers that operate in the three national contexts and
visited several times the electronics facilities included in the study.
For the macro level analysis that was used to contextualize the micro level
developments, I relied on relevant scholarly literature on each of these institutions within
the national contexts included in the study; on secondary reports on working conditions,
labor statistics; publications of governmental and non-governmental organizations
focused on labor institutions and labor data; as well as on extensive review of media
reports. The secondary data obtained from these sources was then complemented by first-
hand interviews with representatives of labor unions at national, sector and local levels;
labor inspectorates; regional employment offices; state agencies responsible for the
promotion of foreign direct investment; governmental officials from the ministries of
labor and social affairs. For meso level data, I relied on initial interviews with members
of the Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC), corporate social responsibility
reports by large brand companies and media organizations, and interviews with
representatives of the electronics facilities within each national context. Drawing on this
data I was able to map out the type of transnational governance institutions facilities from
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each national context were integrated into during the second half of the 2000s when most
lead corporations deployed their private regulatory approaches. This national and meso
level data was then juxtaposed with detailed micro-level data that originated from facility
visits and interviews.
During the facility visits, I explored practices on factory floor and interviewed
representatives of production, quality and human resources management based on semi-
structured interviews. I also interviewed representatives of union organizations and
members of the working community based on both semi-structured interviews and
informal conversations. Factory employees, in particular, were interviewed through
informal conversations during lunchtime or shift change in cafeterias and bus station,
respectively. Most of these questions and conversations focused on understanding
working conditions at the facility over the course of the 2005-2011 time period,
experiences with state and corporate regulation, the role and strategies of unions towards
addressing major labor concerns, their interactions with lead corporations and state
agencies. Whenever possible, interview data was complemented by audit reports by
private inspectors. These data enabled not only within and across country case
comparisons at the facility level but some process tracing of regulatory interactions from
mid 2000s when transnational corporate governance initiatives were rolled out to most
suppliers in the Eastern European region until the late 2000s.
Dissertation Overview
The main argument formulated in this thesis is that implementation of
transnational corporate efforts to address labor concerns throughout the global electronics
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industry interact with domestic regulation and bring about mixed results regarding the
regulation of precarious working conditions and employment relations. The underlying
source of these differences bears on variations across labor relation institutions that
influence the onset and extent of regulatory complementarities driving improvements.
This dissertation uses variations in national institutions and private regulatory institutions
that electronics manufacturing facilities from Hungary, Romania and Slovenia were
integrated into during the second half of the 2000s to shed more light on these processes.
These Eastern Central European nations were highly dependent on foreign direct
investments and global production networks in general, in the electronics industry in
particular, but nonetheless had very different institutional configurations.
The similarities and differences across national labor relation institutions in the
three Eastern Central European countries are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. The
historical perspective that considers main changes in these institutions since the early
transition years is consistent with an approach towards cross-national institutional
comparisons that extend beyond comparing institutions merely in their formal and static
manifestations. This emphasis on the functional aspects over time of labor relation
institutions is particularly important in national settings of less advanced societies where
formal characteristics and implementation of institutions often diverge.
The remainder of this thesis is organized around the empirical cases of country
contexts in which regulatory interactions at the facility levels are considered. Chapter 3
examines the emergence of private-public regulatory complementarities in the Hungarian
context with weakly coordinated and decentralized labor relation institutions. Increasing
reliance of the Hungarian economy on the off-shoring and outsourcing manufacturing
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activities of major corporations from several industries generated considerable pressure
for neoliberal reforms of national labor regulation. Notwithstanding the weak regulatory
framework regarding temporary agency employment and the precarious working
conditions provided in practice for these employees, the case studies of two major
electronics factories from the country illustrate that regulatory improvements are
generated by complementary interactions across private transnational and national
domestic regulation. While temporary agency employees were significantly underpaid
and unrepresented by unions in the mid 2000s at both facilities, the implementation of the
transnational corporate responsibility programs of the lead companies they supply for
brought about significant improvements. At the first factory, referred to as Hungary
Electronics 1, improvements included increases in compensation, the inclusion of
temporary agency workers in collective representation and bargaining at the facility, and
a commitment to transfer contracted employees into the stock of direct employees. At the
second factory, factory Hungary Electronics 2, there was also significant improvement in
the compensation of employees but no improvements in the representation or
employment contracts of these workers.
These improvements at the facilities operating in Hungary were the result of the
labor unions' and private auditors' efforts to interweave private and public regulation in
strategic manners to counterbalance their individual deficiencies. The weak inclusion of
labor unions in domestic political and economic decision making regarding labor
regulation at the national level, set incentives for the local union to rely on the
transnational corporate regulatory initiatives as an enforcement mechanism at the first
factory. Private auditors also relied on the national labor legislation to legitimize their
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demands and increase pressure regarding improving working conditions among
temporary agency workers at the second facility. These differences in the processes
driving significant regulatory complementarities in the Hungarian context were due
largely to the different implementation strategies of the lead corporations the two
facilities manufacture for.
In the case of Romania, the focus of Chapter 4, I show that private-public
regulatory synergies were undermined by inconsistencies of domestic institutions of labor
regulation. As restructurings of the public sector and redrawal of the state from the
economy was still ongoing in the 2000s in Romania, collective redundancies and the
arbitrary regulatory arrangements regarding the compensation of collective workers
became prominent also in the growing export oriented manufacturing sector in need for
more labor flexibility. Local managers and unions often used different interpretations of
the laws and relied on interferences by the state to legitimize their practices and demands.
State directed labor relation institutions with ad hoc interferences by the state set
incentives for domestic unions to use transnational regulatory initiatives to limit
exploitative practices at the local sites. These efforts generated more significant results at
the facility that was integrated in more stakeholder engagement oriented transnational
governance efforts, than at the site governed by compliance oriented transnational
approaches. Improvements at the latter were more limited as facility level efforts to build
regulatory complementarities were undermined by the ambiguities and inconsistencies of
domestic formal institutions.
In contrast with these politically complex and conflictual processes of building
private-public complementarities in the national contexts of Hungary and Romania, such
55
developments were relatively absent in the case of Slovenia where trade unions had
traditionally used coordination at the sector and national levels to represent workers'
interests and address labor concerns. The dedication of these broad institutions to
promote social solidarity and responsibility, although challenged over the last few years,
still provided the foundation to address labor concerns in the export oriented and foreign
owned sectors of the economy. While there have been some attempts to use private
initiatives to improve domestic labor regulation at the central level, there was almost no
mobilization at the micro level. The dense coordination across company level unions with
sector and national level unions restricted company level experimentation with alternative
regulatory approaches. It also facilitated the inclusion of local concerns with precarious
conditions into a political strategy at the national level. At the national level, initial
efforts to consider the potential use of corporate social responsibility efforts were limited
by different interpretations of the concept by unions, employers' associations and the
state.
Chapter 6, highlights the contrasts and similarities across the main results
emerging from the analysis within each national context, and complements it with
comparisons across the facilities located in different national contexts but integrated in
the same style of private transnational governance systems. This section then underlies
the main theoretical contributions of the study and considers its practical implications for
a broader set of developing countries. The chapter concludes with a summary of the key
arguments and a brief consideration of the main limitations of the study.
This study makes four important contributions. First, by exploring the
complementarities across national and transnational institutions, I hope to refine our
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understanding of the main mechanisms and processes driving institutional
complementarities, a fundamental preoccupation of contemporary comparative political
economy literature. Second, scholars working on the governance of labor and
environmental practices in global industries have begun to explore the relevance and role
of local institutions. This study builds on these efforts by providing an analytical
framework to understand which institutions might be relevant for their effectiveness and
in what ways. Third, this thesis contributes to our understanding of the influence of
transnational institutions on national labor institutions and politics, especially in
emerging markets that are becoming increasingly integrated in global industries. Last but
not least, by showing the benefits of stakeholder engagement approaches of transnational
governance institutions, I seek to help policy makers at both public and private
organizations devise institutions that are more conducive to social sustainability.
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Chapter 2:
Labor Relations in Eastern Central Europe:
Institutional Similarities and Differences
The importance of globally integrated manufacturing sectors in most Central
Eastern European countries along with their institutional diversity, make this region a
productive and fascinating empirical setting to study the institutional conditions of
regulatory complementarities in a theoretically systematic and empirically compelling
manner. Since the collapse of state socialism in 1989, most Eastern Central European
countries have grown increasingly dependent on transnational production regimes
through the inflow of foreign direct investments in export oriented manufacturing (King,
2001; Bohle&Greskovits, 2006, 2007; King, 2007; Koltay, 2011; Bohle, 2006). The
significance of foreign owned and export oriented sectors represents a distinguishing
feature of Eastern Central European economies (Nolke&Vliegenhart, 2009). The
electronics industry in particular has come to play an important role in several countries
from the region through the offshoring and outsourcing of manufacturing activities of
lead corporations from Western Europe and North America.
Notwithstanding this shared dependence on the manufacturing activities of lead
corporations in electronics and other industries, there is considerable heterogeneity in the
institutional constellations of different countries from the region. Stalinist attempts to
accomplish institutional and ideological standardization during the socialist era in Central
Eastern Europe were followed by institutional diversity as countries made different
political and economic decisions during their transformation from centrally planned
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socialism to democratic market economies (Ekiert&Hanson, 2003). The diversity in the
institutional foundations of the newly established capitalist regimes persisted through
other waves of standardization efforts, including accession to the European Union
(Bohle&Greskovits, 2012). Considering this heterogeneity, Eastern Central Europe
represents an ideal empirical setting to study interactions across transnational private and
domestic public regulation, and explore the institutional conditions of regulatory
complementarities.
This chapter explores in greater detail some of the essential similarities and
differences in the institutional underpinnings of labor relations in the Eastern Central
European region. The first section underlines the structural similarities across most
countries from the region regarding the importance of foreign direct investments and
export orientation of various manufacturing sectors, including electronics manufacturing.
The following section then discusses some of the main implications of the prominence of
foreign direct investments on labor relations systems in Eastern Central European
countries. The third section proceeds with identifying the main similarities across labor
relation institution from the region. This part serves as a starting point to identify some of
the preconditions for the analytical framework discussed in the first chapter to apply to
other emerging economies from around the world. Finally, the most extensive part of this
chapter presents in a comparative setup the main differences across the institutional
foundations of the three country cases included in the study: Hungary, Romania and
Slovenia. These institutions play a significant role in shaping the regulatory
developments around flexible employment practices in globally integrated manufacturing
sectors - the main focus of next three empirical chapters.
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Integration in Global Production Networks through Export Oriented Foreign Direct
Investment
Recent developments in Eastern Central Europe are marked by the unprecedented
rise in foreign direct investment. The inflow of foreign direct investments in the region
grew continuously over the last decades and became an important channel through which
national economies became integrated into the global economy (Bandelj, 2009;
Nolke&Vliegenhart, 2009; Bohle&Greskovits, 2007; King, 2009; Koltay, 2011). After
the collapse of state socialism in Eastern European, most countries from the region saw in
foreign direct investments a tremendous opportunity to advance restructuring of their
economies and to promote export oriented-economic development (Sohinger, 2005,
2004; Ekiert&Hanson, 2003; King, 2001). Creating capitalism without domestic capital
represented a serious challenge for most countries from the region that mass privatization
could solve only partially. Inflow of foreign direct investment was considered another
important ingredient to promote the establishment of strong private sectors in several
countries from the Eastern Central European region (Kalotay et al, 2000). Moreover,
foreign direct investment was seen almost universally in this region as a key source of
long-term economic and social development through the facilitation of export oriented
manufacturing (Sohinger, 2005). As a result, foreign direct investment and multinational
corporations acquired dominant roles in the re-configuration and re-specialization of
Eastern Central European economies (Kwiatkiewicz, 2011).
Notwithstanding this common trend of increasing reliance on foreign direct
investment in the region, there has been variation in the extent to which national
governments pursued this transition and development path. Countries like Hungary and
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the Czech Republic adopted liberal economic reforms soon after the collapse of socialism
and adopted a set of policies to attract foreign direct investment in their economies.
Countries ruled by unreformed successor communist parties, like Romania and Bulgaria,
during the first years after 1989, did not show commitment to foreign direct investment,
as they were generally less eager to embrace market reforms (Bandelj, 2009). Finally, in
the exceptional case of Slovenia, the government initially pursued policies that focused
on strengthening domestic industrial capabilities and opened up to foreign direct
investment only later on. These differences diminished over time, especially since all
post-socialist countries eventually came to adopt the European Union's liberal market
rules.
By the mid 2000s, export oriented foreign direct investments established a strong
foothold in most Eastern Central European countries (UNCTAD, 2005). The share of
foreign direct investments in the national gross domestic product at the end of the 2000s
was 49 percent in Hungary, 19 percent in Romania and 14 percent in Slovenia
(UNCTAD, 2011). Just a few years later, in 2005 these proportions were 55 percent, 26
percent and 20 percent, respectively (UNCTAD, 2011). The share of foreign direct
investment in gross domestic production has generally been higher in Eastern European
economies, relative to other important emerging markets from Latin America and East
Asia (Fabrizio et al, 2009). At the end of 2000s, the share of foreign direct investment in
gross domestic product ranged between a third and two thirds in Eastern Central Europe,
while it represented only a third and a tenth in Mexico and China6 (UNCTAD, 2011).
Industries characterized by relatively high levels of internationalization and technical
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6 Please see Table 4A in the Appendix.
know-how, such as automotive and electronics, have been considered particularly
important for economic development by national governments from Eastern Europe
(Meardi et al, 2011). The electronics industry had had some legacies inherited from the
socialist era in several countries from the region but became particularly important in
Hungary, Czech Republic, Romania and Slovenia after transition to market economy.
The dynamic growth of the sector was driven mostly by investments of major
transnational electronics companies, such as IBM, Flextronics, Jabil, Nokia, Philips and
Samsung, to take advantage of the relatively cheap skilled-labor and proximity to end
markets. In the late 2000s, the share of employment in electronics industry relative to the
entire workforce in manufacturing was 26 percent in Hungary, 16 percent in Romania
and 24 percent in Slovenia (Eurostat, 2013)7. In terms of the outcome, the sector
represented 32 percent in the Hungarian economy, 15 percent in Romania and 21 percent
in Slovenia (Eurostat, 2013)8. Production in the electronics industry is generally destined
for exports to mostly European, Middle Eastern and North African markets. In Hungary
and Romania, approximately 80 percent of production is exported, while this share is
slightly less significant in Slovenia at 65 percent of manufactured products and services
(Bormann&Plank, 2009). The electronics sector is therefore very important in the
regional economy, comparable to other main supplying regions such as China and
9Mexico .
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7 Please see Table 2A in the Appendix.
8 Please see Table lA in the Appendix.
9 Please see Table 3A in the Appendix.
Implications of Reliance on Foreign Direct Investments on Labor Relations
Institutions in Eastern Central Europe
Integration in transnational production regimes by Eastern Central European
economies had important implications on labor relations institutions and employment
regulation in the region. Multinational corporations, the main vessels of integrating into
the global economy, are often rule makers rather than rule-takers and exert important
influence on local institutions (Streeck&Thelen, 2005; Ferner, 2011). This is particularly
true in the case of Eastern Central European countries where institutions have been more
malleable by international influences and national economies are dependent on foreign
capital. Foreign direct investments and multinational corporations represented important
sources of change in Eastern European nations' multi-layered and complex set of
transformations since the collapse of state socialism. Their implications on labor relations
systems have been particularly important, exerting influences at both macro and micro
levels (Aguilera&Dabu, 2006).
Labor relations institutions are widely recognized as key components of national
market economies and business systems (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hancke et al, 2007;
Whitley, 1999). In a broad sense, labor relation systems refer to the multitude of
institutions and organizations set up in reaction to neoliberal markets and in rejection of
the labor as a commodity principle, that ought to introduce more market stability, greater
equality of power relations, and improvement in working conditions (Kaufman, 2004).
This dissertation focuses primarily on tripartite institutions, industrial relation
institutions, and connections between unions and political entities. While their particular
features in Western economies have been examined extensively (Thelen, 2001; Streeck,
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1992; Locke, 1992; Locke and Baccaro, 1996; Kochan, 1994), labor relations institutions
in emerging markets from Eastern Europe, Latin America and Asia have been much less
explored (Kaufman, 2006). Considering the primary role of labor in driving the
integration of transition and developing economies into the global economy (Guillen,
2000), studying these institutions in emerging markets is important for its own purpose.
The main focus of this dissertation is however on the role of these labor relation
institutions in enabling or undermining the emergence of public-private regulatory
complementarities.
At the macro level, the influence of foreign direct investment on national
institutions has often been framed from the perspective of the "race to the bottom"
debate. Several studies emphasize the intense competition among national governments
for foreign direct investment through lowering labor and environmental regulatory
institutions and providing additional incentives to attract foreign capital (Mosley, 2003).
While it is difficult to evaluate the extent to which countries compete for foreign direct
investment by manipulating their rules and regulations, several scholars pointed out that
socialist welfare states have gradually transformed into "national competition states"
whose main function became to mobilize society in the aim of competitiveness
(Drahkoupil, 2008; Hirsch, 1995; Jessop, 2002). Overall, foreign corporations extending
their activities to Eastern Central Europe enhanced pressures for greater flexibility in
labor market institutions and neoliberal reforms of regulatory frameworks (Bohle, 2006).
In all three countries included in the study, for example, foreign companies played
important roles in influencing governmental policies and institutions regarding
employment, to allow for greater flexibility in the type of contracts, hiring and firing of
64
people in great numbers, working time arrangements, etc. Some scholars also claim that
the formal institutions have been decoupled from informal implementation to invite and
accommodate foreign direct investments (Bandelj, 2009).
At the micro level, initial expectations that multinational corporations operating in
the region will directly transfer labor relation models from their host societies were
shattered shortly after the onset of the 1990s. Even when multinationals from home
societies with strong social models operated in Eastern Central European countries, they
did not replicate their industrial relations systems throughout their subsidiaries (Groux,
2011; Almond et al, 2005). Multinational corporations are more likely to standardize
across product related systems, but much less likely to do the same with their labor
relations and employment practices (Kwietkiewicz, 2011). While they adopt modem
human resources practices such as career management, strategic approach to professional
training, new work organization, performance appraisal and/or performance-based
remuneration systems to support economic competitiveness, multinational corporations
don't transfer and standardize along the social models from home societies
(Kwiatkiewicz, 2011). European Workers Councils and transnational unions have also
failed so far to raise employment relations and working conditions in Eastern Central
Europe to levels that are comparable to employment practices and labor standards in
advanced Western societies (Groux, 2011). The overall influence of foreign direct
investment and multinational corporations at the micro level has been to strengthen the
trend towards enterprise-centered systems of industrial relations and enhance the strength
of management over collective bargaining at the micro levels (Aguilera&Dabu, 2006)
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Labor Relation Institutions: An Eastern European Model?
The extent to which the institutional infrastructures of Eastern European societies,
including their labor relations institutions, resemble existing models identified by the
varieties of capitalism, national business or comparative employment relations literatures,
or constitute their own category, has been debated in a growing literature over the last
years (Bohle&Greskovits, 2012; Nolke&Vliegenhart, 2009; Cernat, 2006;
Knell&Shrolek, 2005; Bandelj, 2003; King&Szelenyi, 2001). Several of these studies
argue that the influences of a common set of external factors, including the neoliberal
ideology formulated in the Washington Consensus agenda, accession to the European
Union and integration into global production networks, resulted in similarities that are
characteristic to state regulation and labor relations institutions from this region (Aguilera
and Dabu, 2006; Bohle, 2006; Pollert, 2000; Ost, 2009). Some of these common features
include gradual shift towards greater flexibility and more liberal regulation of
employment practices, fragmentation and weakening of unions, increasing
decentralization of industrial relations systems, and weak establishment of corporatist
institutions.
Eastern European societies have experienced a gradual shift towards greater
flexibility in state employment regulation and weak implementation over the last two
decades (Bohle, 2006; Neumann; 2006). Overall, the role of the state in regulating the
labour markets and practices is significant (Orenstein, 1995; Pollart, 2000; Cazes and
Nesporova, 2004). National legislation and institutions underpinning their
implementation, however, underwent a whole series of reforms since 1989 in the
direction of reducing social protection and increasing flexibility in employment practices
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(Cazes and Nesporova, 2004; Delteil, 2011). These reforms were shaped to a large extent
by the neoliberal agendas of international organizations such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, as well as by the growing influence of multinational
corporations operating in the region. Accession to the European Union carried mixed
influences introducing additional labor governance institutions on one hand (Cazes and
Nesporova, 2004; Aguilera and Dabu, 2006) and encouraging greater flexibility and
deregulation on the other (Bohle, 2006; Bohle&Greskovits, 2006; Meardi, 2007). Several
scholars point out that while the requirements of the European social model regarding
employment protection were formally fulfilled by national governments, their
implementation has been largely circumvented so far (Avdagic, 2005; Meardi, 2007;
Cazes&Nesporova, 2004; Bandelj, 2009). Labor laws are often weakly enforced or
ignored, labor inspectorates remain deficient and courts' effectiveness in redressing
unions' grievances are quite mixed (Delteil, 2011; Cook, 2010; Pollart, 2000). As the
empirical chapters will illustrate, particular areas that lack enforcement are often times
part of a political strategy to accommodate the needs of global markets and buyers.
The gradual shift towards neoliberal reforms was to a great extent enabled by
common weaknesses of labor relation institutions in the region, including ineffective
tripartite institutions, increasingly decentralized collective bargaining institutions and
weak labor unions. These weaknesses are often cited as common features of labor
institutions in Eastern Europe.
Tripartite institutions in Eastern Central Europe were introduced in the 1990s
mostly as a result of external influences emanating from international organizations such
as the International Labor Organization and the European Union. Social dialogue was
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strongly encouraged by these organizations to promote a more democratic and peaceful
transition from socialism to capitalism. National governments saw these institutions
mainly as instruments to acquire legitimacy for their economic and social reforms while
maintaining social stability. Labor unions generally welcomed any neo-corporatist
structure that would promote their voice as representatives of working people and help
them regain legitimacy. While some point out that the contributions of these institutions
have been more significant than is commonly given credit for (Hassel, 2009; Iankova,
2004), there is general agreement that tripartite institutions in Eastern European countries
barely resemble in form or importance the corporatist institutions of Western European
nations (Delteil, 2011; Pollart, 2000; Woolfson, 2011). Consequently, tripartite
institutions of the European periphery were labeled as "pre-emptive corporatism"
(Wiesenthal, 1995) for their primary role to legitimate reforms and maintain social
stability, "illusory corporatism" (Ost, 2000) for their weak resemblance of Western
European counterparts, or "empty shells" (Jepsen, 2003) for the lack of substantive
content of the negotiations. One important illustration of their weaknesses is that in times
of crisis, tripartite institutions have often been simply swept aside by the governments of
several countries from the region (Toth and Neumann, 2004; Woolfson, 2011).
Other scholars argue that most Eastern European societies havefragmented and
decentralized collective bargaining systems with an increasing share of collective
bargaining agreements being negotiated at the enterprise level. Enterprise level collective
bargaining is the predominant level of industrial relations in several Eastern Central
European countries and it often represents the only important industrial relations system
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within the country (EIRO, 2011)0. The importance of enterprise level collective
bargaining is in part related to legacies inherited from the socialist era when the
autonomy of state owned enterprises was promoted strategically by socialist governments
in the region (Pollart, 2000). Another important factor related to the increasing
decentralization of industrial agreements has to do with the structural transformations that
economies from Eastern Central Europe experienced, including privatization of state
owned enterprises and inflow of multinational enterprises. Foreign corporations generally
prefer to maintain the autonomy to define the terms of employment conditions,
particularly with respect to remuneration and working conditions (Toth, 1997; Pollart,
2000). Social dialogue at the company level commonly restricts the role of the unions to
mere consultation and is often organized around the need of management for
organizational flexibility (Delteil, 2011). Notwithstanding European and national efforts
to strengthen the sector level institutions of social dialogue and collective agreement,
sectoral coordination in Eastern Central Europe continues to remain underdeveloped in
most countries. The weakness of sector and national level collective agreements has often
been connected to the low average coverage level of collective bargaining in Eastern
Central Europe, generally between 25-50 percent, relative to an average of 70 percent in
the old members of the European Union (Cook, 2010; EIRO, 2012).
A considerable body of research on labor relations in Eastern Central Europe
discusses the relative weaknesses of labor unions in terms of both numerical
representation and political strength. Labor union density in Eastern Central European
10 Please see Table 5.A regarding the dominant level of collective bargaining at the end of the table.
Enterprise level collective bargaining represents the only important level in the country's industrial
relations system in Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania and Poland. It represents a dominant level
of collective bargaining along with sector or national level negotiations in Romania, Latvia and Slovakia.
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countries has declined from complete membership during the socialist era to an average
of 17 percent of the workforce in 201111. Given their close association with the
Communist Parties during the socialist regime, it was difficult to shed their role as
transmission belts between state and workers (Pollert, 2000; Ost, 2009). Labor unions
that were established in reaction to the ideological and historical affiliations of the unions
existing in the past benefitted from some more legitimacy but their emergence ultimately
led to a fragmented representational structure. Restructuring of the economy through
privatization and entry of foreign companies further contributed to the declining
membership of unions (Meardi, 2007).
Moreover, over the 1990s, workers and unions from the region did not think of
themselves as a separate class requiring separate organizations to defend their interests.
Rather, they embraced the neoliberal project in the hope that the "market" will ultimately
serve their interests as well (Ost, 2000). Workers from Eastern Central Europe are much
more likely to opt for exit from national employment rather than voice opinion and
engage in protests (Meardi, 2007; Bohle and Greskovits, 2007). Even when they do adopt
a more conflictual position, their effectiveness is compromised by the power asymmetry
that exists in political and economic institutions between domestic labor and transnational
capital, a feature that is considered rather general for Eastern Central Europe (Bohle and
Greskovits, 2006; Cook, 2010). While some cooperation between unions and political
parties had existed in Eastern Europe, most of these linkages ceased by the turn of the
century (Cox and Mason, 2000).
In summary, the existing literature on labor relation institutions in Eastern Central
1 Please see table in the attachment. The average rate is based on my own calculations.
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Europe generally concurs that national governments and foreign corporations play
powerful coordinating roles in labor relations in the European periphery, relative to their
Western European counterparts. While social dialogue at the national level is generally
under the dominance of the national government, social dialogues and negotiations at the
local level are under the control of the management (Delteil, 2011). With respect to these
institutional weaknesses, Eastern European societies resemble relatively well other
emerging economies from around the world.
Labor Relation Institutions: Distinct Characteristics across Hungary, Romania and
Slovenia
Notwithstanding these common features, closer examination of the institutional
and political foundations of labor relations systems in particular countries from Eastern
Central Europe also reveal a set of distinguishing characteristics (King, 2007; Knell and
Shrolek, 2005; Cernat, 2006; Feldmann, 2006; Greskovits&Bohle, 2012). Domestic
features inherited from the previous regime or established during the early transition
years brought about diversification across the region (Feldmann, 2006; Frege, 2002).
Overall, employment relations are still in a process of flux but different patterns were
detected over the 2000s (Stockhammer, 2009). Hungary was generally understood as a
more market oriented political economic system with weak labor institutions in place.
Slovenia on other hand was the sole representative of a more coordinated political
economy model. Romania was generally included in between these two models, as it had
labor relations institutions that were more centralized than in Hungary but provided
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12significantly weaker coordination than in Slovenia . Overall, state intervention in labor
relations was strong in the Romanian context and was therefore considered to be closer to
the state oriented institutional model characteristic to countries like France and South
Korea (Kang and Moon, 2013). While the role of states is generally strong in former
Eastern Central European countries (Hancke, 2007), interference by the state in Romania
was less governed by formal coordination with social stakeholders, as in the case of
Slovenia, or by dedication to provide market friendly environment, as was often the case
in Hungary. Rather, state interference was more guided by ad hoc interventions to
balance institutional failures or by clientelistic connections with various organizations
and individuals.
All three countries underwent reforms to increase the flexibility of their labor
markets, but they have done so through different strategies and to different extents.
Attempts to evaluate the strictness of employment protection placed Hungary on the more
flexible end and Slovenia closer to the protective side of the spectrum, with the rest of the
countries in between (Boudier-Bensebaa, 2008). Labor regulatory reforms in Eastern
Europe accommodated both external and internal aspects of flexibility, although the
approach has been more balanced in the case of Slovenia than in Hungary and Romania
that relied mostly on external forms of employment flexibility' 3 . The significance of
atypical forms of employment has been increasing in all three contexts over the last
decade, but governmental efforts to promote flexible working hours and part-time jobs
13 There are two forms of flexibility that can be promoted by public policies or pursued by private
strategies to adjust to economic volatility: internal and external flexibility. While internal flexibility refers
to job changes within the same enterprise, flexibility in working times, multiple job-holdings and part time
positions; external flexibility refers to new forms of employment and collective firing (Boudier-Bensebbaa,
2008).
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have been relatively stronger in Slovenia. In the context of ongoing restructurings
through most of the 2000s in the Romanian public and private sectors, regulatory reforms
in Romania have gradually eased the restrictions and procedures connected to collective
firings.
The differences in labor relation institutions underlying these arrangements are
quite significant across the three countries included in the study. In Hungary, tripartite
institutions, industrial relations institutions, political connections between unions and
parties/state agencies are relatively weak. In Slovenia, strong tripartite institutions at the
national level have been complemented with strong industrial bargaining institutions at
the sector level. Formal affiliations between social-democratic parties and labor unions
used to be quite strong in Slovenia in the past, although they declined through the 2000s.
In Romania, weak tripartite institutions coexist with centralized coordinated industrial
bargaining institutions. Government officials and union representatives are often
connected through informal networks. These characteristics summarized on Table 1.1. in
chapter 1 resemble relatively closely the ideal type labor relation institutions models
discussed in the previous chapter. Hungary approximated relatively well the labor market
oriented model through most of the 2000s, Romanian institutions resembled the state-
directed labor relations institutions, and Slovenia fitted more closely the coordinated
labor relations model. The following section presents the fundamental aspects of the
institutional architecture of labor relations during the late 2000s in greater detail as they
have important implications on the emergence of regulatory complementarities -
discussed in the next three empirical chapters.
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1. Tripartite institutions
Early initiatives to set up tripartite institutions in Eastern Europe eventually led to
very different outcomes in different national settings with respect to the strength of these
institutions and the extent of coordination between state and social partners
(Cox&Mason, 2000). Overall, tripartite institutions in most Eastern Central European
countries focused on three types of issues: broader public policies, especially social
welfare issues; issues related to industrial relations, especially wages; and significant
industrial disputes (Martin&Martin, 2004). Coordination around these issues, however,
differed across the national settings and varied throughout the decades. The main
tripartite institution of Hungary was established before the outset of its transition to
market economic system, and showed considerable promise in the early 1990s. Its
effectiveness to provide a strong institutional arena for negotiations across the state and
social stakeholders has however declined considerably ever since then. Its main role has
become to generate legitimacy around state legislation and policies. The tripartite
institution of Slovenia was set up at the time of its independence in 1991, and although its
strength declined somewhat in recent years, it remained a strong institutional platform to
coordinate across class interests. A rough indicator to evaluate the relative weaknesses of
tripartite institutions in the three contexts is to compare across the number of social pacts
negotiated and agreed on. While the number of social pacts negotiated in Hungary and
Romania were 9 and 10, respectively, during the 1990-2010 time period, this number
reached a total of 29 pacts in the case of Slovenia (Visser, 2011).
The main tripartite institution of Hungary over most of the first two transition
decades was the National Council for Reconciliation of Interests (Orszagos
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Erdekegyezteto Tanacs) (OET) 14. The origins of the National Council for Reconciliation
of Interests (OET) reach back as far as 1988 when it was established to facilitate
negotiations with respect to the country's transition from socialism to capitalism. A set of
protests by taxi and truck drivers in 1990 in Budapest over a sharp increase in gas prices
resulted in its revival by the newly elected conservative government to provide a forum
for social dialogue. The National Council for Reconciliation of Interests (OET)
negotiated a settlement with protesters in one-day sitting and the highly mediatized event
gained considerable popular support and legitimacy within Hungary (EFILWC, 2004).
This institution has underwent a long series of reforms and eventually grew into a
complex organization with a whole set of secretariats, plenaries and committees to
facilitate the operation of the main forum. Its main members have traditionally included
six union confederations, representatives of nine employers' associations, representatives
of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and other ministries.
Over time, the Hungarian tripartite institution has increasingly focused on a narrow
set of issues, was often dismissed by national governments, and gradually acquired a
more consultative than rule making role. Some authors and union members still credit the
National Council for Reconciliation of Interests (OET) for maintaining social stability
during the demise of socialism and for generating legitimacy around social and economic
policies during the first transition decade (lankova, 2002, 2004; Hethy, 2000). Most
scholars point to a set of weaknesses that have come to characterize the OET. First,
institutional reforms of the social dialogue forums reveal a slow trend towards more
pluralistic style of institutions with broader set of participants, and restrictions of their
14 The OET has been abolished several times and replaced by other institutions that differed somewhat in
their roles and memberships.
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roles to simple consultation. The tripartite institution of Hungary was therefore often
qualified as a pluralistic model on the grounds that its interest reconciliation council did
not have "rule-making" competence (Hethy, 2001). Second, this institution has largely
failed to address a broad set of social and economic policies, and has remained
subordinated to the economic strategies of the national government. Even within the
realm of social policies, its focus was rather limited to negotiations of the minimum wage
and setting guidelines for wage increases on an annual basis. Third, national governments
initiated tripartite institutions and remained the primary actor of control over it and
dismissed tripartite institutions at repeated occasions (Cox&Mason, 2000). Labor unions
have been very ineffective at utilizing tripartite institutions to influence the scope and
outcomes of policies (Avdagic, 2005).
Social dialogue has a relatively short tradition in Romania and served primarily to
harmonize formal regulation with European Union directives. The tripartite institutions
adopted by the Romanian government to comply with European directives included the
Economic and Social Council (Consiuliul Economic si Social) (CES), the Tripartite
Commission of Social Dialogue (Consiliul National Tripartite pentru Dialog Social)
(CNTDS), the National Council for Adult Vocational Training (NATB) and the National
Commission on Equal Opportunities Field (CONES), established at the end of the 1990s.
Nevertheless, these newly created tripartite institutions lacked experienced staff, had low
effectiveness in practice and were overpowered by the Romanian government (Rusu,
2002; Trif, 2004). Intervention of the state in negotiations in tripartite forums has
traditionally been very strong, often assuming a double role, as both government and
employer (Trif&Koch, 2005). Union representatives considered that negotiating social
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pacts was often just a way for the government to acquire support in election years.
International organizations, particularly the European Union and the International
Monetary Fund, continued to exert significant influence on policy debates and industrial
bargaining within the tripartite framework throughout the following years
(Ciutacu&Chivu, 2007).
The responsibility for tackling issues concerning the labor market and labor
relations in Slovenia has never been considered to be in the exclusive area of the
government, but also in the domain of all social partners. The inclusion of social partners
in economic decision-making has been quite extensive thanks to the relatively robust and
strong tripartite institution (Crowley&Stanojevic, 2011; Bohle&Greskovits, 2012;
Grdesic, 2008). The Social and Economic Council of Slovenia (Ekonomsko-Socialni Svet
Slovenije) (ESS) was established in 1994 and has remained the main discussion forum
for key decisions regarding social and economic issues ever since then. In the realm of
labour and social matters, it has focused on a whole range of aspects including revisions
of the government's legislative proposals with respect to employment, political and
economic decisions with respect to pensions and health care, as well as taxation.
Tripartite institutions in Slovenia persisted through repeated contestation by neoliberal
forces exerted by the European Union, external markets, and center-right governments
(Ost, 2009).
2. Industrial relations institutions
The European model of social dialogue is based on tripartite negotiations along
with bi-sectoral coordination across workers' and employers' organizations through the
industrial relations systems. National level negotiations ought to be complemented by
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collective agreements at the sector and enterprise levels in the economies of the European
Union. The industrial relation systems of Eastern Central European countries through the
2000s, however, also present some important differences with respect to: the level and
extent of coordination across managers and employees, the coverage of collective
agreements, the content of collective agreements, and the fragmentation and weakness of
labor unions. The main differences and similarities in the industrial relations systems of
Hungary, Romania and Slovenia over the 2000s are summarized in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2. Labor relations institutions in selected Eastern Central European countries
Hungary Romania Slovenia
Workplace representation union and workers union union and
councils workers council
Labor union density (at
the end of 2000s 17% 32% 29%
Principal level of Company level National and Industry level
collective bargaining company
Collective bargaining 23% -100% 96%
coverage at the end of
2000s
Labor confederations MSZOSZ, CNSLR-Fratia, ZSSS, KNSS,
ASZSZ, SZEF, CSDR, CNS, KSJS Pergam,
ESZT, LIGA, Cartel Alfa and Konfederacija,
MOSZ Meridian Altemativa,
Solidarnoost,
KSJS
The industrial relations system in Hungary is highlyfragmented and decentralized
where company unions have their own legal entities and the coverage of collective
bargaining is one of the lowest in the region at approximately 32 percent in the late 2000s
(EIRO Hungary(a), 2005; Koltay, 2011). As the general strategy of unions was targeted
towards strengthening national level tripartism and sectoral bipartite bargaining in the
early 1990s, workplace industrial relations were largely left to local union representatives
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without sufficient support from national offices. Notwithstanding efforts to strengthen
collective agreements at the sector level in Hungary through a Phare program in the early
2000s as well as additional support provided by the European Union in the mid 2000s,
sector level representation and coordination has remained weak.
While the role of collective agreements at the enterprise level has increased
significantly over the last decades in Romania, collective agreements at national level
continued to play an important role for working conditions and employment relations in
Romania. National and sector level collective bargaining establish a minimum framework
for company level collective bargaining. Provisions at lower levels have to be similar or
more favorable for employees. In Romania, the state has a significant role in shaping its
industrial relation arrangements with frequent interventions in both national and sector
level negotiations (Trif, 2007)". Similarly, the industrial relations system of Slovenia is
much more centralized with important national and sector level collective agreements,
and close to full coverage of employees (Stanojevic, 2005)16. The differences in the
coverage of sector level bargaining illustrate relatively well these differences in the extent
and level of coordination. Sectoral bargaining covers only about 8 percent of the
workforce in Hungary, relative to 46 percent in Romania and an even higher share in
Slovenia (Toth et al., 2000; EIRO, 2012).
The content of collective agreements also follows different patterns in the three
national settings. In Hungary, collective agreements generally take place at the enterprise
15 To some extent, this tendency is a legacy of state authoritarianism during socialism, as well as
consequence of the gradual and late reforms adopted in Romania to transition from state controlled
socialism to liberal market democracy (Trif, 2007).
16 Almost all employees have been covered by collective bargaining in Slovenia - a result of the past
position where the employers' side included chambers of commerce and industry, to which all employers
had to belong. However, new legislation has ended this arrangement and coverage might decline.
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level and often failed to include stipulations with respect to wages and other issues
essential for labor unions. The weight placed on working times and organization of work
has been on the increase over the last decade. The overall tendency has been to focus less
on wage negotiations and increase stipulations with respect to flexible work arrangements
such as extending over time, including the annualization of working times, stipulations
with respect to work-time changes (EIRO, 2005). Sectoral agreements in particular,
where established, are particularly weak in content and have very little influence on firm
level negotiations (Koltay, 2011). Collective agreements are usually concluded at large
firms, while small and medium enterprises are largely unregulated by collective
agreements. (EIRO Hungary (a), 2005). Most collective agreements are found at larger
enterprises that are often subsidiaries of multinational enterprises17 . Overall, labor has
been relatively weak to influence collective bargaining outcomes at the enterprise level.
Collective bargaining agreements have been shaped to a great extent by employers'
decisions and practices, state policies and market forces (Bohle&Greskovits, 2006).
In Slovenia and Romania, collective bargainings cover a broader range of issues
and set precedents for company level negotiations. In Romania, state regulates the
registration and specifies the content of collective agreements. Collective agreements
have to cover at least issues of wages, working conditions, working hours and holidays.
Once executed and registered, collective agreements have the power of law and set
minimum standards. Interventions by the national government recently have been shifting
17 In cases of brown-field investments, a labor union has often existed on the site prior to the change in
ownership and local management of the company continued to engage in industrial negotiations (Szabo and
Zentai, 2011). Among green-field investment sites, labor unions have traditionally concentrated their
efforts on such establishments because of the large number of employees and the benefits of increasing
membership. While some multinationals have notoriously resisted association of workers, in general,
freedom of association is relatively well regulated in Hungary.
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the outcomes of these agreements in the direction of providing more favorable business
environments to potential investors, putting greater emphasis on flexibility and
maintaining low labor costs. Company unions and collective bargaining at the enterprise
level are becoming increasingly important as they establish the effective terms of
employment relations and working conditions. In Slovenia, collective negotiations
generally cover payment, working conditions and working time, redundancy terms,
training and a range of procedural issues such as dispute resolution, trade union facilities
and information arrangements.
There are some important differences also with respect to strength of labor unions1 8
in the region. Labor union structure is fragmented in all three countries, but the density of
representation, cooperation across the unions and their collective strength varies
considerably across them (Frege, 2002; Neumann, 2002).
Employee representation through labor unions is weak and fragmented in
Hungary. Today, Hungary has six union confederations, of which four originated from
the former socialist union National Council of Trade Unions (Szakszervezerek Orszagos
Tanacsa) (SZOT). These include National Association of Hungarian Trade Unions
(Magyar SZakszervezetek Orszagos SZovetsege) (MSZOSZ) 19, the largest and most
politically active union confederation in Hungary, which includes the Hungarian
Metalworkers' Federation (Vasas Szakszervezeti Szovetseg) (Vasas). The other two
18 Please see Table 6A in the Appendix for comparative statistics on union density.
19 Along with the Autonomous Trade Union Confederation (Autonom Szakszervezetek Szovetsege)
(ASZSZ), Unions' Cooperation Forum (Szakszervezetek Egyuttmukodesi Foruma) (SZEF), and
Intellectuals' Trade Union Confederation (Ertelmisegi SZakszervezet Tomorules) (ESZT).
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confederations were established after the regime change 20. By the mid 2000s, the six
union confederations had a density rate of only 17 per cent, one of the lowest in Europe.
Initially, unions were very polarized along the new and old dimension but these tensions
eventually declined over time. Another source of fragmentation of employee power laid
in the insitutionalization of workers councils in Hungary in 1992, with negotiation power
granted to them in 1998 by the conservative Hungarian Civic Union (Magyar Polgari
Szovetseg) (FIDESZ) government. Later amendments in 2002 by the socialist
government eventually removed the negotiation rights or workers councils and increased
the consultation rights of unions. With the increasing prevalence of temporary agency
workers in the workforce and the lack of collective representation for this segment of the
workforce, there is another source of division of collective representation of employees
emerging in the Hungarian context. Representatives of both National Association of
Hungarian Unions (Magyar Szakszervezerek Orszagos Szovetsege) (MSZOSZ) and
Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions (Fuggetlen Szakszervezetek
Demokratikus Ligaja) (LIGA) noted that labor unions have been reluctant to organize
campaigns of recruitment in an effort to challenge their legitimacy.
Union representation is also fragmented in Romania with five union
confederations in place. Although unions have suffered considerably from the negative
influence of restructuring of the economy, the shift towards service sectors and de-
legitimization due to their political connections during and after socialism, Romanian
unions still have relatively high membership at a density rate close to 40 percent in 2007.
In 2007 there was an attempt to establish cooperation across three of the confederations.
20 These include the Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions (Fuggetlen Szekszervezetek
Demokratikus Ligaja) (LIGA) and National Federation of Workers' Councils (Munkastanacsok Orszagos
Szovetsege) (MOSZ).
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This did not take place in the end, but in general, trade unions cooperate rather
effectively. While labor is generally more quiescent in Eastern Europe, industrial protests
have been much more common in Romania (Koltay, 2011). The union structure is also
fragmented in Slovenia, consisting of seven union federations altogether, with the
Association of Free Trade Unions of Slovenia (Zveze Svobodnih Sindikatov Slovenije)
(ZSSS) standing out more clearly as the dominant union confederation. Since most
unions and their federations grew out of the former regime, the ideological division line
is less prominent and cooperation across the union confederations is relatively strong in
Slovenia.
3. Connections between unions and political entities
Formal and informal relations across social stakeholders and different governing
bodies often draw unions into the political arena and enable them to exert influence the
political decision making process (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Higgins, 1985).
Linkages and influences with government officials have been weaker for labor
unions in Hungary, relative to employers' associations and major corporations ties with
state representatives, as well as relative to connections between unions and government
officials in Slovenia and Romania. Considering the crisis of legitimacy experienced by
unions in post-socialist nations, most unions in Hungary declared their independence in
an effort to gain more legitimacy. While National Association of Hungarian Unions
(MSZOSZ), the largest trade union confederation, had been politically connected to the
socialist liberal party for a longer time period, it eventually followed the same strategy of
declaring independence from political entities to preserve its legitimacy. Even during
21 The conservative government generally looked upon unions with suspicion as being 'left-wing' or too
close to socialism (Hethy, 2001). Cooperation with LIGA was therefore very limited to mobilizing protest
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time periods of cooperation, the actual influence of unions on political outcomes was not
very insignificant, setting a strong contrast with similar experiences in Western Europe,
and to some extent in Slovenia (Hethy, 2001; Dimitrova and Vilrokx, 2005). The
dynamic of the relationship was much more about political parties utilizing unions in
their strategic advantages, rather than the other way around (Adavgic, 2005). As part of
the cooperation pact signed between National Association of Hungarian Unions
(MSZOSZ) and the Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Part) (MSZP) in 1994,
for example, representatives of MSZOSZ expected a comprehensive social pact in order
to manage the losers of the transformation and advance social partnership (Hethy, 2001).
The Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) - the main governing party at the time, however,
eventually adopted an economic stabilization package in 1995 with harsh austerity
measures. In contrast, in Slovenia cooperation between social-democractic parties and
unions has been much more stable and productive, particularly between Association of
Free Trade Unions of Slovenia (ZSSS) and social democratic parties in Slovenia. The
strength of these affiliations, however, also declined considerably in the case of Slovenia
throughout the 2000s. Representatives of national unions noted that there has been
growing convergence across center-right and center-left parties with respect to the
content of economic and social policies.
Political influences through informal ties across union and state representatives
have also been considerably weaker in the case of Hungary than in Romania and even
Slovenia (Grodeland, 2007). The political interests of workers and their representatives
were supposed to be exercised outside the realm of trade unions in Romania, but unions
against specific policies. The most notable recent connection between the two entities took place in
November 2007 when a massive protest organized by LIGA against privatization efforts of the health
insurance system, was also supported by conservative party, then part of the opposition.
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nonetheless continued to maintain a significant political engagement in real life (Trif,
2004; Ciutacu&Chivu, 2007). During the early transition years, strikes were often
organized to support political objectives and strategies of party organizations and their
key personalities (ex. the violent interventions by miners' unions in the early 1990s and
late 1990s). Confederations of unions often times have had political affiliations. The
National Federation of Free Trade Unions of Romania (Confederatia Nationala a
Sindicatelor Libere din Romania) (CNSLR-Fratia) and National Trade Union Bloc
(Blocul National Sindical (BNS) have supported the Social Democratic Party (Partidul
Social Democrat) (PSD), while the Democratic Trade Union Confederation of Romania
(Confederatia Sindicatelor Democratice din Romania) (CSDR) has been more closely
associated with the Christian Democratic Union (Uniunea Crestin Democrata din
Romania) (UCDR) (Rusu, 2002). Political connections with politicians and bureaucrats
remained important resources to promote their own personal and occasionally their
members interests. Representatives of labor unions, for example, often use their
positions as a springboard to pursue their own (political) interests (Trif, 2007). Many
union representatives eventually held parliamentary seats (ex. BNS and CNSLR-Fratia),
and the leader of the National Federation of Free Trade Unions of Romania (CNSLR-
Fratia) was appointed Prime Minister between 1996-1998. These political ties and
affiliations are most prominent at the national and sectoral levels but they sometimes
manifest themselves also at the level of large state-owned or foreign enterprises (Trif,
2004).
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Conclusions
This chapter laid out some of the important similarities and differences that
characterize the institutional foundations of labor relations and regulation in Eastern
Central Europe. The increasing reliance on transnational production networks to drive
development in the region had important implications on labor relation institutions. This
development strategy contributed to the shift in the main focus of labor relation
institutions from maintaining social stability towards achieving greater economic
competitiveness and employment flexibility. The growing presence of foreign direct
investment in the region, the main channel of integration into global markets, also re-
enforced the tendency towards decentralization of industrial relations and enhanced the
strength of management over collective bargaining. These influences are reflected in the
institutional commonalities in Eastern Central European countries.
The weaknesses underlying the institutional architecture governing labor relations
and regulation in Eastern Central European countries make this region quite similar to
other developing and emerging markets from around the world that have become more
integrated into the global economy. These include an increasing shift in public regulation
towards employment flexibility and/or weak enforcement of state regulation, diminishing
density and political power of labor unions, and declining coordination across employee'
representatives on one hand and national governments and employers' associations on the
other. Membership in the European Union has not strengthened national institutions in a
significant manner. On the contrary, some argue that the influence of the European Union
has been to undermine the social-democratic power of labor at the advantage of national
governments that got caught in the politics of attracting foreign direct investment. Eastern
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Central European countries still represent the periphery of the European Union,
particularly with respect to the quality of working conditions and strength of labor
relation institutions, both significantly inferior to Western European standards. The
operation of manufacturing sites supplying for large multinationals from abroad exert
continuous pressures on labor for greater flexibility and lower cost, and often lead to
precarious working conditions.
Notwithstanding these similarities, the heterogeneity in the institutional
constellations underlying integration in transnational production regimes and national
labor relations across the countries make this region a particularly adequate setting to
explore the empirical implications of the analytical framework presented in the
introductory chapter. The market oriented labor relations in Hungary, state directed labor
relations in Romania and coordinated labor relations institutions in Slovenia, provide a
fertile setting to explore the institutional underpinnings of regulatory complementarities
across transnational corporate and national public regulation. The gradual shift towards
manufacturing for lead corporations from mostly Western Europe and Northern America
enhanced exposure to the coordination mechanisms characteristics to large multinational
companies. This has been particularly characteristic to the electronic manufacturing
sector that experienced a growing prevalence of transnational private regulatory efforts
over the 2000s, in an effort to address labor concerns throughout the global production
regime. The implementation of these efforts in divergent institutional contexts, however,
brought about different pathways of regulatory interactions and changes. The emergence
of these regulatory developments within the national settings of Hungary, Romania and
Slovenia, constitute the main focus of the next three chapters to follow. Regulatory
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complementarities are evaluated around slightly different forms of flexible employment
practices in the three national settings as the manifestation and political salience of
particular issues varies according to the legacies of the industrial policies and institutional
reforms adopted during the early 1990s.
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Chapter 3:
Regulatory Complementarities in Market Oriented Labor Relations Institutions:
Regulation of Temporary Agency Employment in Hungary
This chapter examines the emergence of public-private regulatory
complementarities in a national context with weakly coordinated and decentralized labor
relation institutions. The scholarly literature suggests that national contexts with more
coordinated and centralized labor relations institution-characteristic of coordinated
market economies- are more complementary with corporate social responsibility
initiatives (Campbell, 2007; Brammer et al, 2011; Kindermann, 2011). In contrast, I show
that synergistic interactions across transnational corporate social responsibility initiatives
and national institutions are more likely to emerge in market oriented national contexts. I
use case studies of two electronics factories from Hungary to illustrate the emergence of
regulatory synergies during the late 2000s. In the Hungarian context where tripartite
institutions, connections with political parties and industrial relations are relatively weak,
labor unions and private auditors rely on interweaving private and public regulatory
institutions to promote improvements in the regulation of workers integrated in global
supply chains.
Regulatory complementarities are evaluated in terms of improvements in
regulation of temporary agency employment2 - a primary source of flexibility among
electronics manufacturing facilities in Hungary. Market oriented reforms adopted by the
Hungarian government in the early 1990s to integrate into the global economy through
22 According to the Hungarian legislation, temporary agency workers refer to workers who are employed
by a company specializing in recruiting and renting workers, often referred to as labor agency, and then
contracted by a user enterprise for a specific fee (article 193/C of Hungarian Labor Code).
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liberalization of trade and foreign direct investments, generated significant pressure by
the end of the first transition decade to acquire greater flexibility in the labor market
(Bohle&Greskovits, 2012; Kiss, 2007; Bandelj, 2002). Notwithstanding significant labor
law reforms to enable the transition from centrally planned to market oriented economies,
state regulation has remained relatively protective of standard forms of employment
(Kuddo, 2009; Knell and Shrolec, 2005; Czubak, 2002). In the context of political
commitment to promote a functioning market economy based on political stability and
relatively reliable legal system (Emmert, 2008), regulation with respect to standard
employment has been relatively effectively enforced. With greater integration into the
global economy, atypical forms of employment became legalized relatively early on and
regulated through liberal guidelines to allow for greater flexibility in labor markets.
Temporary agency employment has become particularly common form of flexible
employment among large, export-oriented manufacturing establishments over the last
decade (Baranowska, 2008; CIETT, 2010). The increasing reliance on temporary agency
workers among electronics manufacturers has generally been associated with precarious
working conditions including lack of representation by unions, low compensation, high
degree of worker turnover and insecurity for workers (Bormann&Plank, 2010;
makeITfair, 2009). The efforts of labor unions throughout the 2000s to strengthen
national regulation around temporary agency employment were largely ineffective in the
context of weak tripartite negotiations, national bargaining and loose connections with
political parties.
24 Governance indicators reflecting quality of institutions, including government effectiveness, regulatory
quality, rule of law, and control of corruption were all relatively high for Hungary relative to other nations
from Eastern Central Europe. The magnitude of these indicators can be seen on Table 7A in the Appendix.
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Two electronics manufacturing factories form this national context of weak labor
institutions nonetheless improved working conditions for temporary agency workers
during the second half of the 2000s through private-public regulatory complementarities.
In the mid 2000s, both factories employed a large number of temporary agency workers
to accommodate volatility in the volume of production and provided precarious working
conditions for these employees. Temporary agency workers at both facilities were
compensated with payments that on average were 20 percent lower than wages of
"regular" employees 25, were not given standard contracts even after several years of
continuous use of their services, and were not included in labor union representation. The
implementation of transnational corporate social responsibility initiatives produced
improvements in the regulation of temporary agency workers at both of these facilities
through their interactions with national regulatory institutions.
The extent and processes driving the regulatory complementarities at the two
facilities, however, differed considerably. Improvements at the first factory, referred to as
facility Hungary Electronics 1 (HE 1), included higher levels of compensation for
temporary agency workers, inclusion of subcontracted employees in collective
representation, and some initial measures to transfer temporary agency employees to
standard employment contracts. These developments were brought about by the strategic
actions of the local trade union that used transnational governance efforts and state
regulation to improve protection of temporary agency workers at the facility. At the
second factory, referred to as facility Hungary Electronics 2 (HE2), there was also an
increase in compensation of workers, along with improved coordination across the
25 Regular or standard employees refer to personnel hired through standard, open-ended contracts.
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facility and its labor agencies to continue monitoring their payments, but no changes in
the representation of temporary agency workers by the local trade union. These
improvements were achieved through the efforts of private auditors to enforce national
regulation regarding comparable working conditions provided for standard and
subcontracted employees. These differences across the processes driving regulatory
improvements at the two facilities were mainly the result of different styles of
implementation of transnational corporate governance institutions they were integrated
into. While the transnational social responsibility institution in place at facility Hungary
Electronics 1 (HE 1) encouraged engagement of local stakeholders, the governance
institution implemented at facility Hungary Electronics 2 (HE2) relied more on audits to
improve working conditions and employment relations.
This chapter sets out with a short introduction to the main industrial policies and
development strategy promoted by the Hungarian government since early transition years
that have been relevant for the development of the electronics industry in the country
over the years. It then proceeds with a discussion of the consequences of these policies
and of the emerging production regime on employment relations and working conditions
in the Hungarian economy through the 2000s, focusing especially on flexible
employment practices. The main section of this thesis consists in the contextualized case
study analysis of two electronics facilities from Hungary that supply major corporations
from industrialized countries. These cases not only illustrate the precarious working
conditions associated with temporary agency employment among electronics
manufacturing factories in Hungary, but also analyze and discuss the improvements that
were brought about by complementary interactions across domestic and transnational
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regulatory institutions. The chapter concludes with a brief summary and discussion of the
analysis.
The Global Market Oriented Development Path of Hungary and the Rise of Export
Oriented Foreign Manufacturing Sectors
Unlike most transition economies from Eastern Central Europe, Hungary has
promoted foreign direct investments and export oriented manufacturing since early stages
of the transition process (Bohle&Greskovits, 2012; Stark&Vedres, 2003; EBRD, 2011).
A representative from the Hungarian Investment and Trade Development Agency
(Magyar Befektetesi es Kereskedelemfejlesztesi Ugynokseg) (ITD Hungary) 26, an
organization founded in 1993 to help implement the government's investment and trade
policies, remarked the following about the mindset of policy makers in the 1990s:
"foreign direct investment was considered a means of achieving a whole set of other
policy objectives such as industrial and regional development, strengthening the trade
balance, promoting more advanced technologies and research and development activities,
generating new jobs". While most countries from the region adopted some restrictions on
privatization through foreign investments, privatization and economic reforms in
Hungary were highly favorable towards foreign direct investments from more advanced
economies (Bandelj, 2003; Sass, 2004; Nolke&Vliegenhart, 2009; Bohle&Greskovits,
2012).
Governmental efforts to attract foreign direct investment in the early 1990s relied
on a complex variety of measures, including both economic incentives and
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political/institutional provisions. The economic incentives included land concessions, tax
breaks and financial incentives, often based on direct negotiations with potential investors
(Sass, 2004; Kiss, 2007; Wang et al, 1995). Investments in one of the major electronics
manufacturing sites in Hungary by Nokia corporation, for example, were met with special
incentives that included a ten years long holiday from profit tax and five years long
holiday from local tax. Additionally, the Hungarian government also provided land and
infrastructure free of charge, as well as generous state aid package to encourage
employment27 . Industrial Free Trade Zones established by the Hungarian government in
the early 1990s also played an important role in attracting export oriented, technology-
intensive foreign direct investments (Bormann&Plank, 2010).
The early market oriented approach of Hungary also emphasized the importance
of a stable political environment and good governance institutions to attract foreign
investments and integrate into global markets (Stiglitz, 1998; Kapur and Webb, 2000;
Woods, 2005). What exactly this translates into for institutions has not always been clear,
but the quality of governance institutions in Hungary by the end of the 1990s was
superior to most countries from the region (Schimmelfenning&Sedelmeier, 2007).
Tripartite institutions in Hungary, for example, were set up and used mainly to maintain
social stability and confer legitimacy to policy and institutional reforms in Hungary
(lankova, 2002, 2004; Hethy, 2001). Through the 2000s, Hungary fared relatively well in
the region with respect to rule of law, quality of regulation, control of corruption,
27 This amount was approximately 200 million Hungarian Forints, the equivalent of 670,000 USD.
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although still below the overall quality of institutions in most Western European nations
(WorldBank, 2013; Wallace&Latcheva, 2006)28.
These early efforts to promote foreign direct investments in the country
eventually led to the emergence of strong foreign owned and export oriented economic
sectors in Hungary. The magnitude of foreign direct investments in Hungary was among
one of the highest in the region by the late 1990s at 44 percent of total gross domestic
production, compared to only 19 percent in Romania and 17 percent in Slovenia
(UNCTAD, 2005). Approximately 26,000 companies with foreign participation operated
in Hungary in 2001 that accounted for about 80 percent of international trade (Sass,
2004). According to the estimation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), the inflow of foreign direct investment in Hungary between
1993 and 2000 contributed to about 80 percent of the job creation between during that
time period (UNCTAD, 2005).
Significant investments projects were made in automotive and electronics
industry, two industrial sectors that were targeted by the Hungarian government to
promote industrial restructuring and socio-economic development in the country
(Nolke&Vliegenhart, 2009; EBRD, 2011). While Hungary had some legacies in the
electronics industry that reached back to the socialist era, the sector became particularly
important for the Hungarian economy after transition to market economy. Opening up the
Hungarian economy to the global market in the early 1990s exposed its electronics
industry to harsh competition from the technologically advanced industries from North
28 Please see table 7A in the Appendix for more detailed comparisons across the three national settings
included in the study.
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America, Asia and Western Europe (Bormann&Plank, 2011). Domestic firms were either
closed, restructured or sold to investors (Kataria&Trabold, 2004).
The revival of electronics manufacturing in Hungary took place during the first
transition decade and was driven almost exclusively by foreign transnational corporations
as a significant share of the initial inflow of foreign investments concentrated in
electronics manufacturing. During the period leading up to 2001, Hungary attracted more
than 60 percent of investments in electronics manufacturing in Central and Eastern
Europe (Kalotay, 2005). The dynamic growth of the sector was mostly due to
investments of major transnational electronics companies such as IBM, Flextronics,
Nokia, Philips and Samsung, and so on, to capitalize on cheap labor and proximity to end
markets. These were mostly export platforms of major lead corporations set up to serve
consumers from Western Europe, North America and the Middle East. The share of
foreign ownership in the electronics industry has reached 84 percent by 2001 and
continued to remain significant throughout the years (Sass, 2004; Nolke&Vliegenhart,
2009). Although the growth of the industry has slowed down over the 2000s, at the end of
the decade the electronics sector represented around a third of outputs and employed
close to a quarter of the Hungarian active labor force in manufacturing (Eurostat, 2013).
The economic recession had a powerful impact on the Hungarian economy, but affected
the sector less strongly (ITD, 2012).
29 Source: http://www.hita.hu/Content.aspx?ContentlD=4d45a945-daec-4a7c-b6f2-b291c317b865.
According to my calculations, the decline in the electronics industry in the aftermath of the economic
recession was by 16 percent, relative to the fall in manufacturing outputs by 24 percent. Recovery followed
quickly from 2010 on (Eurostat, 2013).
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Growing Pressure for Flexible Employment: The Emergence of Temporary
Agency Employment in Hungary
This global market oriented approach with extensive reliance on foreign direct
investment from the early transition era had important implications on labor regulation
and practices in subsequent years. The growing importance of manufacturing integrated
in global industries gradually intensified the pressure for cheap and flexible forms of
employment to strengthen economic competitiveness (Milberg, 2004). Notwithstanding
extensive set of changes to the labor legislation after the collapse of the socialist regime,
labor market regulation has remained relatively protective of traditional forms of
employment (Kuddo, 2009; Knell&Shrolek, 2005). Flexibilisation in the Hungarian
context manifested itself primarily in the legalization of atypical forms of employment
and softening the application of the rules of full-time employment to these types of
employment (Czuban, 2002).
The regulation of temporary agency work, as a particular form of atypical
employment, presented important opportunities for both policy makers and employers in
the early 2000s. Employers saw temporary agency work as an important source of cheap
and flexible labor to meet requirements of major buyers with respect to low cost and
volatility in the volume of production. Representatives of the Hungarian Development
Agency and the American Chamber of Commerce in Hungary noted that several
investors expressed their expectations for flexible employment during initial negotiations
and through their lobbying activities once a manufacturing site was established. Policy
makers saw temporary agency work initially as an important source of national
competitiveness, and later on as a possible platform to generate more employment. As
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one official from the Hungarian Development Agency noted: "Foreign investors
expressed explicitly their preference for employment flexibility during initial negotiations
with the agency. Increasing the flexibility of employment institutions came to be seen as
a potential institutional advantage relative to other countries from the region to attract
promising foreign investors in the country".
The growing export-oriented manufacturing sector, including the electronics
industry, lobbied early on for the legalization and liberal regulation of temporary agency
employment. Several electronics manufacturing facilities operating in Hungary reported
major fluctuations in their production, with around 40 percent difference between highest
and lowest activity periods. In fact, the pragmatic origins of sub-contracting workers
from another organization reach back to the practices of electronics manufacturing
corporations in the mid 1990s. During this time period, an IBM facility in Hungary, for
example, relied on contracting workers for short time periods from a Hungarian
electronics manufacturing company, Videoton, to flexibilize its workforce and cut back
on costs with human resource management 30. Agency work represented one of the few
issues that most corporations and employers' associations agreed on, and led to
significant collective action on the employers' side. Labor unions during the early 2000s,
on other hand, were preoccupied mostly with the reversal of a set of neoliberal reforms
adopted by the conservative government in power since 1998 that weakened industrial
relations system and reduced protection for full-time employees in Hungary (EIRO
Hungary (b), 2003).
30 These lending agreements used stipulations in the Hungarian Labor Code referring to off-site assignment
of direct employees of the Videoton company to perform work at the IBM site.
98
The Hungarian government finally legalized the practice of temporary agency
work in 2001 with very liberal regulation of the terms of employment (Governmental
Ordinance 118/2001). The focus on providing employment flexibility and achieving
greater national competitiveness is reflected in the ministerial motivation introducing the
law proposal with respect to temporary agency work in 2000. This document explicitly
notes that: "the responsibilities of the Hungarian legal framework ought not to focus
solely on the protection of employees' interests. It has to consider and harmonize the
interests of both employees and employers in a general effort to increase national
economic competitiveness."3 1 The regulatory framework adopted by the Hungarian
government in the early 2000s was very liberal with no restrictions on purpose or
duration of use, or the working conditions to be provided for these employees at user
facilities. Hungarian regulatory framework of temporary agency employment was often
compared to the Anglo-Saxon liberal system due to its relatively liberal approach (TUC,
2005).
The significance of agency work increased considerably in Hungary over the last
decade. The share of temporary agency employees was estimated to be around 2.7
percent of the total workforce before the onset of the economic recession (MMOSZ,
2011). Temporary agency workers in Hungary consist mainly of manual workers with
lower levels of education, employed for lower-skill manual jobs (CIETT, 2009;
EFILWC, 2006). Multinational manufacturing companies operating in Hungary have
been the most important consumers of temporary agency work (CIETT, 2010;
31 This approach towards regulation of temporary agency work persisted throughout the year as both
representatives of employers' associations and the Hungarian government justified demands for liberal
regulation of agency work on the need to maintain economic competitiveness relative to the regulatory
frameworks of neighboring countries that might be more successful at attracting foreign investments
(MOSZ PR person).
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Baranowska,2008; TUC, 2005), with the share of temporary agency employees often
approaching 50 percent of total employees during peak activity periods
(Bormann&Plank, 2010). The significance of temporary agency employment grew more
prominently in Hungary relative to other countries from Eastern Central Europe. While
temporary agency employees represented about 30,000 workers in full-time equivalent
(FTE) in 2002, it nearly doubled by 2007. The number of agency workers in full-time
equivalent was only 30,000 in the much larger Romanian workforce and a mere 2,743 in
Slovenia (CIETT, 2010). These corresponded to penetration rates of about 1.4% in
Hungary, relative to 0.3% in Romania and 0.58% in Slovenia. Another aspect that is
indicative of the dynamic growth of temporary agency employment in Hungary is the
significant increase in the number of agencies from 282 in 2002 to around 757 in 2010.
The number of labor agencies in Romania and Slovenia were 142 in Romania and 73 in
Slovenia in the late 2000s. These differences are summarized on table 3.1 below.
Table nr. 3.1: Prevalence of temporary agency work in Eastern Europe in 2010
Number of Penetration rate (%) Number of labor
temporary agency agencies
workers (in Full
Time Equivalent)
Hungary 55,000 1.40 757
Romania 30,105 .30 142
Slovenia 2,743 .58 73
Source: CIETT, 2010
With the growing significance of temporary agency employment in the Hungarian
economy, precarious working conditions associated with subcontracted temporary
employment became more obvious. The report of the Hungarian Labor Inspectorate from
the mid 2006 noted that irregularities around the contracts and operations of agency work
represented one of the important sources of labor violations in the manufacturing sector
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(OMMF, 2006). Nonetheless, regulation of temporary agency employment has not
become a priority for enforcement agencies as state inspections in subsequent years
focused primarily on eliminating undocumented employment practices, especially among
foreign workers. Representatives of the two most important labor union confederations,
the National Association of Hungarian Unions (Magyar Szakszervezetek Orszagos
Szovetsege) (MSZOSZ) and the League of Independent Unions of Hungary (Fuggetlen
Szakszervezetek Ligaja) (LIGA), as well as civil society organizations focused on
providing legal assistance to workers, also remarked significant differences in the
working conditions provided for temporary employees relative to regular workforce.
According to a representative of the National Association of Hungarian Unions
(MSZOSZ) union, an internal study they conducted in 2009 suggested that agency
workers earned between 20-30 percent less compensation than standard employees with
similar qualifications and job descriptions.
Public-Private Regulatory Complementarities: Regulation of Temporary Agency
Work at Two Electronics Manufacturing Factories
Multinational manufacturing companies operating in Hungary have become
important users of temporary agency work over the last decade (CIETT, 2010). The share
of contracted employees at electronics manufacturing sites often reaches half of the total
workforce during peak activity periods. The prevalence of agency work and the
precarious nature of their working conditions in Hungary have been strongly criticized by
international civil society organizations monitoring working conditions in the global
and/or regional electronics industry (makeITfair, 2010; Bormann&Plank, 2010).
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Hungarian labor unions organizing workers from the industry, the National Association
of Hungarian Unions (Magyar Szakszervezetek Orszagos Szovetsege) (MSZOSZ) and
Hungarian Metalworkers' Union (Vasas Szakszervezeti Szovetseg) (Vasas), have also
raised concerns regarding the increasing prevalence of these employment practices
(EIRO Hungary (b), 2005). Main areas of concern included the relatively low payment of
agency workers, their inferior occupational status, and lack of representation by labor
organizations. Moreover, these positions are also very insecure. As a representative of
National Association of Hungarian Unions (MSZOSZ) reported: "while some workers
face very high volatility as they get assigned to diverse factories on very short terms,
others have been used at specific enterprises for several years, without getting transferred
to the pool of regular employees". Finally, private audits conducted by major
corporations at several electronics manufacturing sites from Hungary also revealed
problems with compensation and working time among temporary agency workers32.
1. Flexible employment practices at two electronics facilities in Hungary
The case studies of two electronics facilities from Hungary, referred to as facility
Hungary Electronics 1 (HE 1) and Hungary Electronics 2 (HE2), that supply major
multinational corporations from Western Europe and North America, illustrate relatively
well the prevalence of these problems associated with temporary agency employment in
the electronics industry. These two facilities were included in the study because they
share a set of important similarities not only with each other, but also with the other
facilities operating in Romania and Slovenia that are included in the study. These
facilities are similar in size, technical sophistication, production profile, foreign
32 Source: These refer to audits conducted by representatives of a major multinational information
technology corporation from Northern America, Hewlett Packard that has been sourcing from six
electronics manufacturing companies from Hungary over the 2000s.
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ownership, export-orientation, and are integrated in transnational governance institutions.
These characteristics are discussed in greater detail in the next paragraphs and then
summarized in Table 3.2.
The two factories included in the study were set up during the 1990s in peripheral
areas of Hungary, through significant investments by foreign corporations. Facility
Hungary Electronics 1 (HE1) was established in 1998 with an investment fund of
approximately 100 million Euros that was generously supported by the Hungarian
government 33. The site specializes mostly in the assembly and maintenance of
information and telecommunication equipments, and manufactures exclusively for a
major Western European brand corporation, referred in the thesis as Corporation
Electronics 1. Facility Hungary Electronics 1 (HE1) is one of the major exporters of
Hungary as it supplies the European, North African and Middle Eastern markets of
Corporation Electronics 1. Over time, production expanded and specialization shifted
from larger volumes of a smaller set of products to smaller quantities of a relatively large
and technically sophisticated range of products34.
While this facility generated a large number of jobs in the periphery of Hungary,
the use of temporary agency workers and the inferior working conditions provided to
them became more significant over the years. In 2008, the facility employed close to
6,000 people and provided a monthly average wage of around 400 Euros (close to 600
USD). Out of the 6000 employees, however, 3000 workers were contracted from eight
labor agencies that operated in the region. A significant share of the temporary employees
33 It was a green-field investment that quickly became one of the biggest manufacturing sites in the country
through ongoing investments.
34 In 2004, for example, the investment was expanded to add an additional 50 Euros million to expand
manufacturing capacity; in 2007 another investment of 10 million Euros were added.
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consisted of Hungarian speakers from Slovakia. According to representatives of human
resources management at the facility, the large share of temporary agency workers was
mainly to acquire greater flexibility in the adjustment of labor input to volatility in
production volume, as well as to outsource a part of human resource services regarding
their recruitment and administration. Volatility at this facility was estimated to be quite
significant, with the volume of manufacturing during low activity periods representing
approximately 65 percent of production during peak times. Temporary agency workers
were mostly direct personnel assigned for technically less sophisticated positions.
Similarly, the establishment of facility Hungary Electronics 2 (HE2) dates back to
the 1990s when it was set up as a smaller facility in the southwestern part of the country.
The initial brown-field investment was encouraged by the generous tax incentives of the
local government. An additional green-field investment of 70 million USD was made in
2000 to essentially double the manufacturing capacity of the site. Facility Hungary
Electronics 2 (HE2) specializes in assembly of electronics products, manufacturing of
some components, and provision of repair services. The computing and
telecommunications industry represented approximately 60-70 percent of its business
over the late 2000s, along with aviation/automotive and medical devices industries as the
other areas of activity. Similarly to facility Hungary Electronics 1 (HE I), this factory also
specializes more in the production of smaller batches of a relatively wide variety of
products. Notwithstanding the greater diversification of the end markets this facility
supplies for, the technical sophistication of production is very similar across the two
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facilities 35 as attested by an electrical engineer who accompanied me during visits to
these facilities.
This facility initially started its activities with only a few hundred people, but the
number of positions grew considerably over the years. By 2008, the facility employed
approximately 5,300 employees. Temporary agency workers represented between 25 and
50 percents of the workforce depending on the intensity of production during a particular
time period. The average wage at this facility was approximately 380 Euros, comparable
to the average compensation at facility Hungary Electronics 1. Similarly to facility
Hungary Electronics 1, these employees were contracted mostly to enable greater
flexibility and meet the volatile fluctuations in production volumes with outputs during
low activity periods representing around 60 percent of the production during very active
months.
Table nr 3. 2: Similarities and divergences across the facilities
Characteristics Facility HE 1 Facility HE2
Established 1998 1994
Size (Number of employees) 6,000 5,300
Production profile Assembly, repair Assembly,
services components, repair
services
Lean manufacturing management system Yes Yes
Volatility (share of lowest production in 65% 60%
highest level of production volume)
Workplace representation (unionized) Yes Yes
Share of temporary agency work 40-50 percent 25-50 percent
Role of temporary agency work Lower skill, direct Lower skill, direct
Reviews of working conditions at these two facilities revealed very similar set of
problems regarding temporary agency employment during the mid 2000s. Firstly, reviews
3S The similarity in technical sophistication across facilities Hungary Electronics 1 and 2 was attested
by an electrical engineer who accompanied me during visits.
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of human resources documents showed that both facilities employed high shares of
temporary agency workers that came close to half of the entire workforce during time
periods of high level of activity. The union representative at facility Hungary Electronics
1 estimated that around 11,000 temporary agency workers were contracted at the facility
over the decade since the establishment of the factory. Secondly, there were no
restrictions with respect to the length of use of temporary agency workers at the facilities.
Several of them had been contracted as agency workers for long time periods and were
provided no security or stability with respect to their employment situation. One
employee at facility Hungarian Electronics 2, for instance, was employed as a temp for
several years. The facility would assign him to work at the factory for 2-3 months at a
time, and then just sign a new temporary contract with him when he was done.
Thirdly, union and audit reports also expressed concerns about the significantly
lower compensation provided to temporary agency workers at the facilities relative to
regular employees. The gap between the compensation of direct personnel with low skill
levels and temporary agency workers with similar qualification and job responsibility
were around 25% at facility Hungary Electronics 1 (HEl) and 30% at facility Hungary
Electronics 2 (HE2). These differences were mostly due to differences in monetary
bonuses that are added to basic pay for workers but nonetheless represent a significant
chunk of the final wages of employees. At facility Hungary Electronics 1 (HEl) these
bonuses were often made conditional on yearly presence, which is inherently problematic
among temporary agency workers due to their volatile time schedules with frequent
interruptions in their use at the facility over the course of the year. At facility Hungary
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Electronics 2 (HE2), local management failed to provide them with performance bonuses,
but sometimes, even with appropriate compensation for weekend work and night shifts.
2. Domestic regulation of temporary agency employment: liberal state
regulation and reluctant unions
The precarious working conditions associated with temporary agency
employment at electronics facilities were greatly enabled by liberal regulation and
deficient enforcement. The legal amendments adopted in 2001 clarified the contractual
position and obligations of the parties but included almost no other stipulations with
respect to the use and terms of employment of contracted employees 36. A whole set of
revisions and additional amendments to the Labor Code were adopted in subsequent
years, but state regulation has nonetheless remained one of the most liberal ones in the
European community and was often compared to the regulatory approaches of liberal
market oriented societies like the United Kingdom and the United States (TUC, 2005).
In the mid 2000s, Hungary was among the few countries from the region that did
not have stipulations with respect to equal treatment of regular and contracted employees,
reasons for use, or limits on duration of use. These specifications were quite common in
the national labor legislations of other European Union member countries, including most
Eastern European nations (TUC, 2005). The only restriction with respect to the use of
temporary agency workers was with reference to their use as substitutes for employees on
strike. Even with respect to the use of temporary agency workers during strikes,
prohibitions were limited only to new temporary agency workers and not to the ones that
36 Employment of workers by the labor agency can be both for open ended or fixed terms, but since
temporary agency work is considered a special category of employment contracts, the same employment
legislation as for regular employees does not apply. For example, in case of contracts between labor
agencies and the workers, there is a shorter period of dismissal, no compensation in case of dismissal,
exemption of stipulations with respect to collective redundancies, etc.
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have already been utilized at the user company (EIRO, 2009). Specific stipulations with
respect to providing equitable employment and working conditions for temporary and
standard employees were adopted only in 2006 in Hungary. These amendments required
equal monetary compensation to be provided for standard and temporary agency
employees after six months of service at a particular facility, and equal in-kind benefits
after two years of employment.
Notwithstanding legal reforms adopted in 2006 to provide greater protection for
subcontracted labor, the inferior compensation and occupational status of temporary
agency workers persisted as enforcement of state regulation has remained relatively weak
(EIRO Hungary (b), 2009). Representatives of trade unions and civil society
organizations expressed concerns repeatedly with respect to the deficient implementation
of comparable conditions in principle. Temporary agency workers continued to receive
compensation that was much lower than wages of employees hired through open-ended
contracts, even though they had similar responsibilities and educational backgrounds. A
study conducted by the trade union pointed out that agency workers earned in average 15
to 20 percent below standard employees in Hungary. Representatives of the union
confederations from Hungary also insisted that enforcement of state regulation regarding
flexible employment practices have also been strategically lax in order to provide more
flexibility for major foreign employers in the country.
Implementation of state regulation regarding temporary agency employment has
been challenged by the relative importance of large foreign industrial investments that
drove exports and provided employment, as well as by technical difficulties to monitor
compensation of workers. Some of the main users of temporary agency employment in
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the Hungarian context are major manufacturing facilities that employ thousands of
workers, make significant contributions to local and national budgets, and are key
exporters in the Hungarian economy. The state has become increasingly accommodating
of the needs of major export oriented sectors and sites to allow for greater flexibility in
employment. Moreover, while the certification of labor agencies has been regulated
relatively effectively, equitable treatment of standard and subcontracted workers at user
enterprises remained more difficult to assess.
The complexity of compensation schemes and the triangular structure of the
employment contract created an information problem that made accurate assessments of
the compensation of standard and atypical employees rather difficult. Facilities Hungary
Electronics 1 and Hungary Electronics 2, for example, contracted with multiple labor
agencies and the administration of the flow of employees represented a challenge even
for the human resource departments of these facilities. Compensation of workers at most
facilities is determined based on complex schemes that include basic wage and a whole
set of financial and in-kind benefits and bonuses. Given the separate book keeping system
between the agency and the user enterprise, it is difficult to investigate the compensation
that workers are entitled to and are effectively paid. The exact types of financial
compensation that temporary agency workers are eligible for during and after the first six
month of their use at a particular facility to comply with the comparable condition
principle was subject of debate in the Hungarian context in the late 2000s (EIRO
Hungary(b), 2008).
In addition to deficient regulation by the state, collective representation of
temporary agency workers has been absent as labor unions at central and company levels
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remained reluctant to organize and represent temporary agency employees in industrial
relations with employers and employers' organizations. This was part of a general
strategy of labor unions to undermine the legitimacy of atypical forms of employment in
the context of limited abilities to impose formal limitations on these practices. Employees
in the electronics industry are generally represented by the company level entities of the
Hungarian Metalworkers' Union (Vasas Szakszervezeti Szovetseg) (Vasas) 37. Its
recruitment campaigns over the last two decades targeted specifically green-field
investments by multinational corporations due to their relatively large size and potential
benefits from acquiring more members, but these efforts did not extend to temporary
employees. Representatives of both National Association of Hungarian Unions
(MSZOSZ) confederation and the Hungarian Metalworkers Union (Vasas) confirmed that
unions generally do not include temporary agency workers. This was true also at both
facilities included at the study, neither of the unions represented or provided services to
temporary agency workers in the mid 2000s. This strategy made sense in a national
context where inclusion of labor unions in national tripartite negotiations served the
primary role to confer legitimacy to economic and political reforms.
Labor union confederations tried to influence state regulation in the framework of
the main tripartite platform, albeit with little success. In the context of relatively good
relations between the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and National Association of
Hungarian Trade Unions (MSZOSZ) confederation after the former facilitated the
reelection of the party in government, labor union demands played a role in adopting the
comparable conditions principle in the Hungarian labor legislations. Notwithstanding the
37 Founded in 1877, the Hungarian metalworkers union is one of the oldest unions that operate in Hungary.
At the end of the 2000s, the union has about 31,000 members from electronics, motor vehicle, and
metallurgical industries from all around the country.
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significant efforts of the MSZOSZ to support the reelection of the Hungarian Socialist
Party (MSZP) in 2004, their demands were met only partially. Initial proposals of the
labor unions included a much broader and stricter set of limitations on the use of
temporary agency employment. The demands put forth by various labor union
confederations included comparable conditions principle, restrictions on the purpose of
use, numerical limitations on the number of subcontracted employees, and stipulations
regarding the employment through open-ended contracts after a specific duration of use.
The ability of labor unions to exert further influence regarding the regulation of
temporary agency employment has remained largely unsuccessful throughout the 2000s,
especially after political connections across the main leftist party and one of the key labor
union confederations were dissolved. Most labor unions discontinued any connection
with political parties by the end of the 2000s to acquire greater legitimacy, and political
parties also refrained from close ties with labor union to maintain credibility regarding
their market orientation (Avdagic, 2005). The National Association of Hungarian Trade
Unions (MSZOSZ) was the last union confederations to have some connections with the
Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialiats Part) (MSZP) but these finally
discontinued in 2006 after a major political scandal surrounding the prime minister and
leader of the Hungarian Socialist Party. A representative of Democratic League of
Independent Trade Unions (LIGA) confederation, for example, expressed discontent with
respect to the fact that the National Interest Reconcialiation Council (Orszagos
Erdekegyezteto Tanacs) (OET), the main tripartite forum of Hungary, would
systematically prioritize the interests of investors, and accused the government of
engaging in interest coordination only with respect to employers' associations. This is
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consistent with the scholarly literature pointing to the subordination of industrial relations
system to the primary strategy of the Eastern Central European governments to promote
and accommodate foreign investors (Aguilera&Dabu, 2006; Bandelj, 2009).
3. Evaluating the extent of regulatory complementarities at the facilities
Within this national context with weak labor relations institutions and segmented
regulation of the labor market where precarious working conditions for temporary agency
employment is the norm, improvements in regulation of agency workers might seem
unlikely to come about. And yet, at both facilities included in the study, improvements in
the regulation of temporary agency workers unfolded gradually over the 2000s, driven by
complementary interactions across private transnational and public domestic regulation.
The adoption of private transnational regulatory initiatives by the lead corporations,
corporations Electronics 1 and Electronics 2, in the mid 2000s interacted with Hungarian
state and collective regulatory institutions in ways that enabled improvements in the
social regulation of agency workers at the two facilities.
At facility Hungary Electronics 1 (HE 1), local management adjusted its payment
arrangements to include temporary agency workers into its bonus schemes, and set up a
systemic plan to transition temporary agency workers to standard contracts at an annual
rate of 200 employees. Additionally, the local union extended membership and
representation to temporary agency workers at the facility, a rather unique development
that diverged significantly from what was generally the norm at establishments located in
the country. The union also initiated a recruitment campaign specially targeted towards
agency workers employed in the region to be represented through a special department of
the regional representative office. Finally, in addition to more traditional approaches to
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address labor concerns through collective representation and bargaining, the union also
initiated the establishment of a multi-stakeholder certification program of labor agencies
that operate in the region.
At facility Hungary Electronics 2 (HE2) improvements were somewhat more
limited but nonetheless significant considering the national trend in the country. Local
management of the facility agreed to retroactively pay all due weekend and night shift
benefits to contracted employees, and eventually consented also to extend its
performance bonus scheme to temporary agency workers. While these adjustments were
initially limited to the information and communication technology department of the
facility where the manufacturing activities supplying corporation Electronics 2 take
place, the company union helped to diffuse these practices at other departments at the
facility. Moreover, local management representatives adopted an improved system of
information sharing between the user facility and the 9 labor agencies it worked with.
These developments are summarized in table nr. 3. 3. The table illustrates that while
improvements at the second facility were more limited to reducing discriminatory
practices between temporary agency and core standard employees, regulatory
developments at facility HE I included a broader range of developments.
Table nr. 3. 3: Improvements over time: Divergences in the extent of improvements
Facility HEl Facility HE2
Improvements in regulation of temporary agency
work
e Endow workers with rights and
reduce discrimination
* Set limits on extensiveness
* Empower through representation
* Provide insurance for vulnerable
groups such as unemployed, seniors, the
sick, etc.
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4. The onset of regulatory complementarities through transnational
regulatory initiatives
These developments were the result of complementary interactions across state
domestic and transnational private regulation unfolding in the Hungarian context over the
second half of the 2000s. Following the major reputational concerns in the global apparel
and textile industries due to precarious working conditions at supplier sites, most large
corporations in the electronics industry adopted transnational governance initiatives in the
mid 2000s to promote corporate social responsibility in their supply chains. These efforts
were adopted both by original brand manufacturers and major manufacturing service
providers in the electronics industry. As part of collective efforts to promote better
working conditions throughout the industry, the Electronics Industry Citizenship
Coalition (EICC) was established in 2004. Notwithstanding a gradual convergence
towards industry-level action with respect to adopting and implementing a set of
principles regarding social and environmental standards throughout the industry, there is
still considerable variation in the style of implementation of these transnational
regulatory efforts.
The major corporations the facilities in the study manufacture for are some of the
most dedicated corporations in the global electronics industry to promote social
sustainability. Their institutions of transnational governance, however, differ
considerably in the main implementation approaches. While Corporation Electronics 1
emphasizes engagement with local stakeholders to facilitate transnational governance,
Corporation Electronics 2 focuses more on unilateral auditing and corrective actions to
achieve compliance with its labor standards throughout the supply chain.
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The main approach adopted by Corporation Electronics 1 to promote social
responsibility emphasizes the importance of engagement with social stakeholders
involved with social and environmental issues. Its partners in the past included Oxfam,
World Wildlife Organization, the European Metalworkers' Union, and various less-
known governmental and non-governmental organizations from around the world.
Similarly, in host societies where most of its products are manufactured and associated
services are provided, Corporation Electronics 1 has put an emphasis on engaging with
local stakeholders to monitor and address labor concerns. As part of its general corporate
social responsibility program, Corporation Electronics 1 adopted a Steering Committee to
enable cooperation with local actors and facilitate the implementation of the program
throughout the supply chain. The transnational governance institution of the corporation
also relies to some extent on auditing, albeit to a much lesser extent than Corporation
Electronics 2.
The transnational corporate responsibility initiatives of Corporation Electronics 2,
on other hand, relies primarily on consistent auditing, perfecting evaluation methods and
instruments, tracking violations, formulating coherent corrective action plans to address
precarious working conditions through its production base. Another important aspect of
its approach is to engage first tier suppliers in rolling out its monitoring efforts further
down the supply chain by conducting similar style of audits and corrective actions with
second-tier suppliers. Corporation Electronics 2 is also member of several international
forums and organizations set up to facilitate diffusion of corporate social responsibility
practices throughout the industry but has a relatively limited experience with engaging
with local actors, particularly labor unions, to address labor concerns at manufacturing
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site. The main coordinator of the central corporate social responsibility program of
Corporation Electronics 2 in North America clearly stated that the leadership of
Corporation Electronics 2 does not believe in and support labor unions because they are
based on the idea of making a division between the workers and managers. "In a world of
global competition, the emphasis should be on cooperation between workers and manager
as we compete together in a global market environment".
Implementation of these different styles of transnational regulatory institutions
generated interesting and important differences not only in the extent, but also in the
processes of regulatory complementarities emerging in the Hungarian context. Union
efforts to influence state regulation of temporary agency workers through interventions in
the tripartite institution have been largely unsuccessful. Amendments to the Hungarian
legislation in 2006 were limited to stipulations regarding comparable conditions principle
and ignored most of the additional union demands regarding the conditions and duration
of use of temporary contracted labor. The unions' strategy of undermining the legitimacy
of reliance on temporary agency workers by not including temporary workers in their
representation has also been unsuccessful. These institutional constraints set an incentive
for employee representatives and agents of transnational corporations included in the
implementation of the social responsibility programs to engage with alternative
institutions, whenever possible, to improve regulation of agency workers. The
decentralized character of the national industrial relations system in Hungary facilitated
this divergence from the strategies of the central union. The differences in the
transnational regulatory initiatives resulted in the emergence of different processes
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through which one type of regulatory initiatives have been used and sometimes redirected
to complement for the deficiencies of the other type of regulatory efforts.
5. Union-driven regulatory complementarities in the context of stakeholder
oriented transnational regulatory approaches
The integration of facility Hungary Electronics 1 (HE 1) in the stakeholder
engagement oriented transnational governance approach of Corporation Electronics 1
enabled the emergence of regulatory complementarities with important implications on
working conditions of temporary agency employees. The combined presence of
transnational private and national public regulation compensated for each other's
deficiencies in the national institutional context of weak labor relations in Hungary.
Domestic regulation of temporary agency employment lacked enforcement through state
interventions or through effective industrial relations negotiations through the 2000s, but
provided legitimacy to regulatory guidelines regarding the compensation of
subcontracted workers. The transnational corporate regulatory approach of Corporation
Electronics 1 then became the institutional platform to facilitate implementation of state
regulation. The corporate social responsibility program, however, did not act as an
enforcement mechanism on its own, but was mobilized through the industrial relations
system that the facility was integrated into. The main actor at facility HEl guiding and
leading the process of interweaving across alternative regulatory regimes in
complementary manner was the local labor union, hence the reference "union driven
regulatory complementary processes" at the site. Corporate transnational social
responsibility, state regulation, and industrial relations, all played a role in enabling the
emergence of these improvements.
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The underlying conditions for union driven regulatory complementarities to come
about included the incentives set by the institutional weaknesses of national labor
relations system, as well as the opportunities set by the transnational regulatory
approaches of the lead corporation. Finally, the absence of institutionalized coordination
in the Hungarian industrial relation system also facilitated the ability of the local unions
to act upon the incentives and take advantage of the institutional opportunities that the
facility became integrated into. The following paragraphs trace the emergence of union-
driven regulatory complementarities from the perspectives of the incentives and
opportunities set by national and transnational institutions.
The weak industrial relations system with delegitimized and powerless labor
unions that facility HE 1 is embedded into constrained local initiatives by the union to
improve working conditions of temporary agency employees through traditional
institutional platforms, and set incentives to engage with alternative regulatory
approaches. The labor union at facility HE 1 was set up relatively soon after the
establishment of the site as central representatives of the Hungarian Metalworkers'
Federation (Vasas) encouraged the unionization of large green-site investments by
foreign investors due to the potential they represented in terms of new membership. As
labor unions were generally delegitimized throughout the 1990s due to their socialist
legacy, the Vasas union at facility HE 1 struggled to recruit members during its initial
phase of existence. The credibility of the union and its membership grew only in the early
2000s after union representatives confronted the local management over a conflict
regarding the working time schedules of employees during winter holidays. Union
membership increased dramatically and included approximately 20 to 30 percent of the
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workforce by the mid 2000s. Consistent with the general trend in the Hungarian context,
the union at facility HE 1 did not recruit temporary agency workers even though their
number was increasing significantly.
Notwithstanding poor coordination across industrial representation and relations
at company and national levels in Hungary, company level unions initially followed the
strategy of national unions of delegitimizing temporary agency employment through non-
representation. During the mid 2000s, the local Vasas union at facility HE 1 approached
central representatives of the National Association of Hungarian Trade Unions
(MSZOSZ), that Vasas union was part of, about the growing prevalence of this type of
employment. Representatives of the union confederation informed local union
representatives of their continued efforts to influence the politics of labor regulation.
Notwithstanding the relatively good relations across the Hungarian Socialist Party
(MSZP) and the major labor union confederation MSZOSZ, union demands in the
framework of the tripartite institution National Council of Interest Reconciliation (OET)
to strengthen state regulation of temporary agency employment were met only partially in
the context of increasing dependence on foreign corporations and transnational
production regimes. Initial demands of the unions included restrictions on the use of
temporary agency workers, as well as the immediate application of comparable
principles. The adoption of restrictions was however strongly opposed by employers'
associations and major corporations. While the comparable conditions principle was
eventually included in the Hungarian legislation in 2006, the new amendments stipulated
their application for pecuniary compensation only after six months, and of compensation
in-kind only after 2 years of use. The implementation of this stipulation has been rather
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limited in subsequent years. At facility HEl, the share of temporary agency workers
continued to grow and inferior working conditions persisted.
Facility level efforts by the local labor union to address labor concerns remained
limited over the early 2000s as industrial relations in the Hungarian context were
becoming increasingly decentralized and undermined by a significant power asymmetry
between large corporations and workers' organizations. The labor union at facility HEI
interacted with local management on a fairly regular basis to address general issues
related to standard employees, but was very reluctant to approach local management
about more controversial issues, including the precarious working conditions among
temporary agency workers at the facility. This approach of subservience and power
asymmetry between local management and managers at large foreign companies was
quite common in Hungary and other Eastern Central European where foreign investors
had represented great political importance in the national contexts (Aguilera&Dabu,
2006). Facility HE I, for example, has been one of the major manufacturing sites in the
Hungarian economy, of both national and regional importance. The company has been
one of the major exporters from the country throughout the 2000s. Celebrations of key
moments in the factory's history - such as the inauguration of the new addition to the
manufacturing site or the surpassing important landmarks in the volume or type of
production, were often attended by the prime minister of Hungary and other top
government officials. As reluctant as the union representatives were initially to upset
local politics by making too strong of demands on local management, the union
eventually addressed the local management in 2006 when the comparable conditions
principle was introduced into state regulation about their concerns regarding the inferior
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payment and growing number of temporary agency workers and demanded changes in its
practices. The company representatives, however, simply reminded them of the necessity
of their practices and maintained the status quo.
The submissive approach of the union extended even to state-society relations at
local level regarding enforcement of labor regulation. In addition to reluctance to
approach the local management directly, the union leadership was also unwilling to
appeal to the local enforcement agencies to remediate company practices with respect to
contracted labor. The primary reason for their hesitation, as the representative explained,
was that they "were trying to avoid generating tension with local management".
Complaints can be filed anonymously and the labor inspectorate is obligated to follow up
on them, but as the representative noted: "These actions have a way to get to the ears of
the local managers". A new Hungarian manager was just assigned at the facility and the
union representatives were particularly eager to establish good relations with the new
leadership.
As one of the major manufacturing sites in the region that employs several
thousands of people and contributes millions of Euros to the local budget in taxes, the
facility had relatively privileged position with local governmental agencies. Interviews
with labor inspectors from the regional labor inspectorate office revealed significant
flexibility towards understanding the fine balance between their responsibilities to
enforce compliance with state regulation and the need to allow for employment flexibility
among large export-oriented industrial establishments. When asked about their awareness
of the large number of contracted workers employed at facility HE 1, one of the labor
inspectors noted: "Facility HEl represents one of the major employers and has
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contributed significantly to social and economic development in the region. As the global
electronics industry is characterized by great uncertainty, manufacturing companies need
to be able to adjust their labor input relatively quickly and at a moderate cost."
Considering the large number of Slovakian workers hired at the facility, the local labor
inspectorate focused mostly on ensuring that the documentations of these employees and
their legal contracts with local labor agencies comply with state regulation.
In the context of institutional failure to enforce stronger regulation of temporary
agency employment, incentives were strong to consider alternative strategies. The
transnational corporate social responsibility initiative that facility HE1 became integrated
into over the decade was eventually used as an alternative institutional platform for the
local union to promote better regulation of temporary agency employees at the facility.
Union representatives were first informed about the corporate social responsibility
program of Corporation Electronics 1 in 2007. The local management passed on the code
of conduct to union representatives and provided some additional informative material to
them about this transnational initiative. While some union representatives were familiar
with the term of corporate social responsibility from media sources, they understood it
mostly as public relations strategy of corporations to represent themselves in positive
light and somehow excuse or hide their exploitative practices.
The local union started to consider the relevance of this institution for labor
concerns at the facility, when representatives were contacted directly by the newly
established Corporate Social Responsibility Steering Committee of Corporation
Electronics 1 to establish a channel of communication regarding social practices at the
facility. At the beginning of 2008, representatives of both union and management were
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invited to participate in a workshop organized by Corporation Electronics 1 regarding the
meaning of corporate social responsibility and the particular features of the program to
raise labor standards throughout their supply chain. One of the local union representatives
described this event organized on the site of the facility as a platform where both factory
management and union representatives were placed on equally inferior position in
reference to the representatives and demands of Corporation Electronic 1. The local
workers organization recognized a potential ally in the lead corporation to balance the
power asymmetry at the local level and engage with local management on a more equal
footing. In other words, the existence of corporate social responsibility program of
Corporation Electronics 1 and the inclusion of both management and workers'
organization in their informational and training programs had positive implications on
local industrial relations that are essential component of the national regulatory system.
Notwithstanding the local character of discontent with flexible labor practices at
the facility, the union at facility HE 1 used the transnational regulatory effort of
Corporation Electronics 1 to put pressure on local management to adopt changes in their
practices. Empowered by their involvement in Corporation Electronics 1's transnational
corporate social responsibility program, the local union approached again the local
management regarding their concerns about temporary agency employment. Shortly after
the training program on Corporate Social Responsibility, union representatives compiled
data on the number, duration of use, and compensation of temporary employees and
approached representatives of the human resources management during one of their
regular meetings. This initiative proceeded with a new meeting that included also the
plant manager in addition to the human resources management, and the unions continued
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to frame the dialogue in terms of the expectations of Corporation Electronics 1 to
promote socially sustainable practices. Initial requests to change company practices
regarding temporary agency work were linked to the corporate social responsibility
principles, particularly its emphasis on non-discriminatory practices and compliance with
state regulation.
As negotiations across local management and union proceeded, the general
framing and common reference by the union to the transnational corporate social
responsibility of Corporation Electronics 1 was combined with reliance on state
legislation to legitimize particular demands regarding the compensation and use of
temporary agency employees on site. Labor union representatives made clear references
to stipulations of the National Labor Code regarding comparable conditions to be
provided in compensation for standard and subcontracted employees. While the presence
of the transnational corporate social responsibility had implications on improvements on
industrial relations system, stipulations in state regulation were necessary to make legal
claims on the need to adjust compensation schemes at the facility to provide higher
payment for subcontracted workers. With respect to compensation of subcontracted
workers, the management agreed to extend equal payment only for subcontracted
employees who had been working at the facility for more than 6 months, as stipulated by
state legislation. Additional requests to limit the use of temporary agency employees to
one year were dismissed by the local management as part of the negotiation, reflecting
the necessity of the authority of state legislation adopt initial changes. This development
indicates that sometime additional pressure by the lead corporation can nudge local
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practices ahead, but legality of these demands still sets constraints on how far the local
decision-makers are willing to go.
Improved coordination across management and unions facilitated by the
transnational corporate social responsibility program thus became an arena to discuss
and negotiate further changes at the site, setting in place a virtuous cycle of ongoing
interactions across domestic and transnational regulation, setting in place regulatory
improvements. Labor unions considered that extension of the transnational social
responsibility program of Corporation Electronics 1 played an important role in engaging
the local management to cooperate about adopting changes in local management and
union practices. Human resource management representatives confirmed that while they
have already had frequent interactions with local management to coordinate over
employment practices and labor standards at the facility, the corporate social
responsibility program of Corporation Electronics 1 "strengthened the commitment of
local management to promote social dialogue with the union and seek common
solutions".
These discussions and negotiation across the facility leadership and union
representatives contributed to the extension of union membership to temporary agency
employees and their representation in collective bargaining. As local management agreed
to adjust the compensation of temporary agency employees to that of standard workers,
they represented less of a threat to become substitutes for standard employees and
presented potential benefits to the union to combine their interests in collective
negotiations. The inclusion of temporary agency employees in the union membership was
a rather unique development at the time when most local unions continued to refrain from
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recruiting subcontracted labor in its membership. The inclusion of these employees in
representation and extension of the collective agreements meant that the same rights
would apply for these employees and that the union would monitor the implementation of
the collective agreement for agency workers as well. While in-kind benefits, such as the
cafeteria system and transportation services, were not extended to temporary agency
workers, their coverage by the collective agreement resulted in an increase of
approximately 25 percent in the compensation of all temporary agency workers,
regardless of the length of their use at the facility.
The transnational corporate social responsibility program provided considerable
leverage for the local union to make additional demands and gain the cooperation of local
management at the facility. In the absence of state regulation regarding the limitation on
use of subcontracted labor, the local union appealed again to the corporate social
responsibility program of Corporation Electronics 1 by addressing the Steering
Committee directly. The local union sent a report to representatives of management at
both the manufacturing and lead companies on the high share of subcontracted employees
at the facility and appealed for intervention to change these practices. Faced with
additional pressure from another regulatory authority, local management eventually
consented to setting up a joint plan to transfer a number of workers from temporary to
open-ended contract, with sensitivity to oscillations in the production volume. Even
though no limitations were set on the purpose or length of use of temporary agency
workers at the facility, local management eventually committed to transitioning between
200 and 300 workers per year to standard contracts.
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Considering the high turnover rate and short-term assignments of some of the
agency workers utilized at the facility, the representatives of the factory union eventually
approached the local management to support their efforts to organize temporary agency
workers at the regional level. The industrial park that facility HE 1 operates in also hosts a
few suppliers that specialize in the manufacturing of some of the components and
provision of packaging materials, and are also important users of temporary workers
contracted from the labor agencies. The legality of freedom of association and operation
of unions is clearly stipulated by Hungarian government, although local and regional
representation schemes of temporary agency employees were completely absent in
Hungary in the 2000s. As the union representatives in Hungary receive payment by the
facility to represent workers at the facility and coordinate with local management at the
facility, a general practice throughout the region that is also regulated by law, the
agreement of the local management was essential. With an emphasis on promoting
corporate social responsibility through the entire value chain, the local management
appealed again to the transnational corporate social responsibility program to acquire the
cooperation of the local management regarding their regional representation efforts. A
regional representation unit for atypical employees was established in 2010, in
cooperation with other Vasas unions operating in the region in general, and the industrial
park in particular.
In the absence of an integrated industrial relation system in Hungary, the local
union had considerable leeway to adopt local solutions and proposed a truly innovative
approach to promote more equitable working conditions for subcontracted and standard
employees. Realizing that negotiating and concluding collective bargaining with labor
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agencies or user enterprises at the regional level faced both organizational and political
challenges, the representatives of the union initiated a voluntary certification program of
labor agencies operating in the region. This approach was inspired by private governance
institutions that became increasingly common in Hungary with the growing presence of
foreign corporations and greater integration into transnational production regimes. To
acquire additional political support and legitimacy to this market based approach, the
union representatives also appealed for the support of the Regional Public Employment
Office to confer greater legitimacy to this initiative. This Regional Public Employment
Office has traditionally been responsible for the regulation of labor agencies operating
under its geographic jurisdiction through the obligation of labor agencies to register with
the agency and audits organized to evaluate compliance with a set of requirements
stipulated by the law to allow for their operation39. These processes however, relied on
very formalistic rules and paid little attention to the actual practices of labor agencies.
The certification initiative proposed by the Vasas union at facility HE 1 was intended to
complement state regulation, through the evaluation of actual practices of the labor
agencies and certification of local labor agencies by union leaders and representatives of
the Regional Employment Office40.
These unique developments at facility HE 1 were enabled by the loose
coordination system across unions and employers in the decentralized and weakly
coordinated Hungarian industrial relations system. Notwithstanding industry level
representation - a legacy from the socialist era, Vasas did not participate in industry level
39 These include: the professional requirement of the employees at the agency, appropriate permanent
office, availability of a collateral of approximately 4,000 Euros.
40 At the time of my last visit at the facility in 2011, this initiative was still in progress and was not yet in
operation.
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collective bargaining. The sector level industrial relations system is very weak in
Hungary, with no collective bargaining in most industries. As a member of the MSZOSZ
Confederation, Vasas is included to some extent in the national regulatory politics,
coordination across the industry level union and the confederation is however much less
extensive as in the cases of Slovenia and Romania. While national level union
representatives set general trends and strategies for factory level unions, coordination
across them is not very dense and does not constrain experimentation with local
solutions.
In summary, the transnational corporate responsibility initiatives that facility HE 1
became integrated into in 2007 played an important role in the onset or processes driving
public-private regulatory complementarities at the facility, and to some extent, at the
regional level. Through its stakeholder oriented approach and direct engagement with
local unions, the private governance institution provided a platform that enabled
balancing out of the power asymmetries between local union and management. This
institution played an essential role in empowering the local union to initiate solutions at
the local and regional levels. The regulatory program of Corporation Electronics 1 was
then used strategically by the local union to facilitate cooperation and coordination with
local management to address concerns with precarious working conditions characterizing
the use of temporary agency workers. While the transnational corporate institution
provided opportunity and an instrument to achieve improvements in the regulation of
temporary workers, the liberal character of state regulation and the decentralized
collective bargaining system set the incentive for the local union to seek solutions with
the help of alternative mechanisms. State regulation played an important role in
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legitimizing union demands regarding specific changes in the working conditions of
temporary agencies, enabling freedom of association at regional level, and in rendering
greater authority to the certification program of labor agencies. These complementarities
resulted in improvements of individual and collective rights of agency workers,
elimination of discriminatory practices, adoption of some restrictions on the use of
agency work, and the initiation of an innovative certification system.
6. Compliance-driven regulatory complementarities in the context of market-
oriented state regulation
Similarly to facility Hungary Electronics 1 (HE 1), regulatory improvements of
temporary agency employment at facility Hungary Electronics 2 (HE2) were contingent
on the combined effects of transnational private regulation, state regulation and industrial
relations that the facility is integrated into. In contrast with the processes of union driven
regulatory complementarities at facility HE 1, however, regulatory developments at
facility HE2 were shaped primarily by the strategic efforts of private auditors to interact
with state regulation, while labor unions had a much more limited role. Transnational
private regulation complemented the weak enforcement of state regulation and played the
role of a direct monitoring and constraining force to facilitate its implementation. It also
improved coordination and information flow across the facility and labor agencies that
facilitate monitoring of working conditions of temporary agency employees by local
management, union and state inspectors. State regulation complemented the weak
legitimacy and accountability of private regulation, and rendered greater authority to the
specific regulatory demands of the lead corporation. Transnational private regulation
excluded labor unions from the monitoring and enforcement process, and labor unions
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only facilitated the diffusion of some of the improved practices at other manufacturing
departments of facility HE2. The main actors driving regulatory change at the facility
were the private auditors of Corporation Electronics 2 and hence the reference as
compliance driven regulatory complementarities at facility HE2.
These processes of regulatory improvements unfolding at facility HE2 are
discussed from the perspective of the national and transnational institutional conditions
facilitating their emergence. The weak national labor relation institutions set incentives
for the local labor union to seek alternative strategies, but these efforts were more limited
in the absence of stakeholder engagement oriented transnational regulatory approach.
While the compliance oriented transnational regulatory approach of Corporation
Electronics 2 did not empower the local union and improve coordination across the union
and management at facility HE2, it provided the opportunity to develop and
institutionalize regular monitoring and coordination across the facility and the labor
agencies from the region. This is essential given the triangular character of the labor
contract connecting the user facility, labor agencies and temporary employees; as well as
the shared responsibility of the user facilities and labor agencies to comply with state
regulation.
Considering the economic and political significance of facility HE2 at both local
and national levels, industrial relations at the enterprise level were also marked by the
generally stronger bargaining position of the local management relative to the union.
Similarly to facility HE I, manufacturing is dedicated almost exclusively to exports and
facility HE2 is therefore one of the key exporters from Hungary. The initial investment
was supported through generous concessions from the Hungarian government that
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persisted to some extent to ensure that manufacturing will not be relocated. In the weak
labor relation institutional setting of Hungary, the Vasas labor union operating at the
facility had considerably smaller economic and political importance, with implications on
industrial relations and working conditions at the facility. Representatives of the local
union had initially been reluctant to approach the local management about the growing
number and inferior compensation provided to temporary employees at the facility,
mainly to avoid tension. Over time however, as the number of temporary agency
employees grew, the union representatives initiated discussions with the department of
human resources management in the mid 2000s about the general state of employment
relations and working conditions at the facility, including concerns regarding the
temporary agency workers. These discussions, however, did not result in any significant
changes in the flexible employment practices at the facility. Local management ignored
the unions' concerns and demands to increase the compensation of temporary agency
employees and limit their numerical presence on site.
With initial efforts to coordinate with local management largely ineffective, the
union eventually appealed to the regional labor inspectorate and submitted a complaint in
2007 about the high share and poor working conditions of temporary agency employees
at the facility. The union had made other complaints in the past regarding labor concerns
among standard employees and the regional labor inspectorate often helped to remediate
the sources of the complaints. This, however, was not the case with respect to regulation
of agency workers at the facility, as the inspectorate didn't address and rectify the low
payment of temporary agency workers and their increasing prevalence at the site. State
enforcement through the labor inspectorate has been deficient at this facility as well,
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given the lack of political will to restrict flexibility large foreign investors and technical
difficulties to detect violations with respect to temporary agency work. Similarly to
facility HE 1, facility HE2 is also a major investment site in the northwestern part of
Hungary, with tax contributions of several millions of Euros by year. The facility is also
an important employer in the area, pulling in workers from rural areas in the region that
have traditionally been affected by high unemployment and increasing levels of poverty.
While state inspections following the complaint submitted by the union resulted
in some penalties for violations of collective rights with respect to overtime, they did not
impose any sanctions for violation of state regulation regarding the precarious conditions
provided for temporary employees. A labor inspector from the regional labor inspectorate
explained that when a complaint is filed by labor unions or employees of any facility,
they usually check for a broader set of issues, not only the issue in case. It is common that
they identify non-compliances connected to other aspects of employment practices than
the ones motivating the initial complaints. State inspectors also noted the challenges of
monitoring compliance "with an increasingly complex and often ambiguous set of
regulatory guidelines, especially as the rate of reforms had increased in the process of
accession and new forms of employment had been adopted". This is consistent with
reports of the International Labor Organizations about the growing difficulties that
inspectors face as atypical forms of employment are becoming increasingly common
around the world (ILO, 2011). Finally, the inspectorate also demonstrated sensitivity
regarding the need for flexibility among major corporations: "Major manufacturing sites
located in the region, such as facility HE2, face significant volatility with respect to the
volume of production and flexibility of employment is very important for them. As major
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employers in this region, we tried to be sympathetic to that necessity." This strategy was
part of the segmented regulatory strategy adopted in Hungary to balance across
employment security and flexibility in the globally integrated sectors.
Although the number of temporary agency workers was growing since the early
2000s, the union leadership remained reluctant to extend its recruitment efforts and
interest representation to include contracted workers. Labor concerns at facility HE2
were to some extent integrated into a national strategy to regulate labor throughout the
economy. As part of the Hungarian Metalworkers' Union (Vasas), some exchange of
information across the local cells and national office of the Vasas union and National
Council of Hungarian Trade Unions (MSZOSZ) confederation existed, but coordination
remained limited in the absence of strong sector level industrial relations. The strategy of
the local union at facility HE2 was shaped only partially by the national trend to avoid
legitimization of this new form of employment by the labor unions. The decision of the
union leadership was also influenced by their strategic efforts to consolidate and
strengthen the position of the union at the facility by recruiting members who are more
likely to stay for a longer time period at the facility.
In the absence of effective institutional platforms in the domestic context to
address labor concerns related to temporary agency employment at facility HE2, the labor
unions also considered alternative transnational approaches to address these problems.
The labor union at facility HE2 interacted more actively with the European Workers'
Council and participated in some of its training. While participation in the European
Workers' Council was generally useful, there had been no direct implications on
industrial relations and working conditions at the facility to the date. Transnational
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corporate social responsibility initiatives were extended to facility HE2 in 2005 as
Corporation Electronics 2 started to implement regular audits at the facility. These audits
included evaluations regarding the labor, health and safety, environmental, and ethical
business practices at the facility, along with the management systems. The evaluations
lasted for about two days and relied on extensive interviews with local management,
reviews of labor contracts and documents regarding the administration of human
resources at the facility, and to a more limited extent, interviews with workers.
Considering the emphasis on monitoring and compliance among the private
auditors trained by Corporation Electronics 2, transnational corporate regulatory efforts
largely excluded local organizations from these processes altogether. Labor unions were
informed about the existence of the transnational regulatory approach strictly from
management as the local leadership was addressing the violations regarding the
inadequate integration of the code of conduct of Corporation Electronics 2 at the facility
and among its suppliers. This entailed the inclusion of information on the Social
Responsibility Code of Conduct of Corporation Electronics 2 in the initial training
material of newly recruited workers, as well as posting information on boards designated
to communication with employees and workers' organizations. With no engagement of
the labor union, the transnational private regulatory institutions provided little to no
opportunities to be used as alternative channel by the union to address labor concerns at
the facility.
Non-compliances with respect to the compensation of temporary agency workers
were first remarked in 2007, when the evaluations revealed that these employees are not
included in the performance bonus and additional payment systems of the facility.
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Stipulations of the code of conduct guiding these corporate monitoring efforts included
directions to comply with national regulation and avoid discriminatory practices of any
sort throughout the supply chain. Moreover, as the issue of comparable conditions
provided for temporary and regular employees became a more prominent concern on both
the European and national labor agenda, the private inspectors of Corporation Electronics
2 with a regional focus on mostly Eastern European suppliers, made a greater effort to
evaluate the working conditions provided for temporary agency workers. An evaluation
of this sort in 2007 resulted in the discovery that while the basic payments were
comparable across external and internal employees at 82,000 HUF at that time (the
equivalent of approximately 360 USD); the compensation of standard employees also
included performance bonuses, overtime and nightshift pay, and cafeteria system that
temporary agency workers were not entitled to. Considering the familiarity of these
auditors with the every-day practices of their supplier facilities and ongoing audits over
several years, the private auditors were relatively well equipped to acquire information
and monitor the working conditions of temporary agency workers at the facility.
The implementation of transnational corporate social responsibility program of
Corporation Electronics 1 however provided other alternatives as it influenced regulatory
developments at the facility through interactions with national regulatory institutions.
There are three aspects of these processes that were particularly relevant for the
emergence of regulatory complementarities and will discuss them one by one in the rest
of the section. The first one refers to the improvement in compensation of temporary
agency workers used at the information and telecommunications department, through
references to national state legislation by private auditors to legitimate and reinforce their
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demands for comparable compensation for contracted labor relative to regular employees.
The second aspect of regulatory interactions consists in the efforts of the local trade union
to diffuse improvements in the compensation of temporary agency workers to the entire
facility. The third aspect refers to the relevance of audit based transnational corporate
social responsibility initiatives for improving coordination across local management and
labor agencies that the facility contracts with, essential also for compliance with state
regulation.
In the absence of legitimacy, characteristic to corporate regulatory authority,
initial requests by private auditors from the local management at facility HE2 were met
with significant resistance. The corrective actions following the audits failed to remediate
compensation of temporary agency employees. Local management considered that they
were complying with national regulation and refused to make amendments in their
practices. In order to address resistance by local managers, the private auditors referred to
European and state legislation with respect to temporary agency employment, including
the comparable pay principle, to legitimate their demand for better working conditions
provided to temporary agency employees. Notwithstanding a systematic deficiency in
enforcing state regulation regarding temporary agency workers in the national regulatory
context, state regulation had considerable legitimacy and authority in the political context
that promoted rule of law as part of its global general market oriented development
strategy (Eggert, 2009). As a result of these pressures, both the bonus system and
cafeteria package was eventually extended to temporary agency workers who have been
working at the facility for longer than six months. The private auditors, in essence, used
state legislation to legitimate their demands to extent financial compensation to
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temporary agency workers and increase pressure on local management to complement the
deficiencies in enforcement of state regulation in the Hungarian context.
As the combined positive influence of transnational private and national state
regulation applied only to the manufacturing department dedicated to supply for
Corporation Electronics 2, further interactions with local industrial relations were
essential to diffuse these improvements at the facility. The adjustments resulting from
complementary interactions across national and corporate regulation applied only to the
production unit where most of the manufacturing activities supplying Corporation
Electronics 2 took place. This represented about 35% percent of the entire business
operations of facility HE2 and close to 70 percent of its operations dedicated to
information and telecommunications industry. Given the higher cost of temporary agency
employees at the production section, the share of temporary agency workers declined
somewhat over the next years. While in 2006 agency workers at this section represented
23% of the workforce, which was relatively close to the general level of 27% of the
workforce at the factory level, by 2009 the gap between the two proportions reached
10%, with 20% in the production section of Corporation Electronics 2 and 30% at the
factory level. Union representatives eventually brought these differences up in a meeting
with local management to try to diffuse these practices to other sections as well. Their
requests for higher compensation throughout the factory were framed in terms of the
transnational regulatory approach of Corporation Electronics 2 and other major clients of
the facility. The improvements regarding compensation of temporary agency employees
were eventually extended to all temporary agency workers at the computing and
telecommunication sections, but did not diffuse over to the automotive and medical
138
instruments manufacturing departments. Perhaps more importantly, as interactions across
private transnational regulation and local industrial relations did not empower local labor
unions, temporary agency workers remained largely excluded from collective
representation in industrial relations at the facility.
Finally, the monitoring-oriented approach of Corporation Electronics 2 to
promote social responsibility throughout its entire supply chain made an additional
contribution to the regulation of temporary agency workers in the Hungarian context. An
important aspect of the transnational corporate governance effort was to engage first tier
suppliers to monitor sustainable labor and environmental practices further down the
supply chain. As most of the material inputs for the activities of facility HE2 are imported
from abroad, mostly from Asia, very few of their suppliers are located in the proximity of
the facility. The most important local suppliers included the labor agencies and the
suppliers of packaging material for the shipment of assembled products. Adopting regular
coordination and information sharing across facility HE2 and the labor agencies not only
improved compliance with corporate regulation, but also has the potential of improving
access to information for workers' organizations and state regulatory agencies.
The efforts to roll out an auditing program to the labor agencies that supply
workers for facility HE2, however, were not immediately embraced by local managers
and took gradual changes over several years to implement. Failure to inform agencies
about the transnational governance initiative was one of the first violations identified at
the facility, reaching back to the first audit in the February of 2005. Audits conducted in
subsequent years revealed that although the local management of facility HE2 informed
the agencies about the code of conduct of Corporation Electronics 2, it failed to include it
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in the contracts signed with the labor agencies. By 2007, the local management included
the code of conduct in the contract but failed to organize actual audits to ensure
compliance. It was largely due to these violations, that the corporate social responsibility
department of the brand corporation eventually organized a capability-building program
focused on raising awareness of the importance of social responsibility major suppliers
from Eastern Europe and their second tier-suppliers, and help institute rolling out the
audits to the entire supply chain located from the region.
The local management at facility HE2 eventually organized the first audits in
2010 and as a result improved the administration system regarding the temporary agency
workers used at the facility. These audits were modeled after the procedures that the
private auditors of major buyer corporations followed at their facility and focused on
interviewing the administrative personnel at the labor agencies, review employment
contracts and documentation regarding the compensation of workers that are used at their
own facility. Considering the triangular relations of employment, these interactions have
been helpful to adopt a better management system with respect to temporary agency
workers that make the working conditions provided for temporary agency workers more
transparent for both the managers of facility HE2 and, potentially, for labor inspectors.
Labor unions, however, have so far not been involved in this process.
In summary, complementarities at this facility have been emerging largely due to
a combination of pressure legitimized by national legislation, diffusion facilitated by
collective representation, and improved coordination between user corporation and labor
agencies. The main contribution of the transnational governance institution was to
achieve better monitoring, generate pressure on adopting more labor friendly practices at
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facility HE2, and to improve coordination across facility management and labor agencies.
A greater familiarity with everyday practices at electronics facilities shared by the private
auditors and authority from the market position of the client corporation were both
essential at initiating some of the changes at this facility. National legislation was
essential to legitimize pressure to adopt more comparable monetary compensation terms
for permanent and temporary workers. In the absence of stipulations with respect to
restrictions of use of agency workers, regulatory improvements failed to go beyond these
influences. Local labor unions largely excluded from the implementation of the private
transnational governance institution played a much more marginal role in this case. Their
efforts to diffuse the regulatory improvements throughout the factory resulted in some
benefits for temporary agency employees, but failed to engage more in improving
representation and regulation of temporary agency workers at the facility.
Conclusions
This chapter illustrated that complementarities across national public and
transnational private regulatory approaches are likely to emerge and lead to significant
improvements in the context of market oriented labor relation institutions. The extents
and processes of regulatory complementarities were evaluated and examined from the
perspective of regulation of temporary agency work, a primary form of employment
flexibility in the Hungarian electronics industry.
National institutions have multiple roles and functions in facilitating the
emergence of complementary interactions across domestic and transnational regulatory
efforts at the two facilities included in the study. First of all, the weak tripartite
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institutions and industrial relations systems that were subordinated to the primary
political objectives to promote business friendly environment and economic
competitiveness throughout the 2000s, set incentives for company level unions to use
alternative institutions to promote improvement in the regulation of temporary agency
workers. Second, the relatively loosely coordinated and decentralized industrial relations
system enabled greater experimentation with the use and conversion of alternative
institutions to serve their objectives and interests. Third, state regulation provided
legitimacy and strengthened the political pressure of local unions and corporate actors to
achieve compliance with state and corporate standards.
The extent of regulatory complementarities and the processes underlying
interactions across national public and transnational corporate institutions, however,
varied based on the implementation style or institutional design guiding the
implementation of transnational corporate social responsibility initiatives. The adoption
and implementation of stakeholder engagement oriented regulatory initiatives were more
likely to enable strategic action by company unions in decentralized labor relations
systems to engage with corporate initiatives. These interactions gave rise to union driven
regulatory complementarities, where the agents promoting transnational corporate social
responsibility played only a secondary role. In contrast, compliance oriented corporate
social responsibility initiatives largely excluded unions from any engagement with these
alternative regulatory initiatives. It was the private auditors who became primary
promoters of national and corporate regulation as part of their effort to ensure compliance
with the codes of conducts of Corporation Electronics 2. In some sense, both institutional
approaches facilitated coordination within the domestic setting and compensated for the
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deficient coordination of national labor relations institutions. While stakeholder
engagement oriented approaches facilitated coordination across union and local
management by balancing out the power asymmetries across them, the monitoring
oriented corporate initiatives facilitated inter-firm coordination that is consistent with
shared responsibility for compliance with state regulation.
These processes and outcomes were illustrated empirically through the case
analysis of two electronics facilities. These manufacturing sites are similar in production
profile, technical sophistication, size, strategic importance, and role in the global
industry, with electronics plants from the Romanian and Slovenian context. These
facilities will be the focus of comparative case study analysis in subsequent chapters that
explore the implications of state-directed and coordinated labor relation institutions on
the emergence of private-public regulatory complementarities.
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Chapter 4:
Limited Complementarities in the Context of State Directed Labor Relations
Institutions: Regulation of Collective Dismissals in Romania
This chapter analyzes the emergence of public-private regulatory
complementarities in a state directed national context with centralized but uncoordinated
labor relation institutions. The case studies of two electronics facilities located in this
context illustrate that complementary regulatory interactions do emerge in national
settings with state directed labor relations institutions, although to a lesser extent than in
market oriented political economies. In the Romanian context where national labor
institutions are often dominated by the state and rely on limited coordination with social
stakeholders and industrial relations at sub-national levels, regulatory complementarities
are built to compensate for the inconsistencies and power imbalances in domestic
regulation. These synergistic interactions are relatively more significant than regulatory
complementarities emerging in the coordinated institutional setting of Slovenia.
Regulatory complementarities in the Romanian context were built around
collective dismissals of workers, also referred to as collective redundancy, an important
source of flexibility for electronics manufacturing facilities in Romania. The
development path of Romania over the 1990s was guided by attempts to build political
careers rather than by efforts to promote social and economic reforms and establish
strong and inclusive institutions. This strategy eventually resulted in a political economic
system where implementation of policies and formal institutions is often contingent on
state interventions and political connections rather than on consistent and fairly applied
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regulatory guidelines. Due to a good extent to these institutional weaknesses and
inconsistencies, an export oriented foreign manufacturing base in higher technology
sectors was established only later on in the 2000s. With restructuring of the economy and
of the public administration sector still ongoing throughout the decade41, dismissing large
groups of people were common in both public and private sectors, including the quickly
expanding and dynamic electronics manufacturing sector4 2. These transformations and
adjustments to greater integration in the European and global economy over the 2000s
continued to fuel national debates regarding the regulation of collective dismissals to
promote economic competitiveness. While temporary employment was also on rise in the
Romanian economy, this was still marginal in magnitude at the national level and was
largely ignored by labor unions.
Frequent firings of large groups of people by electronics manufacturing facilities
in Romania generated significant uncertainty and insecurity regarding the stability of
employment in the sector and has therefore been frequently criticized by labor unions,
civil society organizations and the media in Romania (Bormann&Plank, 2010). Rising
power asymmetries across major foreign corporations and labor unions in the weakly
coordinated and enforced institutional setting of Romania greatly undermined effective
labor regulation in Romania. Labor union representatives remarked that workers were
often treated by large manufacturing companies as disposable inputs in the production
process rather than as human beings with material and social needs. Compensations for
temporary and/or permanent redundancies were often inadequate and eroded the
41 These reforms were often driven by the accession process to the European Union. Romania became a
member of the European Union on the I" of January, 2007.
42 Firings of large groups of people were also particularly common in Hungary during the 1990s when the
restructuring of the economy was still ongoing. These transformations declined in importance by the mid
2000 as major restructurings ended and the cost of labor increased.
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livelihood of workers. Selections of the workers to be fired were often based on
procedures that lacked objectivity and transparency. Finally, dismissed workers were
often replaced by new employees willing to work for lower costs or with fewer
privileges.
Improvements in the regulation of collective redundancies in the electronics
sector nonetheless emerged at two facilities located in Romania through the
complementary interactions across transnational corporate and national public regulatory
efforts. The most significant aspect of these improvements referred to the provision of
adequate financial payments to protect the newly unemployed workers, but also extended
to meliorations in the procedures related to collective firings. The extent of these
complementarities and the processes underlying their emergence, however, differed
significantly due to a large extent to the differences in the implementation style of
transnational corporate institutions. While one of the facilities, referred to as facility
Romania Electronics 1 (RE 1) was integrated in the stakeholder engagement oriented
transnational corporate social responsibility initiative of Corporation Electronics 1,
implementation of transnational regulatory efforts at facility Romania Electronics 2
(RE2) relied more extensively on monitoring by Corporation Electronics 2. Regulatory
developments at both of these facilities were, however, more limited than in the cases of
their counterparts from Hungary as national labor relation institutions weakened the
incentives of local unions to engage with alternative institutions and undermined the
ability of national laws to confer legitimacy to private regulatory efforts.
The first sections of this chapter discuss briefly the industrial policies and labor
relation institutions that have been relevant for the emergence of the electronics
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manufacturing sector and flexible employment practices in Romania. The chapter than
proceeds with the empirical analysis of the emergence of regulatory complementarities at
two electronics facilities located in Romania that supply for and are governed by major
corporations from Western Europe and Northern America. While the analysis focuses
primarily on the emergence of regulatory complementarities around collective
redundancies, practices regarding temporary employment are also briefly considered to
provide further basis of comparison with the two other national settings - Hungary and
Slovenia. The chapter concludes with a brief summary and discussion of the analysis.
From Late Reformer to Major Destination of Foreign Direct Investment: the
Emergence of Romania as the Electronics Manufacturing Hub of Eastern Central
Europe
Romania in the early 1990s constituted a textbook case of late and partial
reformer that distinguished it from other economies from the region. Social and economic
reforms to facilitate the transition from centrally planned to market economy were
adopted with considerable delay and remained marked by continuous shifting back and
forth between openness towards global markets and protectionism, inclusion and
exclusion of labor from political decision-making, etc (Bohle&Greskovits, 2012). The
sustenance of the old communist elites in power after transition has often been linked to
the emergence of the extensive networks of clientelism and patronage that undermined
rule of law and effective governance in the country for years to come (Galacean, 2004;
Bohle&Greskovits, 2012; Kitschelt&al, 1999). These circumstances had important
implications on industrial structure and development in Romania: the private sector
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emerged relatively slowly and the inflow of foreign direct investment lagged significantly
behind most other countries from the region (Ferris et al, 1994; Yoruk, 2001; Voicu,
2004).
By the second half of the 1990s, protests driven by economic and political crisis
in the country shifted policymaking towards more neoliberal reforms and accelerated the
pace of economic transformations. Privatization strategies shifted from methods that
favored mostly insiders, such as management-employee buyouts (MEBO) and
distribution of vouchers to the population, towards privatization on case-by-case basis
and opened up to foreign investors (Galaceanu, 2004; Earle&Telegdy, 2002). The inflow
of foreign direct investments has increased significantly since the late 1990s and
Romania started to slowly catch up with other countries from the region in terms of the
stock of foreign capital invested in the country. While initial investments were primarily
in lower-tech industries such as textile and apparel, increasingly, major electronics and
automotive corporations eventually set up manufacturing sites in the country over the last
decade.
By the mid 2000s, Romania has taken firm root in the neoliberal camp, often
encouraged by international organizations, particularly the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the European Union (EU). Romania designed and developed one of East
Central Europe's most comprehensive incentive packages to attract investments in more
complex industries (Bohle&Greskovits, 2012). The Romanian Agency for Foreign
Investments (Agentia Nationala pentru Investitii Straine ARIS) was established in 2002
to promote and attract foreign direct investments in the country. The Romanian
government signed the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
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(OECD) Declaration on International Investments and Multinational Enterprises in 2005
to acquire greater credibility as a reliable destination for foreign investors. State
incentives included government aid, fiscal incentives, subsidies for employment and
training, financial and technical support for internationalization and standardization,
deduction of expenses for research and development activities. While coherent
implementation of the strategic approach remained problematic at times as tax laws
changed frequently, incentives were modified in function of budgetary constraints, etc
(Bohle&Greskovits, 2012), Romania eventually became one of the most attractive
investment sites from the region for foreign capital (AT Kearney, 2011; Pauwels&Ionita,
200841). By 2004, it developed into the third largest destination for foreign direct
investments, after Poland and Hungary. Foreign direct investments over the 2000s
focused primarily on manufacturing, financial intermediation and insurance, as well as
public utilities.
Over the 2000s, Romania became a particularly important destination country for
electronics contract manufacturing companies supplying major companies from Western
Europe and Northern America (Frost&Sullivan, 2009; Bormann&Plank, 2010). This was
in sharp contrast with developments in the early 1990s, when the general political and
economic environment in Romania did not appeal to foreign investors and inflow of
capital was very limited. The first important investment in electronic manufacturing was
the Solectron (now Flextronics) plant set up in Timisoara with an investment of US 100
million USD. The electronics industry then became a specifically targeted industry to
promote, with more favorable economic incentives provided by the government for
43 By 2004, Romania became the third largest destination countries for foreign direct investments in the
region, after Hungary and Poland.
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investments in the sector. The relatively low cost of labor, low corporate taxation,
Romania's strategic location, have also facilitated its transformation into a preferred
destination for investments in electronic manufacturing facilities. Major investments in
electronics manufacturing over the 2000s included Celestica, Elcoteq, Nokia, Zollner,
Benchmark Electronics and Plexus manufacturing sites44. Overall, the current position of
manufacturing located in Romania is based on its relatively low labour costs and
geographical proximity to end markets.
The significant inflow of foreign investments in the industry resulted in the
growing importance of the electronics sector in Romania. Manufacturing has been
dedicated almost exclusively to exports, as the facilities located in Romania generally
supply the end markets of major brand corporations in Western Europe, Middle East and
North Africa. The average annual growth rate of the export of computer, electronics and
optical products was 47% during the 2007-2011 time period (CRPCIS, 2012). The share
of these products represented 8.9% in total exports in 2011. The main ranges of products
manufactured in the country over the second half of the decade include communication
equipment (27.8% of total electronics exports), computers and peripherals equipment
(26.7%) and measuring, testing and navigating equipment (23.1%). While textile and
apparel remained important for Romanian exports, their share decreased significantly
over the years shifting from 47% in 1999 to a mere 30% in 2006 (Pauwels and Ionita,
2008). In 2010, the electronics sector represented 15 percent of the output and employed
about 16 percent of the active workforce in manufacturing (Eurostat, 2013).
44 In addition to the large manufacturing companies, a number of smaller foreign players have invested in
Romania such as Connectronics, Systronics, GDM, Hanil Eletcronics, etc. Just in information technology
hardware there were an estimated 888 factories in the country in 2008 (Bormann&Plank, 2010).
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Regulatory Politics and Institutions in Romania: the Persistent Importance
of Collective Dismissals
The transition towards a globally integrated market economy and democratic
political order required a whole new set of institutional reforms to facilitate these
changes. Some of the most important institutional reforms included the establishment of
tripartite institutions; neoliberal reforms of labor market policies and regulations; the
growing importance of company level bargaining; and the decline in the connections
across political parties and labor unions.
Notwithstanding these changes, the institutional legacies of the first transition
decade have persisted throughout the next decade. The evolution of the Economic and
Social Council of Romania (Consiliul Economic si Social) (CES), the main tripartite
institution of Romania was established to facilitate coordination across the state and
social stakeholders, has been marked by the dominant role of the state4 5 . Notwithstanding
a gradual decentralization of industrial relations with the growing presence of foreign
investments in the region, collective bargaining system at the national level remained a
dominant level of industrial bargaining in the Romanian context throughout the 2000s.
Considering the unified character of national bargaining that included negotiations for
both the public and private sector, the state continued to exert an important influence on
industrial bargaining as well. Finally, clientelistic connections across government
officials and labor union representatives persisted over the decline of more formal
affiliations and connections.
45 Over time, however, the political motivations of the Romanian state and politicians have grown more
attuned with the increasing influence of international organizations - the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the European Union (EU), the Association of Foreign Direct Investors. These organizations exerted
significant pressure on the Romanian government to adopt more neoliberal economic and social reforms.
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Unlike in the case of Hungary where the emergence of foreign export oriented
manufacturing sectors eventually led to the liberal regulation and growing prominence of
new forms of flexible employment, a more "traditional" form of employment flexibility
prevailed in the context of Romania - firings of large numbers of people. Collective
redundancies, referring to dismissals effected by an employer due to objective economic
and technical reasons, became a common source of employment flexibility over the
2000s to enable restructurings and adjustments to global demands among multinational
enterprises from Romania. Post-privatisation restructuring made by the multinationals
resulted in large personnel layoffs, often times in excess of the numbers agreed upon
under privatization contracts (EWCO, 2012). Multinational enterprises were also letting
people go in large numbers as global demand for particular groups or types of products
were changing over time.
By the end of the 2000s, Romania had one of highest rates of collective
redundancies in the Eastern Central European region. Over the 2003-2009 time periods,
collective dismissals in the private sector affected approximately 200,000 people in
Romania, almost three times as many as redundant workers in Hungary and close to ten
times more than employees laid off in Slovenia. These numbers corresponded to an
average share of 14 percent of the total number of employees in manufacturing in
Romania, while there share in the workforce was below 10 percent in both Hungary and
Slovenia, as illustrated on Table 4.1.
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Table nr 4.1.: Rate of Collective Redundancies
Number of employees Number of employees Rate of collective
affected by collective in manufacturing** redundancy (%)
redundancies in (2003-2009 average)
manufacturing*
(2003-2009 average)
Romania 200847 1461920 13.74%
Hungary 74718 253200 10.42%
Slovenia 21814 716960 8.61%
Note: * Source of data: European Restructuring Database, EUROSTAT
**Source of data: ILO Statistics
Within the context of major restructurings going on in both private and public
sectors in Romania, regulation of collective redundancies represented a particularly
salient political issue for domestic labor regulation. Collective firings in the private
manufacturing sector represented a main source of protests by labor unions and fueled
political contestations in Romania for years. In the public sector, while privatization of
state owned enterprises in the manufacturing sector has declined considerably by the mid
2000s, restructurings of public utilities, financial institutions, and public administration
was still ongoing46. The unified character of national collective bargaining further
enhanced debates around the adequate terms for collective redundancies as it represented
an issue of great concern for both public and private sectors.
Collective firings among foreign manufacturing sites to accommodate
restructurings and major changes in the volume of production revealed variations in their
adherences to domestic regulation. Multinational companies sometimes became examples
of restructurings for other companies. The restructuring scheme used in the case of
Automobile Dacia, for example, has become a model and source of inspiration for other
46 As Romania was still struggling with credibility and rule of law of domestic institutions, it often relied
on agreements with international financial organizations, like the IMF, to ensure its reliability as a site of
investment. The Romanian government accepted major restructurings as part of the conditions for these
agreements. In 2009, the government in power made public its plan for a 20 percent reduction of employees
in central public administration.
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companies and regional employment offices. The company worked with the trade union
to define the criteria for selecting the workers to be laid off and to agree a package of
support measures of support for "socially sensitive" cases. A special department - the
"Social Reinsertion Service" was set up to provide counseling and guidance to those
made redundant, advising them on finding a new job or starting a business. The local
agency for employment helped to provide training courses geared towards local labour
market needs. The collective redundancies involved significantly higher compensations
than the minimum payments set through collective agreements at the national and sector
levels.
More often, however, implementation of national laws and collective agreements
among multinationals has been rather problematic. When Bechtel corporation, for
example, decided to fire 825 of its employees in 2011, it failed to consult with trade
unions about the major restructuring and to reveal the objective criteria it was using to
decide which employees were to be let go (Ziua de Cluj, 201la,b). The trade union
representative eventually contacted both the Regional Labor Inspectorate and the Prime
Minister at the time to put pressure on the company to adhere to the rules. According to
trade union representatives, areas of particular concern with respect to implementation of
public regulation regarding collective redundancies among foreign manufacturing sites
over the late 2000s were related to consultations with the unions, adequate compensation,
hiring new employees shortly after the collective firings, etc. Enforcement of national
regulation was undermined by a combination of growing power asymmetries across large
foreign manufacturing companies and labor unions, as well as institutional weaknesses
underlying state regulation.
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With a growing wave of neoliberal reforms since the new Labor Code of Romania
was adopted in 2003, other forms of flexible employment have also become more
common over the years. Temporary agency employment has been regulated and
recognized in Romania since 2003 and grew increasingly popular since 2005. The overall
share of atypical forms of employment, however, is still relatively low in the Romanian
context. Temporary agency workers represented 0.7 percent and fixed term employment
accounted for 2 percent of the workforce in 2009 (CIETT, 2010). A recent company
survey conducted by Manpower, one of the major labor agencies operating in Romania,
revealed that close to two-thirds of companies did not consider temporary employment a
necessity for their activities (Florea, 2009). Although the Council of Foreign Investors
and American Chamber of Commerce have consistently proposed more liberal regulation
of contracted labor and labor unions from Romania expressed concerns with these new
forms of employment, temporary agency employment has remained a relatively low
priority issue in Romanian politics throughout most of the 2000s. The segmentation of
the labor market in Romania is most prominent along the formal-informal, rather than the
open-contract/fixed-contract one (Parlevliet&Xenogiani, 2009). Informal labor is,
however, more present in small and medium rather than large enterprises in
manufacturing and services sectors.
The Emergence of Public-Private Regulatory Complementarities around
Collective Redundancies at Two Electronics Facilities
Considering the dynamic development of the electronics manufacturing sector in
Romania over the 2000s, hiring and firing employees in large numbers was common
155
throughout the decade as companies restructured brown-field investments and adjusted to
fluctuations in global demand. Major electronics manufacturing corporations that
established sites in the region were hiring direct and indirect employees by the hundreds
to expand manufacturing. Hella Electronics recruited about 600 employees in 2006,
Flextronics hired 800 employees in 2006, Nokia planned to open positions by the
thousands in 2007. Even through the economic crisis, several companies were expanding
production as was the case for BYD Electronics and Emerson, opening 2000 and 200
positions. Restructurings and frequent changes in production volume in the global
industry, however, also resulted in frequent dismissals of employees in great numbers.
Flextronics fired several hundreds of workers since its takeover of the Solectron plan in
Timisoara in 2003, and then let go of approximately 1000 employees during late 2008-
2009 time period. Elcoteq and Nokia closed their manufacturing plants in 2009 and 2011,
respectively, pushing close to 3000 employees into unemployment.
These significant changes at electronics facilities in Romania generated
considerable insecurity in the workforce and often failed to comply with public regulation
with respect to collective dismissals. A police raid to the Flextronics plant in Timisoara in
2009 to follow up on a bomb-threat, for example, generated a frenzy among employees as
they thought that the police was sent to "escort" them out after several waves of
collective dismissals had been going on that year. The most common sources of concern
included: insecurity in the workforce, inadequate compensation that affected the
livelihoods of dismissed workers, replacement of redundant workers with temporary or
contracted workers, deficient coordination with workers' unions and regional
employment offices, subjective criteria used to select workers to be dismissed, etc.
156
1. Collective redundancies at two major electronics manufacturing facilities
Two major electronics facilities located in Romania that manufacture for major
corporations from Western Europe and Northern America illustrate these concerns with
collective redundancies relatively well. These two facilities, referred to as facility
Romania Electronics 1 (RE 1) and Romania Electronics 2 (RE2), share a set of similarities
with each other, as well as with the factories from Hungary and Slovenia that are
included in the study. These similarities refer to size, regional importance, technical
sophistication, production profile, foreign ownership, export-orientation, and insertion in
the global electronics industry. Perhaps even more importantly, these two facilities are
integrated into the same transnational corporate governance institutions as facilities
Hungary Electronics 1 (HE I) and Hungary Electronics 2 (HE2) from Hungary, and
therefore provide interesting basis for cross-national comparisons.
Facility Romania Electronics 1 (RE1) was one of the largest foreign owned
manufacturing sites in Romania that specialized in the manufacturing of
telecommunications equipments. The factory had been established in 2008 next to a rural
community that earned its living from subsistence farming, had no full-time doctor and
lacked an adequate school and indoor plumbing. Manufacturing at this facility supplied
exclusively the regional end markets of Corporation Electronics 1. The number of
employees grew over time from approximately 700 employees in 2008 to 4,500 in early
2010 during the peak time period of its activities in Romania. The minimum wage at this
facility was around 210 Euros in the late 2000s. The factory had initially specialized in
low to medium volume production of a rather limited product range, but operations grew
more technically sophisticated over time as the factory shifted towards the assembly and
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maintenance of new group of products in 2009. Flexibility in the volume of production
presented an important challenge for this facility, with the volume of production during
low activity time periods representing approximately 60 percent of manufacturing during
peak activity.
Major labor concerns at the facility included inadequate compensation for both
temporary and permanent dismissals of large groups of workers. Employees were often
asked to take days off with no compensation offered in return. Several workers were
greatly affected by these temporary dismissals, some of them losing as much as 18
percent of their monthly wages in 2010. As the company management committed to
generating thousands of positions in exchange of generous governmental support,
collective redundancies had been relatively rare during the first years of operation but this
changed radically in 2011 when the facility leadership convened all employees and
announced them that the company will close its operations by the end of the year. As
production was moving to Asia, local management had to dismiss the 1,850 regular and
approximately 500 subcontracted employees working at the factory Romania Electronics
(RE 1) in 2011. The local management was reluctant to provide severance packages and
other support for the dismissed employees to protect them during unemployment and
facilitate their transition back into employment. This generated considerable tension with
both the unions and the general public.
Facility Romania Electronics 2 is the biggest foreign manufacturing site operating
in the Western part of Romania. The facility was initially set up in 1998 with an
investment of 150 million USD at the site of an electronic compound plant. The number
of employees of the facility changed significantly over the years. In 2010, the company
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had 2,400 employees with approximately 20 percent of them contracted from labor
agencies. Minimum wage at the company for unqualified workers was approximately 200
Euros. The facility specializes in small volume production of manufacturing goods of
mid-level technical sophistication. Its main operations include assembly, manufacturing
of some components and repair services. The main clients of the facility include lead
corporations from information and telecommunications, automotive, and medical devices
sectors. The information and telecommunications sector represented approximately 70
percent of operations at the end of the 2000s. A significant share of this manufacturing
supplied the regional end markets of Corporation Electronics 2.
Similarly to the other factory, major sources of labor concerns at facility Romania
Electronics 2 (RE2) were related to the frequent and often controversial collective
redundancies. Over the last decade, there have been repeated occasions of collective
firings at the facility with very low compensation. In 2005, 600 employees who had been
laid off were replaced after a few months later with temporary agency workers. In 2008,
the company decided to let go 700 of external workers and 720 regular employees due to
restructurings and failed to consult with the labor union about its plans and possible ways
to avoid these changes. Finally, in 2010, the facility drew considerable criticism from the
regional media about yet another wave of firings and the influence of nepotism in
selecting the employees to be dismissed by local management.
The similarities and divergences across facilities Romania Electronics 1 and 2 are
summarized on Table 4.2 below.
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Table nr 4. 2: Similarities and divergences across facilities Romania Electronics 1
(RE 1) and Romania Electronics 2 (RE2)
Characteristics Facility REl Facility RE2
Established 2008 1998
Size (Number of employees in 2011) 3,400 2,400
Production profile Assembly, repair Assembly,
services components, repair
services
Lean manufacturing management system Yes Yes
Volatility (share of lowest production in 60% 60%
highest level of production volume)
Workplace representation (unionized) Yes Yes
Share of temporary agency work 20 percent 20 percent
Role of temporary agency work Lower skill, direct Lower skill, direct
2. Domestic regulation of collective redundancies: state interventions and
weak rule of law
Regulation of collective redundancies has been an important focus of both
tripartite consultations and collective bargaining over the years. While the national
legislation provided a set of minimum standards regarding the procedures of collective
dismissals in the country, negotiations over compensation of dismissed workers took
place mostly within the framework of industrial relations at national and, increasingly, at
sub-national levels4 8 . In the Romanian context of poorly coordinated and weak
institutions and growing influence of international organizations, enforcement of
domestic regulation regarding collective dismissals has often been problematic. These
circumstances contributed to a great extent to the alarming developments regarding the
terms of collective dismissals at the two electronics facilities included in the study.
With the growing influence of international organizations in Romania, national
48 These negotiations often resulted in granting very generous severance packages for dismissed
employees. Compensation often ranged between 6 times the gross monthly average wages up to 24 months'
payment.
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legislation regarding collective dismissals became increasingly neoliberal in content and
enforcement (Ciutacu, 2007; EIRO Romania(b), 2007). The dominance of the state over
the tripartite institutions in this context of growing integration into the global economic
and political community, further aggravated the general tendency towards removing
social protection from vulnerable groups of people. Legislative reforms adopted in
consultation with social partners were often overridden by unilateral decisions of the
government to meet the requirements of international organizations like the European
Union, International Monetary Fund and Council of Foreign Investors.
Labor law reforms that had been adopted in consultation with the social partners
in 2003 and had provided generally favorable terms for worker were quickly reversed as
the Council of Foreign Investors and other employer organizations approached the
Romanian government to suggest modification along a whole set of issues. Only a few
months after approving the new labor code, the Romanian government unilaterally
adopted a huge wave of additional reforms and relaxed significantly the legal framework
regarding collective redundancies49 . Modifications included a more narrow definition of
what constitutes collective redundancy, simplification of the underlying procedures and
weaker restrictions on the replacement of dismissed employees. For instance, collective
dismissal since then have referred to firing of at least 10 employees due to technical or
economic reasons, instead of 5 (articles 68-74). Moreover, the employer was not able to
fill in vacancies resulting from redundancies for a period of nine months, instead of a full
49 Trade unions responded with major protests and accused the Romanian government of transforming
Romanian labor regulation into a Trojan horse intended to break up the European social model upon
accession. With the state regulation with respect to termination of open-ended contracts becoming more
lax, trade unions have been trying to ensure favorable conditions in case of redundancies and often
negotiated collective agreements bargaining demands for wage increase in exchange of agreements with
respect to dismissals of employees (Trif, 2004).
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year as had been stipulated beforehand. While new regulation still required coordination
with labor unions to consider alternative strategies and throughout the process of laying
off workers, the notification time of unions and public employment offices was
considerably reduced. The International Monetary Fund also put considerable pressure on
Romanian governments in subsequent years regarding the need for further neoliberal
reforms.
Building on the national statutory framework, collective bargaining agreements
had an important role in setting the guidelines for severance packages for dismissed
employees. In 2011, the national collective agreement stipulated that when an employee
is let go due to reasons that don't pertain to his performance and person, he or she is
entitled to a one-month salary (article 78 (1) in the CCM for the years 2007-2010). The
sectoral agreement then stipulated compensatory premium to additional payment
obligations regulated by national directives, of one or twice the monthly salary (articles
22(2) in both CCM for 2007-2010, and 2010-2014). For temporary dismissals at the
initiative of the company, the national legislation prescribed compensation of at least 75
percent of the worker's salary, but then the collective agreement at the national level
signed for the 2007-2010 time period included an agreement that employers accept to
take days off for up to 15 days without any payment, in exchange of efforts by employers
to preserve jobs.
Collective agreements at the company level have come to play an increasingly
important role in negotiating the terms of severance packages for dismissed workers.
While small and medium sized companies generally paid around three times the monthly
salary, major corporations often provided very generous compensation that were
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commonly referred to as "velvet firings" as the payments often reached the equivalent of
10 to 20 times the monthly wages of employees (Hritcu, 2010). This, however, was not
the case for the facilities included in the study. While the collective agreement signed at
facility Romania Electronics 1 (RE1) did not include any stipulations regarding the terms
of severance packages in case of major dismissals of workers, the collective agreement
that was eventually signed at facility Romania Electronics 2 (RE2) specified severance
payment equal to three times the monthly salaries of dismissed workers.
Enforcement of public regulation regarding collective dismissals in Romania,
including facilities Romania Electronics 1 (RE1) and Romania Electronics 2 (RE2), has
been deficient over the last decade for several reasons. These include institutional
weaknesses, growing complexities and ambiguities in the regulatory system; as well as
the growing power of large foreign investors. Romania stands out in the region for its low
level of rule of law, poor quality of regulation, ineffective government and high level of
corruption (Ciobanu, 2009; WorldBank, 2013). Implementation of national institutions is
often contingent on government interventions motivated by particularistic interests
(Crowley, 2006). Strong networks of clientelism and personalistic ties often enable
powerful elites to shape the institutional infrastructure and their implementation in ways
that advantage them (Bohle&Greskovits, 2013; Grodeland, 2007). Both company and
union representatives at facilities Romania Electronics 1 and Romania Electronics 2
complained with respect to the integrity of the main enforcement institution of state
regulations, the Romanian Labor Inspectorate. The low wages of the inspectors and the
complex legislation have frequently resulted in bribing of labour inspectors to ensure
favorable interpretation and selective enforcement of labour legislation (Trif, 2004).
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Several directors of Regional Labor Inspectorates have been investigated in connections
with corruption charges.
Moreover, as public labor regulation has grown increasingly complex and layered
over the years, in the absence of adequate coordination with social partners and across
different levels of social dialogue, it often failed to set clear and concise guidelines
(EIRO Romania(b), 2007). Interviews with company level representatives revealed that
with the growing complexity and inconsistencies of national labor regulation, it has
become quite common for local companies to hire inspectors through private
arrangements to evaluate the major non-compliances with national employment
regulations in an effort to avoid penalties in case of an official audit by state inspectors.
Inconsistencies and ambiguities often encourage opportunistic behavior and therefore
further perpetuate corruption and weak rule of law (Trif, 2004), setting in place a vicious
cycle of institutional failures.
Finally, increasing integration of Romania into the global economy over the last
decade permitted for a growing power asymmetry to emerge between domestic actors and
institutions, on one hand, and transnational organizations and institutions, on the other.
State agencies and even labor unions gradually grew rather subservient to the interests of
foreign companies operating in the region.
3. Evaluating the extent of regulatory complementarities at the facilities
Notwithstanding significant deficiencies in domestic regulation, both facilities
experienced improvements regarding the regulation of collective dismissals of
employees, although to somewhat different degrees and through different processes at the
two facilities. Similarly to the Hungarian context, these improvements were driven by the
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combined effect of domestic public and transnational private regulation. The facilities in
Romania were integrated into the transnational social responsibility initiatives of major
corporations over the late 2000s that enabled domestic actors - union and state
representatives - to use them to compensate for the shortcomings in domestic regulation.
At facility Romania Electronics 1, while there had been no improvements in
providing compensation for temporary dismissals of workers, local management
eventually paid severance packages for permanently dismissed employees and provided
additional support to facilitate their reintegration into the workforce. The final
compensation included three times worth of monthly salaries. The company also agreed
to keep regular employees on the payroll for three additional months after the termination
of production at the facility and offered courses of redirection and requalification during
that time period. Finally, the company also cooperated with the national and regional
governments to recruit other investors in the industrial park. Nonetheless, a large number
of workers were unemployed and uncertain about their future, calling into question the
commitment of the company to foster social development of its manufacturing
workforce. At facility RE2, improvements from regulatory complementarities consisted
in negotiating a higher level of severance package that was above the minimum amount
set through collective agreements at the sector level.
These developments are summarized on table nr. 4 3. This table illustrates that
while improvements at the facility RE 1 included endowing workers with rights to
generous compensatory payments and providing further protection to them from
unemployment and economic uncertainty, improvements at facility RE2 were somewhat
more limited to endowing workers to collective negotiation regarding severance
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packages.
Table nr. 4. 3: Improvements over time: Divergences in the extent of improvements
Facility RE 1 Facility HE2
Improvements in the regulation of collective T
dismissals
0 Endow workers with rights and
reduce discrimination
e Set limits on extensiveness
* Empower through representation
* Provide insurance for vulnerable
groups such as unemployed, seniors, the
sick, etc.
4. The onset of regulatory complemnentarities through transnational
regulatory initiatives
Facilities Romania Electronics 1 and Romania Electronics 2 are similar to the
other plants included in the study not only in terms of their economic and technical
characteristics, but also with respect to the transnational coordination mechanisms they
are integrated into. The facilities are major supplier sites of two large corporations from
Western Europe and North America, Corporation Electronics 1 and Corporation
Electronics 2, respectively. As explained in greater detail in the previous chapter, these
corporations are strongly dedicated to promote corporate social responsibility throughout
their manufacturing bases. One of the main differences across the transnational
frameworks of these two large corporations consists in the style of implementation of
these initiatives. While Corporation Electronics 1 emphasizes engagement with local
stakeholders to facilitate transnational governance, Corporation Electronics 2 relies more
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on auditing and corrective actions to promote social responsibility across its
manufacturing sites51.
Corporation Electronics 1 has been rewarded repeatedly for its efforts to achieve
social and environmental responsibility throughout its supply chain. The implementation
of the transnational corporate social responsibility program of Corporation Electronics 1
relied on involvement of social stakeholders from different levels of society to facilitate
the monitoring of and corrective solutions to labor concerns throughout the supply chain.
Facility Romania Electronics 1 became integrated in this framework of transnational
corporate governance at the time of its establishment in 2008, with the local labor unions
getting informed about the program directly from the representatives of Corporation
Electronics 1. The transnational corporate responsibility program of Corporation
Electronics 2, on other hand, relies almost exclusively on extensive corporate audits and
corrective action plans to improve working conditions and employment relations in the
global supply chain. One important aspect of these interventions is to ensure compliance
with national state and collective regulation. Facility Romania Electronics 2 became
integrated in these frameworks in the early 2006 and there is personnel specifically
designated to manage interactions with respect to social and environmental responsibility
interventions of lead corporations. The labor union on site has been largely excluded
from these corporate efforts to promote labor standards at the facility.
The implementation of these transnational initiatives in the state directed and
institutionally weak national context of Romania enabled the emergence of interactive
processes with domestic institutions, guided mostly by the strategic actions of domestic
51 The institutional similarities and differences are described in greater detail in Chapter 3.
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unions, in rather experimental and incremental manners. The centralized character of
labor relations institutions in Romania had traditionally set in place a tendency for union
representatives to rely on state interventions to generate new or activate existing laws to
promote their individual or group interests. As the national government became more
subservient to international pressures, however, domestic unions redirected their
strategies to appeal to private governance initiatives of lead corporations endowed with
significant economic power and political authority to regulate labor practices in the
industry. The ability of local unions to interact with private regulatory efforts to
compensate for deficiencies in domestic regulation, however, were influenced by the
institutional foundations of transnational corporate social responsibility initiatives. While
stakeholder engagement oriented transnational approaches facilitated, compliance or
monitoring oriented approaches undermined the emergence of regulatory
complementarities.
5. Union driven regulatory complementarities in the context of stakeholder
oriented transnational regulatory initiatives
Major concerns about the adequate payment of severance packages at facility
Romania Electronics (RE 1) were addressed through regulatory complementarities
initiated by domestic unions. The corporate social responsibility program of Corporation
Electronics 1 served as an institutional platform to rebalance power asymmetries across
the facility management and local labor union. As other governments from emerging
economies, the Romanian government lacked the institutional strength and political will
to govern effectively large manufacturing companies that operate under its jurisdiction.
Private regulatory efforts of Corporation Electronics 1 complemented these weaknesses
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by setting additional institutional constraints on the opportunistic behavior of the
management of the manufacturing facility. This institution was however activated and
used by local union to address major labor concerns at the site. The role of the state was
to legitimize the union's efforts to use the transnational regulatory efforts of Corporation
Electronics 1 to enforce domestic regulation. The importance of regulatory interactions in
bringing about improvements is illustrated particularly well by the contrast across the
regulatory developments around temporary and permanent dismissals of employees.
While concerns with permanent dismissals of workers were eventually reconciled
through the activation of transnational corporate social responsibility program of
Corporation Electronics 1 to complement the deficiencies of national regulation,
inadequate payments for temporary dismissals remained unresolved in the absence of
similar interactions.
a) Regulatory efforts pertaining to temporary dismissals
Workers' complaints about unpaid dismissals for limited time periods that were
affecting their and their families' livelihoods initiated a set of initiatives by workers'
representatives and union leadership to safeguard employees from exploitative practices.
Initial steps included efforts to address local management directly regarding these
practices and require compensation equal to 75 percent of their regular salaries, as
stipulated by national legislation. According to state regulation in effect at the end of the
2000s, only employees could ask for unpaid days off. If the company initiated temporary
dismissals, it was considered technical unemployment and the employee qualified for a
payment of 75 percent of the regular salary. In the context of growing importance of
safeguarding jobs in the aftermath of the economic recession, the collective agreements
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signed by the unions at facility REl in 2008 agreed for workers to accept unpaid days off
to help the local facility adjust to major fluctuations in the volume of production. This
followed the trend set by the national collective bargaining agreement that allowed for
unpaid dismissals for up to a maximum of 15 days.
As collective agreements in Romania's industrial relations system have full
coverage, the stipulations included in collective agreements applied to all workers
regardless of their membership in labor unions. The concessions were made by labor
unions on the condition that employers will make significant efforts towards preserving
jobs in the Romanian economy. This, however, was no longer the case for facility REl,
as the company management announced in the same year to close its operations at the
Romanian site and lay off thousands of workers. The efforts of the domestic union and
representatives of non-unionized workers to address these concerns through coordination
and cooperation with the local management left problems unsolved as the representatives
of the manufacturing company reminded them of the content of the collective agreement.
The appeal of employees to the Regional Labor Inspectorate was also dismissed
initially, with a local representative "advising" the workers to look for employment at
another company if they are unsatisfied with their current working conditions. Such
subversive attitude among state agencies and labor unions was becoming increasingly
common in Romania with the rising political importance of major foreign companies in
the country. Facility REl employed a significant share of the local workforce and
contributed to a significant decline in the unemployment rate to a low 2.3 percent in
2010. Moreover, contributions to the local budget facilitated the establishment of a new
local hospital, new park for children and important investments in infrastructure. The
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facility was also important at the national level as the largest exporter in Romania in
2011. When the Romanian economy recorded a decline of 1.5 percent in 2010, economic
growth in the region of facility RE 1 was to a great extent due to the its manufacturing
activities. Civil society organizations from Romania have remarked that regional
enforcement agencies have become increasingly accommodating towards the practices of
major investors in the region.
As initial efforts of employees to coordinate with local management and appeal to
state agencies led to no favorable changes, industrial relations at the national level was
activated by the local union to seek further support for their case. Representatives of
Cartel Alfa, a major Romanian labor union that the union from facility REI was affiliated
with, pointed out in the public media that unfavorable agreements for workers can't
override national legislation. According to Romanian laws, national labor legislation sets
only minimum standards that serve as the foundation for collective bargaining at national,
industrial and company levels. While collective agreements also have the effects of laws
if they are agreed upon by representative organizations, they can only adopt stipulations
that are favorable for employees. Although the relevance of the national union Cartel
Alfa in Romanian politics has diminished over the years, the union still carried important
status in Romania and maintained connections with state bureaucrats and politicians. The
intervention of the Cartel Alfa union contributed to the controversy gaining some
political clout and public attention. The Regional Labor Inspectorate eventually agreed to
review the case more thoroughly but eventually abstained from making a conclusive
decision and referred the case to the Romanian court system.
Inconsistencies in regulatory guidelines and the growing political importance of
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foreign investors often contribute to labor concerns in the Romanian context. With
growing integration in the global economy, the traditional channels of labor relations
often fail to address the institutional weaknesses and growing power asymmetries in the
national contexts of emerging economies. As the example of regulation of permanent
dismissals of workers illustrates below, alternative institutional platforms and new
regulatory strategies can be used to improve protection of workers integrated in global
production regimes.
b) Regulation of collective redundancies
In contrast with regulatory developments around temporary dismissals of workers,
improvements regarding the conditions of permanent dismissals were contingent on the
combined effectiveness of both national and transnational regulatory efforts. The
shocking announcement in 2011 that the company is moving production to Asia and will
permanently dismiss its employees by the end of the year, were followed by new
controversies regarding the terms of these collective firings. The first workers who were
let go were the external employees contracted through the two labor agencies that the
company had been using since it set up production in Romania. The temporary agency
employees - representing approximately 20 percent of the workforce, were not eligible
for severance payments according to national and collective regulation, even though
some of them had been working at the facility for more than to a year. At the
astonishment of union representatives and workers, the management also hesitated to
provide any sort of severance payment or assistance for the approximately 2,000 regular
employees operating at the facility.
The protests and controversy surrounding these developments set into place a
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whole series of efforts by the domestic union to appeal to traditional and alternative
institutions and use them in complementary manners to improve social protection for
dismissed workers. Labor relation institutions facilitated the emergence of these
interactions through the constraints set on domestic union to address labor concerns
through traditional channels. As a consequence, they set incentives for the union to
engage with alternative institutional solutions to promote improved conditions for
dismissed employees. The relative openness of the transnational regulatory efforts of
Corporation Electronics 1 to engage with local domestic actors to identify and address
local concerns facilitated the effectiveness of the union's efforts to combine domestic and
transnational regulatory approaches. Finally, the relative inconsistencies in the national
setting enabled the domestic union to engage the national government to render more
legitimacy and add pressure to its efforts to use private regulation in its interest. It also
provided sufficient degree of freedom to engage in this innovational strategy. In what
follows, the emergence of regulatory complementarities will be examined from the
perspectives of these institutional opportunities and constraints.
In the context of weakly coordinated labor relation institutions and growing
presence of major foreign corporations, company level coordination and arrangements
regarding working conditions and employment relations of Romanian employees have
become increasingly important. Soon after the announcement of the decision to move
production to Asia, negotiations started between union representatives and local
management regarding the terms and procedures of collective redundancies at the facility.
As part of these negotiations, a rather ambitious plan regarding compensations were put
forth by the local unions suggesting severance packages for regular workers that entailed
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the payment of ten time or more their monthly salaries. Although the national regulatory
framework prescribed only two month's salary for employees who are dismissed as a
result of economic and technical reasons in the electronics sector, the general trend in the
country was for large corporations to provide very generous compensations.
Similarly to the regulatory deficiencies in the case of temporary dismissals,
inconsistencies and institutional weaknesses underlying the national regulatory
framework prevented an easy solution to the unwillingness of the local management to
provide severance packages. Upon review of the company collective agreement that was
signed with the unions, the agreements did not have any stipulations included regarding
collective dismissals form the factory. As facility REl was established only recently and
committed to the generation of several thousand jobs in Romania in exchange for
generous governmental support of the investment, the unions did not anticipate major
restructurings of regular employees at the facility and focused their efforts on other
aspects of collective bargaining. Union representatives claimed that since the collective
agreements build on statutory laws and collective agreements, the stipulations in sector
level agreements regarding severance payments of at least two times the monthly salary
should follow. Representatives of local management, on other hand, suggested that since
the stipulations of company level agreements supersede the collective agreements and
national legislation laying at its foundation, they relegated themselves from the obligation
of paying generous severance packages.
As the developments surrounding the facility were escalating to the national level
of labor relation institutions in Romania, new political developments further constrained
the ability of the unions to rely on traditional institutions to achieve improvements. The
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Romanian government declined to register the new national collective agreement that
was negotiated in 2010 and eventually dismissed national level collective bargaining
altogether. The national collective agreement that was signed in 2006 and provided the
foundation for sector and company level agreements signed in subsequent years ended its
effectiveness in 2010. Although the new agreement was not much different in content
from the previous one, negotiations around the new collective bargaining reached a
deadlock and only four out of the thirteen representative employers' associations signed
it. As a result, the national government declined to register it at the Ministry of Labor and
Social Affairs. In the context of negotiating a new loan agreement with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the government eventually amended the Romanian Labor Code
without any consultation with the social members and abolished the mandatory character
of the national collective agreement (EIRO Romania(b), 2012). The new collective
agreement negotiated for the next years did no longer have the same type of legal
authority as in previous years.
This context of major inconsistencies and deficiencies in domestic institutions set
incentives for the local union to eventually appeal to the transnational corporate social
responsibility program of Corporation Electronics 1 to address the problem. Disappointed
by previous experiences with the Regional Labor Inspectorate, the domestic union did not
even appeal to the local state enforcement agency in this context. Rather, the domestic
union used the corporate social responsibility program of Corporation Electronics 1 to
promote improvements. The union representatives got exposed to stakeholder
engagement oriented private regulatory efforts of Corporation Electronics 1 at the time of
the establishment of facility Romania Electronics 1. Representatives of Corporation
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Electronics 1 contacted the labor unions at facility RE 1 directly and informed them about
the corporate social responsibility program, its main focus and mode of implementation.
In addition to informative material on major projects initiated by the lead corporation,
representatives of Corporation Electronics 1 also encouraged direct interactions with the
unions and explained the organizational chart responsible for the administration of the
program.
The ongoing controversy surrounding the relocation of manufacturing from a site
from western Germany to Romania illustrated the manifestation of social responsibility
program of Corporation Electronics 1 in practice. The decision to lay off thousands of
workers at a manufacturing site in Germany resulted in a set of agreements adopted in
cooperation with the local union to provide generous support for the workforce to be laid
off. The closing of the site that affected also about 2,300 workers resulted in an
agreement to provide a severance package worth 200 million Euros. The package
included average payment of 80,000 Euros per worker and additional 15 million Euros
funding to offer a year-long training for laid-off workers This agreement was peerless
even in the German setting where trade unions have traditionally been strong and earned
significant concessions from local management on their own.
The corporate social responsibility program of Corporation Electronics 1 also
became an important institutional platform to appeal to during negotiations at facility
Romania Electronics 1 regarding severance packages. Labor union representatives at the
facility contacted top representatives of Corporation Electronics 1 responsible for the
implementation of its corporate social responsibility program to inform them about major
concerns at the facility. Following these interactions, union representatives also referred
176
commonly to the corporate social responsibility program of Corporation Electronics 1
during negotiation meetings with local management and referred specifically to the
precedent set at the manufacturing site located in Western Germany. According to union
representatives involved in the negotiation process, these references were used
specifically with the intention to put pressure on local management to abide to European,
and especially to Romanian norms, regarding severance payments.
With the engagement of labor relations at the regional and national level, state
interventions served the primary role of rendering legitimacy and authority to unions'
demands for severance packages. The involvement of regional and national
representatives of the Cartel Alfa in negotiations at facility Romania Electronics 1
resulted in the gradual escalation of the controversy around the case to the national level.
In this context of growing national salience of the issue, the Romanian government also
adopted steps to intervene on behalf of the workers. The Prime Minister of Romania
delegated the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs to intervene and help the involved
parties to find a solution regarding the compensatory payments. After a visit at the
Regional Agency for Employment, the minister eventually met with representatives of
the facility. In the framework of this meeting as well as in public statements to the media,
the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs also appealed to the concept of corporate
responsibility of European companies. Furthermore, the minister asked for Corporation
Electronics 1 to follow up on its commitment to promote social sustainability and ensure
that employees from facility RE 1 are compensated with appropriate support to enable
their livelihood and facilitate their readjustments in the labor market.
These efforts by domestic unions to use and combine national regulatory
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frameworks of both national public and transnational corporate regimes resulted brought
about improvements in the social protection provided for dismissed workers. Local
management agreed to provide compensation payments worth three times the salary for
each employee and keep employees on the payroll for an additional three months after
termination of production at the site. During these time period, the company management
provided training for professional conversion and support for job search for the
employees. The regional government also participated in these efforts of social protection
and reconversion for dismissed workers funded by the European Fund of Adjustment for
Globalization that the Regional Office of Employment applied for to provide protection
for the newly unemployed 2 . Company and government cooperation also extended to
seeking new investors in the region who could employ the workers formerly employed at
facility RE1. Finally, with the intervention of the corporate social responsibility
representatives of Corporation Electronics 1, the local management also participated in
setting up a series of grants for employees who were interested in starting a business or to
finish their studies.
These processes unfolding at facility REl took place simultaneously with the
development of the transnational governance initiative of Corporation Electronics 1 to
promote social responsibility in case of major restructurings at its manufacturing sites,
and have probably left their mark on the program. The representative of Corporate Social
Responsibility program of Company Electronics 1 announced in 2011 the start of a new
52 The local employment office (Agentia de Ocupare a Fortei de Munca) applied to access this fund was
eventually granted 5 million Euros that were invested on retraining, stipends for companies who hired from
those left unemployed, covered costs with relocations to other cities to fill in vacancies, etc. The grant also
included 2 million Euros that were spent on stipends for the former employees resulting in about 1000
Euros per employee, which included a special allocation to be spent on getting new clothes, haircuts and
shaves, in preparation for job interviews. The beneficiaries of this fund also included employees contracted
through local suppliers to work on the assembly lines, provide security, catering, etc.
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program that helps people readjust in the labor market in case of major dismissals and in
content is very similar to the measures adopted at facility REl.
In summary, although the decision to move manufacturing outside of Romania
and leave thousands of employees without a job for at least a temporary time period
represents a socially irresponsible act, the stakeholder oriented transnational corporate
social responsibility initiative of Corporation Electronics 1 facilitated the emergence of
regulatory improvements at facility Romania Electronics 1. The program provided an
alternative institutional framework for domestic actors to compensate for institutional
deficiencies in the domestic regulatory system. Both union and state representatives
appealed to the transnational corporate responsibility program to put pressure on local
management and facilitate social protection of dismissed workers. The primary role of
private regulation was therefore to balance out power asymmetries across foreign
investors and domestic actors, and hence act as an indirect enforcement mechanism in the
Romanian context. While the local union initiated and interweaved these regulatory
efforts, unions at higher level facilitated the escalation of the industrial conflict to
national levels politics and the intervention of the state. Finally, the national government
legitimated the unions' efforts and increased pressure on the local management to comply
with transnational private regulation.
6. Union driven regulatory complementarities in the context of compliance
oriented transnational regulatory initiatives
Implementation of domestic regulations with respect to collective dismissals was
also problematic at facility Romania Electronics 2 (RE2). Areas of particular concern
included replacement of dismissed workers with temporary agency workers, lack of
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cooperation with local unions during the dismissal process, biased selection of the
personnel to be laid off, and low compensation for dismissed workers. The
implementation of domestic regulation regarding these aspects of collective firings at
facility RE2 have been deficient over the years and motivated domestic unions to use
transnational corporate social responsibility initiatives to promote improvements in the
social protection of dismissed employees. In the context of compliance oriented
transnational corporate initiatives, however, the ability of the unions to drive regulatory
complementarities were more limited than in the case of transnational institutional
platforms that are more open towards engaging with local stakeholders.
Improvements at facility Romania Electronics 2 were contingent on the combined
role of regulatory efforts of transnational corporation, the state and labor unions, but
interactions across them were more limited and improvements regarding collective
dismissals were more marginal. Similarly to the case of facility Romania Electronics 1,
the corporate social responsibility program of Corporation Electronics 2 provided an
institutional framework to rebalance power asymmetries across the local union and
management, and enable the emergence of the first collective agreement regarding
severance packages. The role of the state was primarily to legitimize and protect the
existence and freedom of operation of the union at the facility, and consequently, to
enable its strategic efforts to engage in mobilizing private regulation to improve industrial
relations and regulation at the site. Notwithstanding the compliance oriented approach of
Corporation Electronics 2 regarding its transnational corporate social responsibility
approach, the union played an important role in activating and mobilizing interventions
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of the lead corporation to put pressure on facility management to adopt more socially
responsible practices.
Initial concerns with the facility's employment practices regarding collective
dismissals started in the mid 2000s when the management of facility RE 1 dismissed
several hundreds of workers without consulting the local union, and soon replaced the
dismissed workers with temporary agency employees. In the absence of collective
agreement at the site, local management provided minimum payment of only two
months' salary for laid off workers set by the sector level agreements. During the golden
era of generous compensation packages ranging from six to 20 times the monthly salary
at other facilities, this was particularly poor support for dismissed workers. After several
attempts to negotiate a collective agreement at the company level, there was no company
level agreement in place throughout the first part of the 2000s.
The traditional institutions of industrial relations and state-labor relations
provided inadequate platforms to address these and similar concerns. Poor regulations of
collective redundancies at facility RE2 in the mid 2000s were mainly due to the growing
power asymmetry across the foreign corporation, and domestic regulatory organizations
in the context of weak rule of law. Facility RE2 represented one of the largest foreign
investments in the Western part of Romania and employed several thousands of people.
Representatives of the local union approached the facility management to discuss
these practices but facility level management was indifferent towards the union's
concerns. Relations between local management and union have traditionally been
difficult at this facility. Previous attempts by the local management to undermine
unionization at the factory by firing several people from the union's leadership resulted in
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a public trial that obligated the local management to re-employ them. The state played an
important role in defending freedom of association and in providing legal protection from
unemployment to the union organizers, but its administrative structure often failed to
address labor concerns at the site directly. While some appeals to the Regional Labor
Inspectorate regarding concerns with working time at the facility resulted in
improvements for employees at facility RE2, complaints regarding the procedures
underlying collective redundancies were not met with any significant response by the
local labor inspectorate.
As facility RE2 was becoming more integrated in transnational corporate social
responsibility initiatives of Corporation Electronics 2 and other major global buyers, the
domestic union eventually tried to use this new emerging institutional platform to address
labor concerns at the facility. Over the mid 2000s, it became increasingly common for the
facility to get evaluated by private auditors of major corporations. These audits were
initially limited mostly to quality audits, with some evaluations of the health and safety
procedures occasionally integrated into them. With the growing importance of the
Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition, more extensive evaluations regarding labor
standards became increasingly common at the facility. Even though the code of conduct
did not have any specific stipulations regarding the terms and conditions of collective
dismissals of employees at manufacturing sites, it stipulated compliance with domestic
regulation. The corporate audits have generally been implemented with no interactions
with local unions. Without the engagement of the labor union in these evaluations,
private auditors largely overlooked major labor concerns at the facility regarding
collective dismissals.
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Sources from the company also revealed examples when these corporate efforts
have been undermined by deficiencies in domestic regulation to produce improvements
in working conditions. A private audit conducted in the early 2008 by Corporation
Electronics 2 exposed some key differences in the compensation of standard and
subcontracted employees. The concerns of the auditors were soon dismissed when local
management appealed to a personal connection in the regional state enforcement agency
to confirm the legality of these practices. These practices were relatively common in the
Romanian context of weak and inconsistent laws. Thus, even in cases where private
audits identified labor concerns, inconsistencies in the guidelines and institutional
weaknesses underlying enforcement prevented more effective change towards
improvements. The effectiveness of corporate social responsibility efforts is often
contingent on domestic national regulation that renders legitimacy and further authority
to corporate regulatory initiatives.
Although the transnational corporate social responsibility initiatives implemented
at facility RE2 did not rely on engagement with local stakeholder, the domestic union
made a series of attempts to engage with Corporation Electronics 2 to force local
management to adopt more socially responsible practices. The leader of the local union
contacted various top-level representatives of Corporation Electronics 2 to inform them
about the uncooperative attitude of the local management and of the poor working
conditions at facility RE2. After persistent efforts of the domestic company union,
representatives of the European office of Company Electronics 1 eventually agreed to a
meeting with the domestic union. The meeting took place in 2007 and included the
Human Resources Manager of the European office of Corporation Electronics 2,
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representatives from the County Council, regional representatives of the National Union
Association (Blocul National Sindical) (BNS), national leader of the Metalworkers'
union, and representatives of local management and union. While the meeting had no
concrete outcome, the European representatives of Corporation Electronics 2 made
repeated reference to the commitment of the corporation to promote social responsibility.
Soon after this interaction, the first collective agreement was signed between the local
union and management with an agreement for a compensation payment worth three
months' salary, as well as additional compensation of one month's salary in function of
seniority.
The efforts of the domestic union to engage higher level representation of
Corporation Electronics 2 contributed to more balanced industrial relations at the facility,
but the continued reliance mostly on corporate audits has not been conducive to more
significant improvements. Notwithstanding the higher compensation provided for
dismissed employees and improved coordination with labor union at the domestic
facility, further concerns with collective dismissals soon followed. Collective dismissals
in 2011 for example relied on marginal coordination with the local unions and obscure
criteria to select the employees to be dismissed from the factory. The local union accused
the management that instead of following the clearly specified selection criteria set by
state regulation, they protected employees who were personally connected to mid- and
top- level management. Furthermore, while other companies in Romania often made
significant efforts to facilitate the readjustment of their employees in the local labor
market, the assistance provided by facility RE2 was limited to providing a simple list of
companies that had job vacancies in the region.
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In summary, complementary interactions were more limited in the context of
compliance oriented transnational corporate regulatory initiatives. As domestic labor
relation institutions failed to provide an effective framework to improve regulation at the
facility, the local union appealed to the transnational corporate governance system that
facility RE2 was integrated into. The primary contribution of the private governance
system was to rebalance power relations between local management and the union, and
facilitate collective agreement regarding the severance package. While corporate audits
have contributed to some small improvements, their effectiveness remained limited by
the weak rule of law and lack of engagement with the local union. The role of the state
was more indirect and limited to its protection of the rights of freedom of association at
the site that later enabled for the strategic efforts of the domestic union to appeal to
transnational corporate institutions to improve industrial relations and regulation at the
local level.
Conclusions
This chapter illustrated that public-private regulatory complementarities are more
limited in the context of state-directed labor relation institutions. The extent and
processes of these complementarities are evaluated in terms of collective redundancies in
the Romanian electronics industry. The relatively recent emergence of the electronics
sector in Romania, in a context of late reforms and reliance on international organizations
to promote its private sector, relied extensively on collective dismissals to adjust
manufacturing in the region to volatility and uncertainty in the global electronics
industry. Regulation of collective dismissals was undermined by a weak rule of law and
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inconsistencies in the domestic regulatory framework. The growing power asymmetry
across foreign corporations and company level unions also enabled the exploitative
practices of large foreign corporations in the national context.
Improvements in the regulation of collective dismissals at the Romanian facilities
were enabled by complementary interactions across private transnational and public
domestic regulation. Transnational corporate regulation played the primary role of
improving coordination at the local level across management and the labor union to
address major inconsistencies in domestic regulation, and reduce power imbalances
between local management and union. The role of the state was primarily to legitimize
and add pressure to unions' efforts to engage lead corporations to implement social
responsibility programs. National labor relation institutions have influenced the
emergence of regulatory complementarities at these facilities in several important ways.
Centralized and poorly coordinated labor relations institutions that are characterized by
state interventions as a dominant coordination mechanism set incentives for domestic
unions to seek alternative institutional platforms to safeguard workers from the pressures
of the global economy. While direct state interventions sometimes conferred legitimacy
and authority to union efforts to build regulatory complementarities, the inconsistencies
and weak rule of law of state regulation also hindered its potential to legitimize
transnational private corporate pressures for better regulation. Finally, the relatively weak
coordination across different levels of industrial relations in a systematic manner enabled
micro level experimentation with corporate regulatory initiatives.
The abilities of domestic unions to use transnational corporate efforts to
complement domestic institutions and guide improvements, however, varied greatly
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across transnational regulatory efforts based on different implementation styles. Once
activated by the domestic union, the stakeholder engagement oriented approach of
transnational corporate social responsibility efforts at facility RE 1 provided a more
favorable platform for regulatory improvements than the compliance oriented
transnational regulatory approach at facility RE2. Nonetheless, the differences in the
extent of improvements and the underlying mechanism of the processes driving
regulatory complementarities were much less significant than in the context of the more
market oriented institutional context of Hungary.
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Chapter 5:
Absence of Complementarities in the Context of Coordinated Labor Relations
Institutions: Regulation of Fixed Term Employment and Working Time in Slovenia
Notwithstanding expectations that national contexts with institutionalized
coordination provide favorable conditions for corporate social responsibility efforts, the
empirical study of Slovenia demonstrates that, in reality, this is not necessarily the case.
This chapter examines the interactions across domestic public and transnational corporate
regulation in a national context with coordinated and centralized labor relation
institutions. In Slovenia, where tripartite institutions and industrial relations systems are
strong and coordinated, these traditional institutional channels remained the main
platforms to address concerns with precarious working conditions and employment
relations in globally integrated industrial sectors. Transnational private regulatory
institutions mostly layered on top of these institutions without significant interactions
across them.
Over the last decade, electronics manufacturing facilities from Slovenia have been
relying increasingly on flexible employment practices associated with precarious working
conditions and employment relations. Manufacturing plants have been employing
workers on fixed term contracts in large numbers to meet fluctuations in the volume of
production at lower levels of economic cost. They have also been using flexible
reorganization of working time, particularly in the forms of overtime and irregular
working times, to meet frequent changes in the volume of demand from major
corporations. Several governmental and non-governmental organizations have expressed
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concerns with respect to these practices due to the high degree of insecurity, lack of
representation and poor remuneration associated with fixed term employment; and poor
work-life balance correlated to intensive working schedule (ZSSS, 2011; SKEI, 2007;
LIRS, 2009).
Since their adoption in the mid 2000s, transnational corporate regulatory
initiatives have been largely ineffective to bring about improvements for workers
exposed to global industry pressures. Concerns with labor conditions among export-
oriented electronics manufacturing factories from Slovenia have continued to be
approached primarily through traditional channels of trade union representation and
social dialogue, with no significant interactions with private governance institutions. In
the electronics industry, company level unions have cooperated mostly with their central
offices and relied on the national tripartite forum to achieve stronger regulation for fixed
term employment. Similarly, with respect to flexible working time and work-life balance,
local trade unions used on company and sector level industrial relations institutions to
address concerns and facilitate better regulation.
Corporate initiatives for social responsibility in supply chains - an increasingly
common institution in Slovenia, largely layered on top of national public regulatory
institutions without too much interaction across them. Unions saw little opportunity for
these institutions to become effective institutional channels to promote improved
employment practices in globally integrated industries. Corporate social responsibility
efforts have been promoted and mobilized mostly by civil society organizations that are
often left out of the national coordination institutions. These initiatives, however, have
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focused mostly on charitable interventions and had no real implications on the flexible
employment practices of companies.
In what follows, this chapter sets out with a brief presentation of some of the
unique characteristics of the Slovenian industrial and institutional context, with a
particular focus on their relevance for employment practices and working conditions in
the electronics industry. The chapter then proceeds with case study analysis of two
electronics manufacturing facilities that operate in Slovenia and are integrated in
transnational governance institutions of major corporations, unwrapping the interactions
across domestic and transnational regulatory approaches. As facility level concerns
become increasingly integrated in national level political strategy to address them, the
narrative follows with discussion of key developments at the national level. The chapter
concludes with a brief summary of the main trends that emerged in the Slovenian context.
The Shift of Industrial Policy from a Focus on Domestic Capabilities to Foreign
Direct Investments: The Transformation of the Electronics Industry
In contrast with other countries from Eastern Central Europe, Slovenia did not
rely on foreign direct investment as a cornerstone of its transformation from centrally
planned to market economy (Crowley&Stanojevic, 2011). The coordinated labor
governance institutions and industrial policies focused on strengthening domestic
capabilities set Slovenia apart from other transition economies during the 1990s (Bohle
and Greskovits, 2012; Crowley and Stanojevic, 2011; Dimovski, 2007; Feldmann, 2006;
Knell, 2005; Bandelj, 2003). Notwithstanding a long history of cooperation with foreign
investors during socialism and Western influence to liberalize the inflow of foreign
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investments, industrial policies during early transition years focused on strengthening the
technical capabilities and economic competitiveness of domestic industries
(Bohle&Greskovits, 2012; Bojnec, 2000; Svetlicic&Rojec, 1998). The Slovenian
government adopted privatization strategies that favored insider groups - employer and
employee associations, to keep formerly state-owned companies in domestic ownership
and to strengthen domestic interest groups (Bohinc&Brainbridge, 2003; Bojnec, 2000).
Accordingly, the inflow of foreign direct investments throughout the 1990s was relatively
restricted 54 (Bohle&Greskovits, 2012; Orazem&Vodopivec, 2000).
At the end of the first transition decade, Slovenia's development strategy
gradually shifted its focus towards liberalizing trade and foreign investment to promote
global economic competitiveness of its economy and acquire greater access to foreign
markets (Bohle&Greskovits, 2012; Beko, 2003; Damijan&Mrak, 2005). The new
tendency became particularly evident when the center-right party came to governance in
2004. The new Prime Minister replaced the "old" generation of governmental economists
with a younger neo-liberal team advocating for radical transformation of economic
policies56 . Domestic and foreign investors were eventually given equal rights to enter and
exit business in the Slovenian economy, and as a result, foreign investors came to play a
an important role in what is often referred to as "the second wave of privatizations" in the
country (Blaszczyk et al, 2003). The government eventually adopted policies and
54 Specific areas of restrictions included manufacturing of military equipment, rail and air transport,
communications and telecommunications, major public utilities, insurance and finance, mass media. Even
in areas where foreign direct investment was less restricted, investment by foreign sources had to be
approved by Slovenian Privatization Agency and registered at the district courts. Moreover, board members
of Slovenian enterprises were subjected to requirements with respect to the nationality of the members.
56 They were part of the Economic Strategic Council appointed to provide expert advise on economic
policies, with a mere consultative role. The Council advocated for greater entrepreneurial
liberalization, privatization, redrawal of state controls from the marketplace, and greater emphasis
on global competitiveness
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programs that actively promoted foreign direct investments in the country, very much
like other governments from Eastern Central Europe. The foreign market and capital
oriented development strategy eventually became the dominant trend in Slovenia as well,
with a special focus on increasing manufacturing of intermediate goods in human and
physical capital intensive industries like the electronics and automotive industries
(Bandelj, 2003; Bojnec, 2004; Bohle&Greskovits, 2012).
These transformations of Slovenia's economic policies are well reflected in the
evolution of the electronics industry over the last two decades. The electronics sector has
a long industrial tradition in Slovenia with domestic companies such as Gorenje and
Kolektor established during the socialist era. With increasing liberalization of investment
and trade policies, foreign direct investment came to play an essential role in expanding
electronics manufacturing activities in the country, and integrating them in transnational
production networks (Beko, 1999; Svetlicic&Rojec, 1998). For example, a Slovenian
manufacturer of lighting systems established in 1921 was transformed into a joint-venture
in 1997 at the initiative of a contract manufacturing company from Germany. The latter
then purchased the entire company in 2004 and reoriented production to supplying brand
corporations from Western Europe. Similarly, Ydria Motors, a Slovenian manufacturer of
motors for home appliances became a joint venture with a German firm Alcatel SEL in
the 1990s and was then bought completely by the German company in 2001. The skilled
workforce and the favorable geographical position of the country greatly facilitated the
integration of Slovenia in the global architecture of the electronic industry. The
government gradually started to adopt a more pro-active and interventionist approach
towards promoting foreign investments in the electronics industry. In the case of a new
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investment project by Alcatel SEL 2010, for example, the government provided generous
support in the form of subsidies for labor costs, to ensure that the investments are made at
the local site rather than abroad. The foreign owned Hella Saturnus Slovenije also
received subsidies from the government in 2011 to encourage its investments in
additional electronics manufacturing capabilities dedicated for export-oriented activities.
By the time Slovenia became a member of the European Union in 2004, most
electronics manufacturing companies from the country, both foreign and domestically
owned, supplied major brand corporations from abroad (InvestSlovenia, 2008). With
more than two thirds of sales destined for Western European markets, around 80 percent
of revenues in the industry came from exports (SEEIM, 2010). By the end of 2000s, the
electronics sector represented approximately 20 percent of production and employed
around 23 percent of the workforce in manufacturing. Electronics manufacturers from
Slovenia include companies in foreign or mixed ownerships that supply foreign brand
corporations such as Hella Saturnus; subsidiaries of major multinational corporations
such as Bosch Rexroth facility; and to a lesser extent, domestic companies that have their
own brand, such as Gorenje. Most factories specialize in the development and production
of electronic components, electrical devices, equipment and systems 58 . Integration in
global architecture of the electronics industry resulted in the introduction of international
product and quality standards among most facilities, along with corporate labor and
environmental standards promoted through specific implementation strategies by lead
corporations (Blaszczyk et al, 2003).
58 Key products include electro motors and machines, household appliances, telecommunication
equipment, medical and optical equipments, power distribution facilities, electronic manufacturing
services, electrical components.
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Growing Pressure for Flexible Employment Practices
These changes in the economic development strategy and industrial structure of
Slovenia had implications on labor institutions and practices. Labor relations institutions
established in the 1990s included a relatively strong and inclusive national tripartite
institution, coordinated industrial relations system, and political affiliation across labor
unions and social-democratic parties. In the context of increasing integration into the
global economy, the Social and Economic Council of Slovenia (SEEE) was also
reformed and some of its traditional roles reconsidered (Banerjee&Kozamernik, 2010)'9.
As the relevance of powerful foreign corporations has grown in the industrial system of
Slovenia, industrial relations at the company level became increasingly important.
Political affiliations across trade unions and political parties have also eroded over time
and their relevance diminished by the mid 2000s (Avdagic, 2005). Notwithstanding these
changes, however, coordination through the national tripartite institutions and industrial
relation at central levels remained relatively strong in the Slovenian context (Feldmann,
2006; Hethy, 2009; Crowley&Stanojevic, 2011)61.
The issues of employment flexibility and company competitiveness became
recurrent themes in the negotiation of employment policies and collective agreements at
the national level (Dimovski&Znidarsic, 2007; OECD, 2011; FDI Summit Reports of
Slovenia, 2005-2011). As employment legislation in Slovenia had been generally more
protective than in other countries from the region, several waves of major reforms were
59 Tripartite wage agreement ended in 2006 and sectoral agreements became a primary platform for
wage coordination (Banerjee and Kozamernik, 2010).
61 Radical neoliberal reforms proposed in 2005, including a flat tax system to replace progressive
taxation system, were eventually stopped through tripartite negotiations. Slovenia was the only
country from Eastern Central Europe where negotiation in the aftermath of the economic recession
yielded a social pact.
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adopted to promote greater employment flexibility in the Slovenian economy (EIRO
Slovenia(b), 2013; Knell&Shrolek, 2005; Vodopivec, 2004). Within the framework of the
Social and Economic Council of Slovenia (SEEE), different types of arrangements were
discussed among policy makers and social partners as alternative approaches towards
greater labor flexibility. Key reforms were adopted in the early and mid 2000s that
focused on extending both external and internal flexibility. These changes enabled more
flexibility in working hours for greater internal flexibility, and broadened the legal
possibilities for fixed-term employment, and legalized temporary agency work for
external forms of employment flexibility. The reforms adopted over the 2006- 2007 time
period addressed further concerns with flexibility in the Slovenian labor market.
Important amendments included allowance of employment by type of work and further
extensions of the possible uses of fixed-term of employment.
In this context of gradual liberalization and accession to the European Union,
atypical employment contracts and flexible work arrangements have grown increasingly
common in the Slovenian economy. Reliance on fixed term employment, overtime and
weekend work became some of the most prominent sources of flexibility in the Slovenian
economy (EFLWC, 2009). Fixed-term employment, also referred to as temporary
employment, refers to jobs whereby the employer and employee agree that the end of the
employment contract is determined by objective conditions such as a specific date, the
completion of a task, the return of another employee who has been temporarily replaced
(EIRO Slovenia(b), 2010). As this form of employment does not entail firing costs and is
often associated with lower levels of compensation, it has become quite common in the
Slovenian economy. Its use is often related high levels of volatility and uncertainty
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regarding future demands in various industries (IMAD/UMAR, 2012).
The prevalence of temporary employment in Slovenia is above the average in the
European Union, and the gap has widened since its accession in 2004 (IMAD/UMAR,
2012). The proportion of fixed term employees in Slovenia grew from 13.5 percent in
2001 to 18.4 percent in 2007 (Eurostat, 2013). In comparison, the share of fixed term
employment in Romania and Hungary, were 1.2 and 7.2 percent respectively. Temporary
or fixed-term employment in Slovenia includes those contracted through labor agencies
as well, but the penetration rate of temporary agency work in Slovenia has been still
relatively low at .58% of the total workforce 62. The European level survey of companies
conducted in 2011 also reflects these divergences. While in Hungary only around 5
percent of companies reported using temporary employment, in Slovenia this proportion
was nearly a quarter of Slovenian companies (EFLWIC, 2009). The economic sectors
that utilize temporary employment include industry, commerce and logistics sectors. In
the industrial sector, they are particularly common among large, mostly foreign owned
and export oriented manufacturing companies (CIETT, 2009).
Table nr. 5.1. The share of temporary employees in total employees
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Hungary 7.0 6.7 7.3 7.8 8.4 9.6
Romania 2.4 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.0 1.1
Slovenia 17.2 17.1 18.4 17.3 16.2 17.1
Source: Eurostat, Labor Force Survey Series
Another important form of flexible employment that has been commonly
practiced by companies operating within the Slovenian context is the intensification of
work throughflexible working time arrangements. These include long-term time accounts
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(as a form of flexi-time), overtime, night and weekend work, etc (EFLWIC, 2010, 2007).
The use of employee-friendly flexible forms of work - such as autonomous working
teams, job rotations, job sharing, however, lag far behind the use of more employee-
unfriendly forms of flexibilisation. The share of companies using overtime over the last
year has also been more significant in Slovenia at 57%, relative to 49% in Romania and
47% in Slovenia (EFLWIC, 2009; 2010). Finally, work at irregular hours has also been
quite significant among Slovenian companies, including work in the weekends and work
in shift systems (the share of companies that engaged in work on Sundays has been 24%
in Hungary, 29% in Romania and 39% in Slovenia; work in shift systems was 22% in
Hungary, 28% in Romania and 39% in Slovenia). These contrasts reveal that flexibility in
Slovenia was met to a significant extent through internal reorganization of working times
of employees.
Table 5.2.: Percentage of companies that engage in flexible work practices in
2009
Long-term time
accounts Overtime Sunday work Shift work
Slovenia 7 57 39 39
Hungary 1.5 49 24 22
Romania 4 47 29 28
Source: Eurofound, 2009, European Working Conditions Observatory
Fixed-term employment and flexible working times have been criticized by labor
and civil society organizations from Slovenia and abroad due to their precarious natures.
Fixed term employment is connected to a high sense of insecurity and less protection,
especially for relatively low skilled jobs (Eurofound, 2010; makeITfair, 2010). The risk
of poverty among temporarily employed people is much higher than among those who
have permanent jobs (Slovenian Development Strategy, 2012). Improving working
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conditions and employment relations for fixed term employees was therefore identified as
an important area of focus by Slovenian trade unions. According to representatives of the
Association of Free Trade Unions of Slovenia (ZSSS), the scope of employment of fixed-
term employees has been marked by a whole set of violations of employment law,
particularly with respect to the repeated re-employment through temporary contracts and
the unequal status of temporary workers compared to permanent employees. "Temporary
workers do not receive the relevant tariff classes [of wages] and their remuneration is
generally at minimum wage, they remain deprived of their compensations for meals and
transport for work, holiday allowance, add-ons for job performance, Christmas bonus.
They generally have fewer holidays and sick benefits, while absence is often punished
with termination or non-renewal of the short term contracts".
The increasing flexibility of working time schedules has been another important
concern for trade unions from Slovenia due to the higher rates of workplace injuries,
inadequate payment of overtime, and poor work-life balance. Intensification of work
through overtime and irregular hours has also been associated with poor work-life
balance among employees (EFLWIC, 2009). According to representatives of labor unions
from Slovenia, overtime practices present particularly important challenges for senior
workers and workers with families. The regulation of temporary employment and
overtime therefore represented important areas of concern in the national regulatory
framework through the 2000s.
The pertinence of these issues in Slovenian regulatory politics is also revealed
through official reports of the Slovenian Labor Inspectorate as they identify atypical
forms of employment and working time as some of the most common areas of violations
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in Slovenia in the mid 2000s, along with informal work and employment of foreign
workers. In 2005, for example, approximately 8 percent of employment contract
violations, which represented by far the biggest chunk of employment violations, were
connected to the legality of employment relations with temporary workers (LIRS, 2005).
Most frequent violations related to fixed-term employment contracts included: contracts
being concluded for jobs that constitute part of the regular activity; exceeding time
limitations; incomplete contracts, etc (LIRS, 2009). Additionally, around 10 percent of
total number of violations in 2004 referred to irregularities with the legality of working
hours, including working time, irregular work, assignment of working times and annual
leaves (LIRS, 2005). The most common breaches related to working time violation
included: going over the limitations of number of overtime hours per week, lack of
adequate remuneration of overtime work, lack of adequate notification and management
of overtime accounts for employees (LIRS, 2009).
Layering of Private and Public Institutions: Regulation of Fixed-Term Employment
and Working Hours
Flexible employment practices have become particularly prevalent over the last
decade in export-oriented manufacturing industries including the electronics
manufacturing sector (EFLWIC, 2009; EIRO Slovenia(a), 2013). Representatives of the
Association of Free Trade Unions of Slovenia (ZSSS) and Trade Union of Electronics
Industry of Slovenia (SKEI) expressed concern repeatedly over the high share of
temporary workers and the common use of "unsocial" flexible working schedules in the
electronics industry (Dnevnik, 2011; SKEI, 2010). Employment through fixed term
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contracts has become a common way to avoid severance payments and cumbersome
firing procedures. The share of temporary employees among electronics manufacturers
often reached 50 percent of the workforce. Employees hired through temporary contracts
were generally more likely to work for long hours and lower pay, in the hope that they
can become full-time employees. Local management of export oriented electronics
facilities required from all its employees on a regular basis to work over-time and at
irregular hours without proper notification in advance, leaving little autonomy for
workers over their working schedules. These practices undermined the work-life balances
of employees and generated significant tension between local managers and trade unions
in the mid 2000s. Notwithstanding the transnational corporate social governance
institutions that most facilities were integrated into, precarious employment practices
persisted throughout the 2000s.
1. Labor concerns at two major electronics manufacturing facilities
Two electronics manufacturing companies located in the proximity of Ljubljana
that manufacture for major brand corporations from Western Europe illustrate relatively
well the propensities of electronics manufacturing facilities towards increasing
employment flexibility and work intensity. Facility Slovenia Electronics 1 (SE 1) is an
electronics manufacturing plant that specializes in the production of components for and
assembly of electronic motors used in both consumer and industrial products.
Manufacturing at this site is dedicated to serve the end markets of a major Western
European brand-corporation, and accordingly, most of its production is exported to
Europe. The state of the art plant was set up in 2004 with an investment of around five
million Euros and employed around 300 workers in 2010.
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Facility Slovenia Electronics 2 (SE 1) is an electronics manufacturing company
with approximately 2000 employees that specializes in the development and
manufacturing of lighting equipment for automobiles, such as headlights, fog lamps,
daytime running lights and single- and multi-function lamps. The company was
established during the socialist era but was bought and modernized by a German
company at the end of 1990s. The company made significant investments in extending
and upgrading the physical technologies of the facility as well as in improving production
processes to expand its export oriented activities. Today, it represents one of the major
exporters from Slovenia with 90 percent of production dedicated to exports. The basic
characteristics of these facilities are illustrated on Table 5. 3.
Table 5.3.: Basic characteristics of the electronics facilities from Slovenia
Characteristics Facility SEl Facility SE2
Established 2004 1997
Size (Number of employees) 300 2000
Production profile Assembly, Assembly,
components components,
research and
development
Lean manufacturing management system Yes Yes
Volatility (share of lowest production in 75% 70%
highest level of production volume)
Workplace representation (unionized) Yes Yes
Share of temporary workers 25-50 percent 50 percent
Role of temporary workers Lower skill, direct Lower skill, direct
These two facilities adopted very similar labor practices over the last decade to
address the high degree of volatility in the volume of production. Factory Slovenia
Electronics 1 (SE 1) employed several employees for only limited time periods and asked
for overtime work on a regular basis. The share of temporary workers at this facility
oscillated between approximately a quarter and half of the workforce, depending on the
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volume of orders. According to union representatives at the facility, these workers were
generally not provided the same benefits and bonuses as the workers hired through open-
ended contracts. Temporary employees, for example, were not eligible for payment to
cover their meals at and transportation to the workplace. They were also more likely to be
asked to work in weekend and do over time. Among the regular employees, complaints
about the instability of their working schedules and requirements for overtime without
proper notification in advance was one of the main sources of tension at the factory. One
of the workers at this factory recounted how she was called in to work on Saturdays
frequently, leaving her with no immediate solution to provide care for her children.
Notwithstanding great economic success that has earned considerable recognition
by Slovenian officials and public, approximately half of employees at facility Slovenia
Electronics 2 (SE2) were hired through temporary contracts at the end of the 2000s.
Employees contracted for a limited time or until the finalization of a specific project,
were often hired repeatedly through these temporary assignments, without transitioning
them to open-ended contracts. In addition to the high share of temporary employees and
precarious working conditions provided for them, labor unions and local media also
criticized the facility for excessive overtime and heavy shifts required from workers.
While these practices were common among both regular and temporary employees, they
were especially problematic among temporary employees. Temporary workers at this
facility recounted several occasions when they were required to take on six hours of
overtime after a regular 8 hour long shift, and then asked to do the same the next day.
These requests were often made without prior notification in advance to allow for
employees to make appropriate adjustments in their personal lives.
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2. Increasing segmentation of labor regulation
In the coordinated institutional context of Slovenia with strong employment
protection and implementation of regulation facilitated by a coordinated industrial
relations system, the growing presence of foreign export-oriented manufacturing
companies exerted considerable pressure for more flexible employment practices.
Similarly to the case of Hungary, regulation of the labor market became increasingly
segmented between temporary and open-ended contracts. While the legal origins of
temporary employment reach back to the socialist era, this form of employment was
relatively well protected and less prominent during the early 1990s. Neoliberal reforms in
the early 2000s, however, broadened the base of contracting temporary employment in
the Slovenian economy and removed a set of restrictions regarding its use.
The regulation in place during most of the second half of the 2000s specified a
rather broad and ambiguous set of conditions for the use of fixed term employment. The
conditions of use included completion of work that is of limited duration by its nature,
replacement of a temporarily absent worker, as well as seasonal work, project work,
temporarily increased volume of work (Articles 52-56 of the Slovenian Law on Labor
Relations). Several of the stipulations allowed considerable freedom of interpretation
regarding the legitimate use of temporary contracts. In case of termination of the term,
termination of the work, or upon cessation of the reason for which the contract was
concluded, the contract could be terminated without the obligation for the employer to
pay severance payment (Article 77, Employment Relations Law). Similarly, regulation
of working time has also gradually become more liberal in content. State regulation
during the end of the 2000s continued to specify 40 hours as the full-time working time,
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but was reformed to allow for more flexibility around it. A working week could be set for
shorter or longer, within the limits of 36 hours set as the minimum and 56 hours per week
(Article 142, Employment Relations Law).
The legislation in place also spelled out a set of restrictions in place. Slovenian
laws prescribed that during fixed term contract, the parties have the same types of
obligations and rights as employees contracted for indefinite time periods (Articles 52-56
, Employment Relations Law ). The employer was prohibited from including one or more
successive fixed term contracts with the same worker for the same position longer than
two years, without an interruption of at least 3 months. Similarly, the possibility for
extensions of working hours close to 56 hours long workweeks had to be specifically
agreed on in the frameworks of individual employment contracts or collective
agreements. Moreover, obligation of overtime had to be ordered prior to the
commencement of work and notified in writing whenever possible (Article 143,
Employment Relations Law).
Implementation of restrictions regarding the use of temporary employment and
overtime has, however, been rather challenging throughout the 2000s. In the context of
coordinated industrial relations system, trade unions play an essential role in facilitating
the application of state legislation and collective agreements in the Slovenian economy.
This has been more challenging with respect to the regulation of working time and fixed
term employment due to a combination of institutional and structural reasons. The
involvement of collective representation and bargaining at the sector level - the dominant
level of industrial relations in Slovenia, with regulation of working hours and atypical
employment was more limited in the 2000s. Notwithstanding full coverage of collective
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bargaining in Slovenia, temporary employees were generally not members of unions in
Slovenia. Additionally, the increasing presence of foreign manufacturing companies with
great economic and political significance weakened coordination across management and
employees' organizations to address concerns. Finally, state enforcement agencies were
often unable or unwilling to restrain the practices of large corporations that compete in
global markets.
The main focus of the Steel and Electronics Industries Union of Slovenia (SKEI),
one of the main labor union organizations in the electronics industry that represents
employees at both facilities Slovenia Electronics 1 (SE1) and Slovenia Electronics 2
(SE2), has been on negotiating basic wages and payment increases for workers employed
in the electronics and metal industries. With a sectoral density of approximately 30
percent of employees in the metal and electronics industries, the Steel and Electronics
Industries Union of Slovenia (SKEI) participates along with two other unions, SKEM and
SKEIE in sector level collective bargaining with the Chamber of Commerce and Industry
of Slovenia (GSZ). Collective agreements in the electronics industry did not extend or
restrict working week over the second half of the 2000s (EIRO Slovenia(b), 2013). The
involvement with regulation of atypical forms of employment has also been marginal,
although Steel and Electronics Industries Union of Slovenia did participate in union
protests in 2011 to prevent the adoption of new precarious forms of employment. These
protests were initiated by the Free Trade Union Association of Slovenia (ZSSS), one of
the major labor union confederations from Slovenia that SKEI is a member of.
Notwithstanding full coverage of collective bargaining that extends to temporary
employees, several labor unions from Slovenia made attempts to represent temporary
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employees directly in industrial relations, but with limited success. Representatives of the
Trade Union of Electronics Industry of Slovenia (SKEI) union from Ljubljana noted:
"These employees are sometimes concerned that given their short term of their contracts
they won't be able to reap the benefits. Other times, they are concerned that considering
their insecure position at the company, their membership in the union might reflect
negatively on the possibility of getting a permanent assignment at the company. As
atypical employees are generally young employees, they are also less likely to be
interested in becoming union members." Collective representation at the two facilities
included 35 and 40 percent of employees respectively, but only a few members were
temporary employees.
In addition to the limited focus of sector level industrial relations on working time
and temporary employment, union representatives also noted the challenges with
domestic regulation in the context of changing industrial structure in Slovenia and
growing power asymmetry across foreign companies and local management. In the
context of high volatility and pressure to keep manufacturing sites competitive in the
global market, labor unions often faced significant challenges in coordinating with local
management to ensure implementation of state laws and collective regulation. Industrial
relations at the company level has become less effective in dealing with the growing
concerns regarding precarious employment practices, and state enforcement agencies
have been largely unsuccessful to fill in the opening regulatory gap. Representatives of
the local unions reported these practices to the local inspectorate even though they
believe that the local management at facility Slovenia Electronics 2 (SE2) and other
companies from Slovenia have multiple sets of records keeping documents "one for
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payroll and one for inspectors and auditors". "When the Labor Inspectorate announces
the management of the company about their arrival and instruct them to prepare records
of working time, it is clear which records will the employer present" noted one of the
union representatives. It is perhaps of little surprise then that these practices have
persisted for years now, with little improvements over time.
3. Transnational corporate regulation of flexible employment practices
In addition to the domestic regulatory system in place to address labor concerns,
transnational corporate social responsibility initiatives have grown more common over
the last decade as Slovenia became increasingly integrated in global production regimes.
Both manufacturing sites included in the study were integrated over the second part of the
2000s in the transnational social governance initiatives of the major corporations they
manufacture. While facility Slovenia Electronics 1 is integrated into a transnational
private regulatory system of Corporation Electronics 3 that puts more emphasis on
stakeholder engagement, facility Slovenia Electronics 2 is governed by more audit and
compliance oriented corporate efforts of Corporation Electronics 4. The transnational
private regulatory programs of Corporations Electronics 3 and 4 are rather similar in style
of implementation to the corporate social responsibility programs of Corporations 1 and 2
that supply from Hungary and Romania.
Corporation Electronics 3 is a major brand corporation from Western Europe that
specializes in electronics consumer appliances and industrial equipment. This company
has had specific programs in place to promote the social welfare of its employees and
their communities since its foundation about 100 years ago. Social responsibility towards
workers and their communities is therefore strongly rooted in the company's tradition.
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Later reforms of its corporate social responsibility program to bring it in line with
initiatives of other major corporations and industry associations from the electronics
industry, including the Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC), were inclusive
of labor unions in both the design and implementation stages. The new principles of
social responsibility of the company were adopted in 2006 with the extensive input of
labor unions of Corporation Electronics 2 and of main manufacturing sites. After a long
negotiation process, the basic principles today include basic human rights and labor
norms as defined by the International Labor Organization (ILO). More specifically, these
include the basic human rights, equal opportunities, integration of handicapped people,
free choice of jobs, rights of children, relations with representatives and their institutions,
fair working conditions, occupational health and safety. Implementation of these
standards also relies considerably on involvement of unions with emphasis on their role
in overseeing compliance throughout manufacturing sites and addressing non-
compliances through corrective solutions. In case of criticism by non-governmental
organizations due to inadequate environmental protection or poor working conditions, the
company generally runs special audits to investigate these concerns in greater detail.
Facility Slovenia Electronics 2 (SE2) is integrated in the transnational corporate
coordination system of a major corporation from Western Europe that is more
compliance oriented in its implementation. This corporation has explicit social standards
in place and initial evaluations of these social standards are integrated into the company's
quality and technical audits performed at manufacturing sites. Implementation relies
mainly on the activities of compliance officers who are responsible for monitoring and
following up reports on breaches of these standards. The compliance officers include the
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managing directors of the company, the plant managers, and specially trained corporate
auditors. Once a breach of standard is detected by or reported to the officers, the audit
team examines the issues and adopts corrective action plans if needed. These measures of
evaluation and monitoring are part of the corporation's strategy to ensure major buyer
corporations about the compliance with basic social standards promoted by globally
integrated electronics and automotive industries.
4. Institutional layering at the electronics manufacturing facilities
Notwithstanding alternative approaches towards addressing labor concerns,
synergistic interactions across transnational private and national domestic regulation have
been largely absent throughout the 2000s at the electronics manufacturing facilities
located in Slovenia. Transnational corporate governance initiatives mostly layered on top
of domestic public institutions in Slovenia, and generated no significant improvements in
regulation of temporary employment or working times. Changes in flexible working time
practices at facilities Slovenia Electronics 1 and 2 proceeded mostly from industrial
relations at the company and sector levels, with no interaction with transnational social
responsibility initiatives of lead corporations. The share of temporary employees
continued to remain very high and precarious working conditions largely persisted
throughout the 2000s.
In the context of coordinated and centralized labor relation institutions in
Slovenia, concerns with precarious labor standards have been approached mostly through
traditional institutional channels: industrial relations and tripartite institutions. With
strong sector level unions in place that coordinate relatively closely with both company
and national level unions in an effort to strengthen labor regulation, there has been no
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incentive to engage with alternative transnational private initiatives. The coordinated and
centralized character of labor relation institutions facilitated the escalation of concerns
regarding temporary employment to the national tripartite institutions - the main locus of
the political strategies of labor unions in Slovenia to improve regulation of atypical forms
of employment. Coordination with sector level unions also played an essential role in
addressing concerns with respect to flexible working time practices through the industrial
relations system of Slovenia. Within this context, trade unions made limited efforts to
engage with corporate social responsibility initiatives to promote their own interests. To
the extent that trade unions considered the opportunities that the increasingly prominent
institutions could potentially offer to improve labor regulation, these also took place
within the framework of the national tripartite institution of Slovenia, albeit with no
significant implications. Corporate social responsibility initiatives generated more
interest among civil society organizations that have been included in the political
decision-making less systematically and saw corporate social responsibility programs as
opportunities to promote their diverse interests in social issues.
a) Company level measures regarding working time management
In contrast with the persistence of high share and insecure status of temporary
employees, regulation of working time improved at both facilities over the second half of
the 2000s. Improvements included mainly the inclusion of workers' representatives in
decision-making process regarding scheduling overtime and weekend work, with
consideration given to the personal preferences and constraints of employees. Labor
union representatives also reported a decline in the extensiveness of overtime over the
years. The main channel through which these improvements were achieved consisted in
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coordination across management and trade unions in the framework of sector level
industrial relations institutions. The Steel and Electronics Industry Union (SKEI) - one of
the main trade unions that organizes employees in the electronics industry - have
traditionally coordinated with company level unions on regular bases to address labor
concerns across facilities. The Steel and Electronics Industry Union (SKEI) commonly
guided and supported local efforts to negotiate with local management. Occasionally, it
also intervened directly to put pressure on employers through protests or negotiations
with the electronics department of the Slovenian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
(GZS)66.
As flexible working time arrangements became increasingly common during the
mid 2000s, labor unions at facilities Slovenia Electronics 1 (SE 1) and Slovenia
Electronics 2 (SE2) eventually used the industrial relations system to address growing
concern among the workforce about the excessiveness of these practices. This time
period coincided with the launch of the transnational corporate social responsibility
programs of Corporations Electronics 3 and 4. While representatives of the unions were
aware of the presence of these new institutions, they largely ignored their potential
relevance to improve regulation of labor practices on site. Rather, representatives of trade
unions at the facilities informed and coordinated with top-level representatives of the
Steel and Electronics Industry Union (SKEI) to address labor concerns. As company
level trade unions are integrated into sector level representation and negotiation - the
strongest level of industrial relations in the Slovenian context, this was seen as an
effective and easily accessible institutional platform to promote their interests in
66 In 2013 for example, SKEI organized major protests in front of the headquarters of the Chamber of
Commerce and Industry (GZS) in Ljubljana to demand coordination regarding basic wages in the
industry and overtime payments (UMAR, 2013).
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improving working conditions for their employees.
With the guidance and support of the Steel and Electronics Industry Union
(SKEI), company unions at both facilities initiated consultations with local managements
and proposed a set of administrative solutions to ensure better monitoring and
management of working time assignments among the employees. These included joint
monitoring of the working times by the human resources management and labor unions,
regular discussions around the issue of working time during weekly meetings, and regular
communication between union representatives and employees at the facilities about their
working time schedules. As a result of these changes, both facilities made progress with
respect to regulation of working hours of employees by strengthening coordination across
local management and unions regarding the overtime and irregular hours of employees.
Implementation of the proposed measures was more complete at facility Slovenia
Electronics 1 (SE 1) than Slovenia Electronics 2 (SE2), as the volatility and volume of
production has also declined somewhat during the economic recession. Excessive
overtime has been more persistent at facility Slovenia Electronics 2 (SE2), but the
improved coordination between union and local management enabled the union to limit
the exploitative practices of local management. Senior employees and workers with
families represented a particular focus of the union's efforts to facilitate more work-life
balance for employees. These efforts in the framework of the company level labor
relations focused primarily on regular employees, but the trade union representative at
facility Slovenia Electronics 1 (SE 1) in 2011 claimed that they were working on
extending their efforts towards temporary employees as well.
b) Coordination with sector and national level labor relation institutions to address
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concerns regarding temporary employees
While coordination across workers' and employers' representatives often resulted
in corrective actions to address labor concerns in the Slovenian economy, this has not
been the case for complaints regarding temporary employment at facilities SEl and SE2.
At facility SE 1 union complaints about the high share of temporary employees were met
with resistance by the local management. They claimed their practices were compliant
with domestic regulation and emphasized the importance of more employment flexibility
to maintain economic competitiveness. The human resource management representative
also insisted that temporary employees, particularly the ones contracted from local
agencies, were a great source for recruitment of employees at their facility. The reactions
of local managers were fairly similar at facility SE2. The union at this site prepared a
report about the presence and occupational status of temporary employees at the site and
emphasized the divergence of some of the local practices from the regulatory guidelines
stipulated by national legislation. The local management, however, remained indifferent
to the union's analysis and requests to remediate their practices.
While both facilities were integrated in transnational corporate social
responsibility approaches, the unions did not consider using them as institutional
alternatives to put more pressure on local management or engage representatives from the
lead corporation to address concerns at the facility. Unions from Slovenia generally
considered that "while the corporate social responsibility initiatives don't hurt, they
simply reinforce statutory regulation or collective agreements, and do not really add to
them", as was noted by a representative at facility SE I. Local management at facilities
SE 1 and SE2 shared similar views regarding the transnational regulatory approaches of
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their lead corporations. The Human Resources Manager of site SEl considered corporate
policies with respect to social responsibility to be "completely overlapping with the
Slovenian employment regulation". Moreover, she also expressed confidence that the
well-functioning of the human resources department in cooperation with other
departments at the facility, and coordination with the local union and workers council,
was sufficient to ensure implementation of national laws and of the collective
agreements. At site SE2, a representative from the human resource departments noted
that the implementation of codes of conduct of the parent company and of buyers is a
positive re-enforcement of voluntary corporate values, but noted that the same principles
have been regulated through a more control-and-command style approach of the
Slovenian state and through coordination with unions. When representatives of a global
buyer corporation inquired about the overtime of temporary employees working on the
assembly line in 2008, for instance, the facility representatives reassured private auditors
about their efforts to remain within legal limits through extensive cooperation with the
local union.
Local unions continued to rely on traditional institutional channels to address
deficiencies in the implementation of state regulation, and to exert further influence on
flexible labor practices at facilities. While regional labor inspectorates were considered to
be relatively effective to enforce state regulation during audits, union representatives also
remarked a potential conflict between the political will of the Slovenian state to maintain
its commitment towards implementation of laws and the increasing dependence of the
economy on employment flexibility. Coordination with sector level unions was seen as a
more effective and reliable institutional approach to both exert pressure on local
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management, as well as to facilitate the adoption of new measures regarding particular
areas of concerns, as was the case with working time flexibility. Instead of engaging with
corporate regulatory institutions to exert more pressure on local management to change
their practices, union representatives from both facilities coordinated with sector and
national level representation to address regulatory deficiencies regarding temporary
employees.
In the context of ongoing debates about labor market flexibility and regulation of
atypical forms of employment at the national level, the Steel and Electronics Industry
Union (SKEI) coordinated on these issues with the Free Union Association of Slovenia
(ZSSS) to develop a national level strategy to improve labor regulation of temporary
employment. The Free Trade Union Association of Slovenia (ZSSS) has played an
important role in influencing labor, health, occupational safety legislation through the
Social and Economic Council of Slovenia (SEEE). The company level union at facility
SE2, for example, communicated with SKEI representatives on a regular basis and
provided data on the manifestations of temporary employment in practice, to inform and
support collective action at the central level. The leadership of the Free Union
Association of Slovenia (ZSSS) from Ljubljana, for example, made a public statement in
2010 against the high share of temporary workers at the facility SE2. The trade union
pointed out that the use of temporary workers at the site steps well beyond the cases
stipulated by the labor law and argued that some workers had been at the site for longer
than two years, without being transferred into the permanent stock. Similarly, the
management of facility SE2 became increasingly involved in national efforts to influence
state regulation regarding temporary employment through participating in the employers'
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association, the Slovenian Chamber of Commerce. The management considered flexible
employment to represent "one of the main sources of economic competitiveness in the
global market of manufacturing electronic components".
Concerns with the precarious nature of temporary employment at the facilities
therefore got folded up to the central level to be addressed through national interest
representation and political maneuvering. Considering the relative effectiveness of the
Free Union Association of Slovenia (ZSSS) to influence state legislation and coordinate
with national employers' associations regarding implementation (Crowley&Stanojevic,
2011; Visser, 2011), the main strategy of the unions has been to focus their efforts on the
Social and Economic Council of Slovenia (SEEE). Even though cooperation across major
union confederations has traditionally been relatively good in the Slovenian context,
collective action around the issue of atypical forms of employment was particularly
strong. As corporate social responsibility layered on domestic regulatory institutions that
facilities SE 1 and SE2 were integrated into without any significant interactions across
them, facility level concerns regarding temporary employment became integrated in the
political strategies of Slovenian labor unions at the national level.
5. Public and private regulatory interactions at the national level
In the context of strong coordination across industrial relations at different levels
and the growing salience of labor flexibility in the political economy of Slovenia,
company level concerns regarding temporary employment became integrated into
national regulatory politics ongoing in the framework of the Social and Economic
Council of Slovenia (SEEE). The SEEE stands out as an effective institutional framework
for interest reconciliation in the Eastern Central European region. While in most
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countries, the effectiveness of labor unions to obtain legislative and policy concessions
has been rather limited (Avdagic, 2005), the influence exerted by labor unions in
Slovenia over consultations in tripartite forums has been much stronger
(Crowley&Stanojevic, 2011). The significant leverage of labor unions over the SEEE is
illustrated relatively well by an incident from 2006 when the labor unions were
dissatisfied with the approach of the Minister of Labor, Family and Social Affairs during
tripartite negotiations on flexible employment policies. Their complaints to the Prime
Minister of the central-right wing government in power during that time period resulted
in the replacement of the Minister of Labor. Once a new minister was appointed, trade
unions continued negotiations with the new representatives of the Ministry and
employers' organizations.
a) Public regulatory developments regarding employment flexibility
Both employers' organizations and labor unions have been strongly involved in
national deliberations regarding regulation of flexible forms of employment. Major labor
unions from Slovenia, including the Free Association of Trade Unions (ZSSS) and other
union confederations, have been highly critical of the increasing reliance on atypical
forms of employment and the precarious character of the working conditions associated
with them. Trade unions regarded flexible employment practices as a threat to labor
standards, with a representative of ZSSS noting: "increase in temporary work cuts the
number in permanent employment and increases social exclusion and poverty, all in the
name of economic competitiveness". Similarly, a representative of Pergam, another
important labor union, remarked: "temporary work is the most precarious form of
employment. Temporary employees have considerably fewer rights and therefore
217
represent a cheaper source of labor for employers. .... As state regulation has been rather
ineffective to enforce constraints on the use of temporary employment, it will gradually
oust regular form of employment". Major employers and employer organizations, on
other hand, understood atypical forms of employment as important source of labor
market flexibility in the context of highly protective regulatory framework of regular
employees. Representatives several major electronics manufacturing facilities operating
in Slovenia expressed that temporary work represents an important source of flexibility to
respond to volatility in orders and enables them to create new employment possibilities.
Accordingly, employers' associations have been advocating for the removal of
constraints on the use of temporary employment.
Public regulation of temporary employment has therefore been the source of
major political contestations across labor unions, employers' associations and the
national government over the last decade. Labor law reforms adopted in 2007 regarding
temporary employment, for example, were the result of a year-long consultation and
negotiation across the state and social partners in the framework of the Social and
Economic Council of Slovenia (SEEE). While both parties agreed on the necessity to
introduce greater flexibility in the labor market, employers' association proposed the
removal of all or most restrictions on the use of temporary employment, while labor
unions demanded for more equitable rights across temporary and regular employees.
Occasionally, political negotiations in the framework of the SEEE were complemented
with protests organized by the labor unions. In 2010, a controversial legislative proposal
was debated in national institutions that would have allowed for unemployed, students
and pensioners to work up to 60 hours per week and 720 hours per year. This would have
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been considered temporary work but with significantly fewer rights, such as lower pay,
no reimbursement of work-related expenses, remuneration for sick or parental leave,
holiday allowance or severance pay. The leader of ZSSS who was a member of the
workers' group on the SEEE, however, organized major protests in front of the Chamber
of Commerce and Industry of Slovenia (GSZ) and called for a national referendum. The
law was eventually defeated by 80 percent of the votes cast against the proposed
legislation. National debates regarding regulation of working time, including that of
overtime work, were sometimes equally controversial. By the end of the 2000, however,
the center point of the conflict over working time flexibility gradually moved to industrial
relations at the sector and company levels.
b) Considering private regulation at the national level
As a main institutional platform for interest reconciliation, the Social and
Economic Council of Slovenia (SEEE) was also one of the first public arenas where the
potential role of corporate social responsibility was considered for the Slovenian
economy. In the context of major reforms adopted in the first part of the 2000s to
facilitate the accession of Slovenia to the European Union, the Free Association of Trade
Unions (ZSSS) initiated discussion about corporate social responsibility with the national
government and employers' associations about the concept and potential relevance of
corporate social responsibility. The concept resonated relatively well with representatives
of both the national government and social stakeholders as it was connected to the
socialist legacy of Slovenia, when social responsibilities such as ensuring full and life-
long employment, providing housing and health care for workers and their families were
delegated to companies.
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Notwithstanding this shared proclivity towards a past when the economic and
social responsibilities of large companies converged, social stakeholders had very
different understandings regarding the exact definition and practical relevance of
corporate social responsibility in the contemporary world. State representatives
understood corporate social responsibility as a potential instrument to encourage
partnership with the private sector in providing social benefits and an inter-ministerial
working group on Corporate Social Responsibility was soon set up in 2004 to consider its
integration into state institutions and operations67. Labor unions understood corporate
social responsibility mainly as employee friendly approaches throughout the entire
production process, including health and safety measures, secure contracts and decent
wages. Finally, the business sector interpreted corporate social responsibility mainly as
social philantrophy for local communities. The director of one of the main employers'
association, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Slovenia, remarked that if
businesses were to adhere to the union's interpretations of corporate social responsibility,
around half of the businesses operating in Slovenia would have to be closed68. These
differences eventually obstructed for the concept and practice of corporate social
responsibility to become an essential part of public policies in Slovenia69
67 This initiative remained fairly fruitless and was short-lived, with no significant consequences on state
policies and programs.
68 Representatives of labor unions attribute this narrow interpretation of the concept by managers and
representatives of employers' associations to the new generation of leadership of corporations that emerged
around the 2000s when a lot of the domestic companies were privatized and new generation of managers
trained by business schools got hired, eventually leading to a private sector leadership with a strong "cost-
reduction" mentality.
69 Some rather limited measures have been adopted in the Slovenian Companies Act amended in light of
EU Directives on CSR (2003/51/EC and 2006/46/EC), which stipulates for companies to include in their
reports information relating to environmental and employee matters. Moreover, companies whose securities
are traded on regulated markets are required to disclose in their annual reports the corporate codes of
conducts to which they adhere.
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Labor unions from Slovenia have continued to remain reluctant during subsequent
years regarding the potential and effectiveness of private regulatory efforts to address
labor concerns in Slovenia. With the growing presence of industrial establishments
governed by transnational corporate institutions, however, labor unions would
occasionally appeal to the commitment of these large corporations towards social
responsibility. In 2010, for example, the Free Association of Unions of Slovenia (ZSSS)
made reference to the corporate social responsibility program of facility SE2 to
emphasize the contrast with its relatively irresponsible labor practices and demand the
employment of temporary workers through regular contracts. Contrary to similar
references made by the Romanian government regarding facility RE 1, however, these
comments were limited only to general statements to the national media with no further
coordination with company level unions and representatives of the headquarter
corporation regarding the implementation of socially responsible practices. In fact, these
statements were made mostly to influence public opinion within the context of national
political contestation.
Over the last years, however, it has b'een mostly civil society organizations that
engaged more actively with corporate social responsibility initiatives in the Slovenian
context. Left out of the traditional coordination institutions, these organizations adopted a
more active role than unions in promoting and guiding the social responsibility efforts of
large companies that operate in the Slovenian economy. These programs covered a
relatively broad range of social objectives for communities but have rarely focused on
improving employment practices for workers. While exceptions exist, as is the case with
Ekvilib, a civil society organization established in 2003 to promote the concept and
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practice of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) that developed a certification program
of socially responsible employers, these initiatives have been largely ineffective so far to
promote real change in the behavior of large industrial establishments.
Conclusions
This chapter illustrated that in a national context with coordinated labor relation
institutions, private regulatory initiatives of large multinational corporations are largely
redundant. The transnational corporate social responsibility initiatives of large
corporations that manufacture in Slovenia have layered on top of domestic labor relation
institutions without significant interactions across them to promote regulatory
improvements.
The increasing integration of the Slovenian economy into transnational
production regimes generated significant pressure for employment flexibility throughout
export-oriented industrial facilities, including the electronic manufacturing sector. In the
context of a strong tripartite forum in place, a variety of external and internal forms of
employment flexibility have been considered. With relatively weaker restrictions set on
temporary employment and flexible working time regulation, increasing reliance on
temporary employment and frequent changes in working time schedules have become
particularly common in the electronics sector of Slovenia. The precarious nature of
working conditions associated with these practices generated considerable concern
among labor unions and civil society organizations.
The implementations of transnational regulatory initiatives have been relatively
ineffective at bringing about improvements in the regulation of these precarious practices.
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To the extent that improvements did take place, they were mostly the result of union
strategies in the context of domestic labor relation institutions that have traditionally
served to promote regulation since the collapse of the socialist regime. Coordination with
sector union and local management constituted the primary strategies to provide greater
autonomy and social protection for employees regarding overtime and irregular working
hours. With respect to temporary employment, company unions relied mostly on
coordination with sector and national unions and consequently, on tripartite institutions,
to exert pressure on employers for more socially responsible practices that are in
compliance with national regulation.
The national institutional context played an important role in limiting the
emergence of private-public, transnational and national regulatory complementarities.
First of all, in the context of strong tripartite and industrial relations systems with
significant coordination across labor unions, the state and employers' associations, there
was little incentive to engage with alternative institutional channels to achieve stronger
regulation of labor concerns in globally integrated industries. Second, strong coordination
across labor unions at different levels to facilitate industrial relations with corporate
representatives left little space of maneuver to experiment with alternative approaches at
the company level. Finally, as enactment and implementation of regulatory guidelines in
Slovenia relied more on strategic interactions at different levels of the industrial relation
system, state regulation on its own was likely to render legitimacy to corporate pressures
towards better regulation without the engagement of labor unions.
The implementation of both stakeholder and compliance oriented transnational
regulatory approaches were mostly irrelevant in this context, with little differences across
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them. The incentives and opportunities regarding corporate social responsibility
initiatives of large corporations have been somewhat more significant for civil society
organizations, but with no significant implications on labor standards at export-oriented
facilities.
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Chapter 6:
Discussion and Conclusions
The previous empirical chapters examined the institutional conditions of public-
private regulatory complementarities in three different national contexts from Eastern
Central Europe. Since the collapse of the socialist regime, Hungary, Romania and
Slovenia have become increasingly integrated into the global electronics industry, albeit
at different times and under different institutional conditions. By the mid 2000s, the
electronics manufacturing sector was significant in terms of production, employment, and
exports in all three countries. Notwithstanding positive contributions to the economy,
integration in the highly volatile and very competitive industry generated significant
pressures regarding employment flexibility. In Hungary, the electronics industry has
become increasingly dependent on the use of temporary agency employment7 0 as a main
source of cheap and flexible labor providing low compensation and no job security for
contracted employees. In Romania, electronics facilities have dismissed large groups of
workers on a regular basis to adjust their labor inputs to major changes in volume and
organization of production. Finally, in Slovenia, a combination of internal and external
sources of flexibility has been used in the electronics industry including flexible working
time7 1 and fixed-term employment 72. Temporary employment, collective dismissals and
flexible working time represent important sources of employment flexibility throughout
70 Temporary agency employment refers to the use of employees contracted from a labor agency, for a
limited time period.
71 This refers mostly to overtime, irregular shifts and weekend work.
72 Fixed-term employment is also commonly referred to as temporary employment. While it can include
also temporary employees contracted from agencies, it generally refers to employees hired for a specific
term by the electronics facility itself.
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the electronics industry (UNIDO, 2009). The precarious working conditions that are often
associated with these forms of employment represent common sources of concern for
civil society organizations from around the world (Barrientos et al, 2011;
Bormann&Plank, 2010; makeITfair, 2009; GoodElectronics, 2009; Smith et al, 2006).
The prevalence of these practices and the precarious working conditions associated with
them, however, differ to some extent according to the industrial policies and labor
institutions in place in particular national settings.
Transnational corporate regulatory efforts to remediate labor concerns at
electronics manufacturing sites from around the world led to different types of outcomes
across national settings from Eastern Central Europe. Private regulatory efforts of lead
corporations interacted with state regulation differently across divergent national
institutional settings with implications on the extent of regulatory improvements.
Building on the empirical analysis of regulatory complementarities in the national
settings of Hungary, Romania and Slovenia - the main focus of the previous three
empirical chapters, this chapter sets out with a brief summary of the regulatory outcomes
at the electronics facilities and an overview of how were these evaluated. This is then
followed by an extensive discussion of the main similarities and differences across the
processes that drove regulatory improvements, and their fit with the analytical framework
presented in the introductory chapter. Subsequent sections summarize and reiterate the
key arguments formulated in the thesis, and then discuss practical implications of the
study for a broader context of globally integrated emerging economies. The thesis
concludes with a brief discussion of the main limitations of the study.
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The Extent of Regulatory Complementarities in the Three National Contexts
Labor relation institutions - including tripartite coordination, industrial relation
institutions, and political affiliations across labor unions and the state, sometimes
facilitated and other times undermined the emergence of private public regulatory
complementarities. In Hungary, decentralized and uncoordinated labor relation
institutions facilitated the emergence of complementary interactions across private
transnational and public domestic regulation, with significant improvements for
temporary agency employment. Public-private regulatory complementarities were more
limited in the state-oriented national institutional setting of Romania, enabling more
modest improvements in the regulation of collective dismissals of workers. Finally,
transnational corporate efforts did not enable improvements in the regulation of flexible
working time or temporary employment in the coordinated labor relation institution of
Slovenia. These differences across the three national contexts were demonstrated in the
previous three empirical chapters using case studies of two electronics facilities in each
country. These facilities were selected based on their similarities in size, production
profile, technical sophistication, export-orientation, foreign ownership, as well as in
function of the differences in the regulatory initiatives they are integrated into, to serve
comparative analysis for both within and across national settings.
The extents of regulatory complementarities were evaluated around different
forms of flexible employment in the three contexts. While integration in the global
electronics industry exerted significant pressure for greater employment flexibility in all
three countries, it manifested in increasing reliance on and growing political contestation
around temporary agency employment in Hungary, collective dismissals in Romania, and
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employment flexibility and flexible working time in Slovenia. The particular
manifestations of these pressures differed across the national settings because integration
into the global electronics industry was driven by different types of industrial policies and
took place under different institutional conditions. This approach of focusing on different
cleavage points across (historical) institutional settings follows a relatively long tradition
in the comparative political economy literature initiated by Locke and Thelen (1995).
Hungary was one of the early promoters of foreign direct investment in the region
and adopted a set of weak labor relation institutions in the 1990s to facilitate this
development strategy. The emergence of extensive export oriented foreign manufacturing
sector during a time of weak inclusion of labor in political decision making eventually
resulted in the increasing prevalence of a new form of employment - temporary agency
employment, with very liberal regulatory framework. Romania emerged as a hub for
electronics manufacturing later in the 2000s due mainly to its late and partial reforms
marked by frequent state interventions throughout the 1990s. Major restructurings in the
Romanian economy were still ongoing during the last decade and collective dismissals
were quite common throughout the economy. In the context of relatively low labor costs,
it became an important source of employment flexibility in the electronics industry as
well. The national salience of regulation of dismissed workers was further magnified by
the unified character of collective bargaining at the national level, that integrated public
and private sector negotiations. Finally, Slovenia initially promoted domestic industrial
capabilities and shifted its policies towards a more global oriented development strategy
at the end of the 1990s. The inclusive and coordinated labor relation institutions adopted
in the early transition years persisted throughout this radical shift. The relatively strong
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labor unions facilitated the consideration of a broader set of sources for employment
flexibility, including both internal and external forms of flexibility. The increasingly
liberal regulation over the 2000s, however, contributed to the prevalence of precarious
working conditions in the electronics industry and political contestation around its
preeminent aspects: flexible working time and temporary employment. In the context of
increasing integration in the global economy and the emerging power of foreign
corporations, the political will and ability of national governments in all three contexts to
enforce regulation around these employment practices has diminished. In some cases,
additional technical challenges with the clarity and consistency of regulatory guidelines
presented additional challenges for domestic enforcement.
The extent of regulatory complementarities around these issues were evaluated
based on a procedure that examined the extent and type of improvements on four
important dimensions of labor regulation, built through the combined effectiveness of
public and private regulation at each facility. Endowment of workers with rights and
reduction in discrimination; imposition of limits on extensiveness of a particular practice;
empowerment through representation, and provision of social protection for vulnerable
groups of people have been identified by the scholarly literature as important aspects of
labor regulation (Botero et al, 2004). These dimensions were used to evaluate progress in
regulation of flexible employment practices at the facilities from Hungary, Romania and
Slovenia, ranging through an ordinal scale from significant to no regulatory
improvements.
Improvements in the regulation of temporary agency employment at facility
Hungary Electronics 1, for example, included endowment of subcontracted employees
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with additional compensation to reduce discrimination across standard and temporary
agency workers; setting limits on the use of agency employment as part of the collective
agreement negotiated between the local union and management; and empowerment of
temporary agency employers through representation by the local union. These
developments were exceptional at a time when low compensation for temporary agency
workers was common and unions did not include temporary employees in their
membership (Neumann, 2009). While regulatory developments at facility Hungary
Electronics 1 were the most extensive, the transnational governance institution of
Corporation Electronics 1 facilitated the emergence of improvements at facility Romania
Electronics 1 as well. Regulatory improvements included endowment of dismissed
workers with severance payment, along with some additional training courses and
consultation. In a context where "velvet firings" with generous severance packages were
still common, these improvements were, however, more modest.
Similarly, at facilities Hungary Electronics 2 and Romania Electronics 2,
suppliers of Corporation Electronics 2, improvements were relatively more significant in
the case of Hungary than in Romania. At facility Hungary Electronics 2, improvements
included a systematic change in the compensation schemes of temporary agency workers,
along with the adoption of a new system of coordination across local management and
labor agencies to reduce discrimination between temporary and standard employees. At
facility Romania Electronics 2, improvements also included higher compensation for laid
off employees, but problems regarding the procedures associated with collective
dismissals persisted. Finally, notwithstanding important similarities across the private
regulatory approaches of Corporations Electronics 1 and 3, and Corporations Electronics
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2 and 4, respectively, regulatory complementarities did not come about at facilities
Slovenia Electronics 1 and 2.
The extents of the regulatory improvements at the facilities from Hungary,
Romania and Slovenia are summarized on table 6.1 below. Overall, regulatory
improvements at the Hungarian facilities were more extensive and quite exceptional in
the national context. Improvements were more limited in the Romanian context and
completely absent at the facilities located in Slovenia.
Table 6.1. Summary of regulatory improvements at facilities from Hungary (HE 1 and
HE2), Romania (REI and RE2), and Slovenia (SEI and SE2)
HEl HE2 REl RE2 SEl SE2
Improvements in regulation of 79T 7T 77
flexible employment practices
Endowment of workers with 7 9
rights and reduction in
discrimination
Imposition of limits on
extensiveness of a particular
practice
Empowerment through 9
representation
Provision of social protection
for vulnerable groups of
employees
Political Economy of Regulatory Complementarities: Putting the Pieces Together
Considering the important differences across the national institutional settings, the
case studies within each national context reveal some interesting differences and
similarities across the processes driving regulatory complementarities. These differences
and similarities can be best understood from the perspectives of the domestic labor
relation institutions in each context and the strategic interactions they set in place, as
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suggested by the analytical framework in Chapter 1. First, national labor relation
institutions set different incentives for workers' representatives to engage with alternative
forms of regulatory approaches to drive improvements in working conditions and
employment relations. Second, national labor institutions influence the ability of
domestic and transnational actors to rely on domestic regulation as sources of legitimacy
and political authority for their demands and strategic actions. Finally, the divergent
transnational regulatory institutions present different types of opportunities for domestic
and transnational actors to build regulatory complementarities. The relevance of the
institutional features of private regulation, however, is also contingent on the national
institutional setting where they are implemented. While the differences across
stakeholder engagement and compliance oriented private regulatory approaches were
highly relevant in the Hungarian context, the relevance of divergent approaches was
smaller in the Romanian context and irrelevant at the facilities operating in Slovenia. The
following sections will discuss each of these three roles of national, and to some extent of
transnational, institutions.
1. National labor relation institutions as sources of incentives and
constraints for union-driven regulatory complementarities
Domestic labor relation institutions are important because they provide platforms
for reconciliation of conflict regarding labor regulation. There are three important
channels through which labor unions can influence policy outcomes and practices. These
include: tripartite institutions, industrial relation systems, and political connections with
the state. What matter are not just the formal aspects of these labor institutions, but rather
the effectiveness of labor unions to access them and use them to influence policy
232
outcomes and practices regarding flexible employment practices. A more historical
approach towards understanding the functional aspects of these institutions, underlying
the similarities and main differences across the three setting, was provided in Chapter 2.
Their relevance for regulating employment flexibility in the electronics sector were then
further considered in the empirical chapters focusing on regulatory developments at two
facilities in each national setting.
In national contexts with weak labor relation institutions, as was the case of
Hungary, domestic unions used transnational corporate regulatory efforts to compensate
for the weak enforcement of state regulation and improve working conditions for
temporary agency workers. Notwithstanding a promising start, tripartite institutions of
Hungary became relatively weak platforms for effective coordination across state and
social stakeholders (Hethy, 2001). While national unions engaged in national level
political strategy, their efforts were hindered by the institutional weaknesses to put
pressure on the state to impose stricter regulation. In the absence of strong and
coordinated industrial relations, company level unions had no alternative strategies
available to influence employers' practices through domestic institutions. Therefore, the
incentives for strategic engagement with transnational regulatory initiatives as an
alternative strategy to influence processes at the company level were strong. The
company level union at facility Hungary Electronics 1 eventually used transnational
corporate regulatory initiatives to promote improvements for temporary agency
employees. In the process of building complementary interactions across corporate and
state regulation, union representatives and private auditors used state regulation to
legitimize their efforts and reinforce the authority of their demands from local
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management. The transnational regulatory initiatives, as hierarchical coordination
systems that local facilities are integrated into, served the role of enforcement
mechanisms through the pressure exerted on facility management to comply with
regulatory guidelines. The mobilization of the alternative regulatory institutions thus
compensated for the weak political will of the state to enforce legislation regarding
temporary employees, and also for the relative powerlessness of the union to exert
pressure on the company directly.
The relative importance of national labor relation institutions in influencing the
strategic approach of domestic unions is also well illustrated by the empirical cases of the
two facilities in Romania. The absence of relatively effective domestic labor relation
institutions to address sources of conflict in the implementation of regulations regarding
collective dismissals set incentives for domestic company unions to rely on transnational
regulatory initiatives to promote their objectives. The main national tripartite institution
in Romania was established relatively late and remained dominated by the state. Overall,
it provided a weak platform for effective coordination across the state and social
stakeholders. Industrial relations at the national level were also undermined by strong
interferences by the national government (Trif, 2004). This was possible in part because
of the unified character of national collective bargaining institutions, and in part because
of a strong legacy of state interventions in Romania. In 2010, for instance, under growing
pressure by international organizations to restructure and liberalize the economy, the
government simply canceled the national collective agreement. In the absence of strong
sector level unions, domestic unions relied on weaker coordination with the national
unions. These connections with the regional and national representatives of the unions,
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and with state agencies, sometime facilitated a rebalancing of power between domestic
labor and transnational capital. This was the case at both facilities Romania Electronics 1
and 2, when the domestic unions used connection with state agencies - the Ministry of
Labor and Social Affairs and County Council, respectively - to acquire political authority
for their demands on the management of the facilities and lead corporations. The
coordination across unions and state enabled by these political connections between
national level representatives was, however, relatively weak and had an ad hoc character.
In the absence of strong and consistent platforms to exert influence over state regulation
and industrial relations in a systematic manner, domestic unions used transnational
corporate regulatory efforts to compensate for deficient state enforcement and power
asymmetries in industrial relations.
In contrast with the national settings of Hungary and Romania, the existence of
strong and coordinated labor relation institutions in Slovenia, constrained similar
incentives for domestic unions to engage with transnational regulatory initiatives. Sector
level unions and collective bargaining played a strong role in exerting both political
pressure and providing innovative solutions for labor concerns related to working time
schedule at facilities Slovenia Electronics 1 and Slovenia Electronics 2. In the case of
temporary employment, the role of sector level unions was of mere coordination with the
national unions in this matter. Temporary employment represented the topic of national
regulatory politics, with contestations by both the unions and employers' associations.
The sector level union played the role of intermediary between company and national
level representatives of workers' organizations. Concerns with temporary employment
were rolled up at the national level and became the focus of coordination across the state
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and social partners. As tripartite institutions rely on coordination with social partners to a
much greater extent to adopt policies and facilitate their implementation in Slovenia, this
was used as a main institutional platform to address concerns regarding temporary
employees. The tripartite institution was also the main locus for social stakeholders and
the state to consider possible complementarities across domestic policies and corporate
social responsibility initiatives. Deliberate strategic efforts to build complementarities
across corporate and public institutions, however, were challenged by different
understandings shared by state, employer, and union actors.
In addition to their influence on the incentives of domestic unions to engage with
alternative forms of regulatory institutions, the extent of coordination across the industrial
relation system also influenced the degree of freedom of local unions to experiment with
innovative strategies to address local problems. Dense coordination across different
layers of industrial relation levels set institutional constraints on micro-level institutional
approaches. This is best illustrated through the comparisons across Hungary and
Slovenia, where the institutionalized coordination across company, industry and national
level social dialogues differ considerably. While coordination across company and
national level unions was relatively loose in the case of Hungary, it was institutionalized
through the presence of strong sector level unions and industrial relations in Slovenia.
The absence of similar coordination systems provided greater degree of freedom for
company level unions at facilities Hungary Electronics 1 and allowed them to diverge
from the national trends and strategies. In Romania, the lack of consistency and poor
coordination in national regulatory context also provided considerable degree of leverage
for alternative strategies at the company level. In the Slovenian context, on other hand,
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company level unions were more closely integrated into the national approach of union
confederations to put pressure on employers and state at the national level.
2. National labor relation institutions as sources of legitimate and consistent
guidelines for private regulation
The extents of centralization and coordination characteristic to labor relation
institutions were also relevant for the ability of transnational actors to utilize domestic
regulation to confer legitimacy to private regulatory efforts and exercise greater pressure
for improvements. Large corporations are endowed with significant economic resources,
technical know-how, and now, regulatory power, to promote improvements in labor
standards. These regulatory efforts, however, lack legitimacy (Anner, 2011; Fransen at al,
2012), and are therefore often dependent on the political authority and procedural
predictability of state regulation to compensate for their key deficiency. In national
contexts where the adoption and implementation of domestic institutions were part of a
national strategy to promote a more stable environment for markets, transnational
corporate actors were able to use domestic regulation to facilitate implementation of their
social responsibility initiatives. In the case of Hungary, for example, political
commitment towards promoting business friendly environment with legitimate and
predictable set of laws, state regulation was used to complement corporate demands and
pressures. The main role of the tripartite organization of Hungary has been to legitimate
policies and maintain political and social stability in the country, rather than to provide a
platform for effective coordination (Avdagic, 2005). References to state legislation were
used by domestic unions at facility Hungary Electronics 1, to legitimize and guide
demands for improvements in the working conditions and employment relations of
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temporary agency employment at the manufacturing site. At facility Hungary Electronics
2, the private auditors monitoring the site used national state legislation to legitimize and
exert more influence on local management to change their practices with respect to
contracted employees.
In the state-oriented institutional context of Romania, where implementation of
domestic regulation was based more on state interventionism guided through a
combination of public and particularistic interests, the reliance on domestic institutions
was more problematic due to their lack of procedural consistency/predictability and
legitimacy. In the case of regulation of collective dismissals, state legislation and
collective bargaining sometimes stipulated contradictory guidelines regarding the
compensation of collectively dismissed employees. Furthermore, the national government
refused to register the collective bargaining negotiated in 2010 and confer it full
legitimacy to serve as the foundation of collective bargaining at lower levels. These
deficiencies in domestic regulation significantly undermined company level pressure at
facility Romania Electronics 1 to provide social protection for dismissed employees. In
an effort to compensate for these deficiencies, the local union appealed to the Ministry of
Labor and Social Affairs through the intermediation of the national union, to legitimize
and support their demands for the adoption of more socially responsible practices. The
deficiencies in the consistency and rule of law also undermined the efforts of private
auditors at facility Romania Electronics 2, to include temporary agency employees used
at the facility in the performance bonus system of standard employees. Local
management at the facility appealed to connection with the regional labor inspectorate to
provide a favorable interpretation of the legislation in place regarding comparable
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conditions of temporary and standard employees. Personalistic ties and clientelistic
networks have been more prevalent in Romania relative to other Central Eastern
European countries (Grodeland et al, 2007).
Finally, in the institutional context of Slovenia, implementation of state regulation
was driven less by a commitment to political and procedural predictability to promote
business-friendly environment, but rather through extensive coordination across
industrial relations at different levels. Within such contexts, implementation of national
and sector level regulatory guidelines relies in a systematic manner on industrial
coordination at all levels, rather than on simple reference to regulatory guidelines that
company managers are unilaterally supposed to comply with (Crowley&Stanojevic,
2011). Even though implementation of national regulation around particular issues was
nonetheless problematic, corporate regulatory initiatives are not likely to compensate for
enforcement deficiencies in state regulation without engaging domestic labor unions. At
both facilities from Slovenia, for example, local representatives identified and advocated
for coordination with local unions as the primary strategy to address concerns with labor
practices at their sites. At facility Slovenia Electronics 2 initiatives of private auditors to
promote an increase in compensation for temporary employees were dismissed by local
management as decisions regarding labor issues and implementations are made regularly
with the local union.
3. Transnational corporate social responsibility efforts as opportunities for
union-driven and compliance-driven regulatory complementarities
The empirical cases also illustrated that the institutional design of transnational
regulatory initiatives are also relevant for the emergence of regulatory complementarities
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in a particular national context. A common distinction in the existing scholarly literature
on corporate regulation of labor standards is between stakeholder involvement and
compliance oriented regulation (Jenkins, 2005). The latter is generally more common and
is sometimes alternatively referred to as "business driven" or "corporatist" approach
(Brammer et al, 2012; Anner, 2011). The main difference across stakeholder engagement
and compliance oriented approaches lies primarily in the mechanism underlying
implementation of corporate social responsibility: involvement of domestic non-
governmental and governmental organizations to monitor and address labor concerns at
manufacturing sites, or regular audits and corrective action plans to improve compliance
with codes of conducts (Hughes and Wilkinson, 2008).
These differences in private regulatory approaches have important implications on
the ability of domestic actors to build regulatory complementarities and guide
improvements. Stakeholder involvement oriented approaches provide more institutional
space for domestic governmental and non-governmental actors to utilize transnational
corporate social responsibility initiatives to enforce or go beyond state regulation.
Compliance oriented approaches, on other hand, generally exclude domestic unions or
governmental agencies from both monitoring and remediation efforts. In the Hungarian
context, for instance, domestic unions at both facilities Hungary Electronics 1 and 2 had
similar incentives and constraints from national relation institutions to use transnational
corporate regulatory efforts to improve working conditions for temporary agency
employees and balance out the segmentation of internal labor market at their facilities. At
facility Hungary Electronics 1, the local union was contacted directly by the
representatives of corporate social responsibility program of Corporation 1, and was later
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included in training about the program. At facility Hungary Electronics 2, the union was
informed about the corporate social responsibility efforts of Corporation Electronics 2
through the local management and only management participated in its capability-
building program. Moreover, while the representatives of the corporate social
responsibility program at Corporation Electronics 1 had direct communication channels
with unions at manufacturing sites, audits and evaluations at facility Hungary Electronics
2 largely ignored labor unions during the monitoring and remediation processes. As a
result of these differences, regulatory complementarities at these two facilities emerged
through very different processes. While at facility Hungary Electronics 1
complementarities were driven by local unions, at facility Hungary Electronics 2,
complementary interactions were driven by the compliance oriented efforts of private
auditors and the local union had a much marginal role in diffusing improvements.
Similarly, in the context of Romania, the institutional design of transnational corporate
regulatory efforts had important implications. While at facility Romania Electronics 1
engagement with the transnational private regulation was relatively easy, at facility
Romania Electronics 2, it required repeated efforts over the years for the local
management to be able to address the lead corporation about labor concerns at the
facility.
In a national context where labor unions and industrial relations are generally
weak and fragmented, the importance of stakeholder engagement oriented approach is
particularly important to create opportunities for participation. While dependence on
export-oriented foreign manufacturing has increased considerably in all three contexts
and contributed to significant power asymmetries between local unions and major
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corporations, this power asymmetry is particularly clear in the market oriented
institutional context in Hungary. Weak unions that have traditionally been subjected to
the global market oriented development strategy of the state, are particularly dependent
on the availability of institutional space in these transnational regulatory efforts to include
and empower them to become initiators of regulatory complementarities. The relevance
of this is illustrated by the contrast across facilities Hungary Electronics 2 and Romania
Electronics 2, two facilities from different national contexts but integrated in the same
compliance oriented transnational regulatory approach. While the local union at facility
Romania Electronics 2 made significant efforts to engage with corporate social
responsibility initiatives of lead corporations to put pressure on local management,
similar efforts were completely absent in the case of facility Hungary Electronics 2. In
the Slovenian context, the presence of stakeholder oriented or compliance-oriented
approaches did not make any significant differences, as the incentives to appeal to them
were marginal in the first place.
National labor relations influence the dependence of domestic actors on the
availability of institutional opportunities to build regulatory complementarities.
Notwithstanding the relatively superior regulatory improvements that emerged as a result
of union-driven regulatory complementarities, stakeholder oriented transnational
regulatory approaches often rely too extensively on initiatives by domestic actors. Even
when they are activated, the role of corporate power to exert pressure directly on local
facilities is more limited and dependent on the strategic actions of domestic actors. This
is not such a problem in national contexts that generate incentives and sufficient strength
to engage with alternative regulatory efforts, as was in the cases of the local union at
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Hungary Electronics 1, or at the Romanian facilities. But it poses challenges for the
emergence of regulatory complementarities when these institutional aspects are largely
absent, as was the case for the domestic unions at facility Hungary Electronics 2, and the
unions from Slovenia.
Compliance driven regulatory complementarities provide an alternative pathway
for regulatory improvements when the implementation of regular evaluations and
corrective action initiatives complement weak enforcement of state regulation in a
particular context. These initiatives are generally more proactive to engage in monitoring
and press for improvements by lead corporate actors directly. These efforts can be quite
effective at extending enforcement power to drive compliance with corporate standards
and state regulation, hence the reference of "compliance driven regulatory
complementarities". The extent of the improvements and their sustainability over time is,
however, more limited than in the case of stakeholder involvement oriented approaches.
Main Theoretical Arguments and Contributions
The central argument of my dissertation is that labor relation institutions in
national contexts where manufacturing for lead transnational corporations take place,
influence the extents and manners of private-public regulatory complementarities. I used
the electronics sector from Hungary, Romania and Slovenia as empirical windows in my
study to examine the divergent pathways of interactions across transnational corporate
social responsibility and national state regulation in different institutional contexts. The
electronics industry is one of the most important and globally integrated sectors
(Sturgeon&Kawakami, 2010), characterized by the prevalence of transnational corporate
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regulatory efforts to address concerns with precarious working conditions and
employment relations. Notwithstanding their institutional heterogeneity, Hungary,
Romania and Slovenia represent important electronics manufacturing sites that are
integrated in global production networks (Luthje, 2002; Luthje&Sproll, 2004; Dyker et
al, 2003; Rojec&Jaklic, 2002).
The previous chapters illustrated that while labor relation institutions facilitated
the emergence of regulatory complementarities in Hungary, these institutions were less
favorable for similar developments in Slovenia. Institutional conditions in Romania were
more mixed - while some institutional dimensions facilitated, other institutional aspects
hindered the processes and extensiveness of synergistic interactions across private and
public regulatory approaches. I hereby join other scholars in arguing that implementation
and effectiveness of transnational corporate social responsibility initiatives can't be fully
understood without factoring in the institutional and political underpinnings of labor
regulation in a particular context (Bartley, 2005; Locke et al, 2012).
A second essential claim of the dissertation is that instead of approaching public-
private regulatory complementarities as functional synergies that arise on their own when
these two regulatory arrangements are combined, to rather understand them as political
processes that are closely connected to national institutions. As the three empirical
chapters on Hungary, Romania and Slovenia illustrated, regulatory complementarities are
more likely to be built by various actors embedded in national and transnational
institutions. Institutional complementarities, therefore, do not always emerge due to a
logic of coherence or fit across main coordination systems (Amable, 2000; Hall&Soskice,
2001), but are sometimes the result of strategic, interest based actions of actors embedded
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in political economy regimes. Notwithstanding coherence or fit across corporate
strategies that include both economic and social objectives, and national contexts with
institutionalized mechanisms to promote coordination across society and the economy,
they are not necessarily complementary with each other in practice. Rather,
complementarities are often built within the contexts of institutional constellations that
set incentives and opportunities for actors to combine alternative arrangements in
complementary manners. In this sense, I add to other studies that point to the existence of
different types of mechanisms driving institutional complementarities
(Schneider&Kircher, 2010), rather than the simple efficiency increasing functional
interactions that the varieties of capitalism has focused on for a long time (Hall&Soskice,
2001).
Once we acknowledge the importance of national institutions in shaping public-
private regulatory complementarities, a question automatically follows about the type of
national institutions that facilitate their emergence. Several studies from the expanding
business literature on corporate social responsibility suggest that social responsibility
efforts of corporations are more compatible with coordinated types of national
institutions (Brammer et al, 2012; Campbell, 2007). In contrast with these claims, I
illustrate that transnational corporate social responsibility efforts are actually the least
compatible with the coordinated national institutions of Slovenia, and more compatible
with the state-oriented national institutions of Romania and liberal market oriented
institutional setting of Hungary. State-directed and liberal marker oriented institutional
contexts set both incentives and enhance the abilities of domestic actors to build
regulatory complementarities across transnational private and domestic approaches.
245
Moreover, I argue that complementarities across corporate social responsibility
and national institutions in developing and transition economies are more adequately
approached from the perspective of labor governance institutions, rather than corporate
governance institutions as is most common in the existing literature (Brammer et al,
2012; Koos, 2012; Kindermann, 2012). In advanced industrialized economies - the main
focus of the business and institutions literature so far, corporate social responsibility can
be seen as a mode of governance of corporations embedded in the national context. In
emerging economies integrated in global production regimes, however, only the workers
are embedded in the national institutional context that are provided as inputs for the
manufacturing operations of transnational corporations. It therefore makes more sense for
studies exploring the implementation of transnational private regulatory efforts to focus
on the institutions that govern relations across workers, employers and the state 3 . The
main institutions that have been traditionally indentified as essential for the governance
of labor regulation and policies through interactions with the state and employers include:
tripartite institutions, industrial relation institutions, and political affiliations across state
and labor unions (Avdagic, 2005).
Corporate governance institutions are, however, not completely irrelevant for the
emergence of private-public regulatory complementarities, as the transnational
governance approaches of major corporations regarding the promotion of social
responsibility throughout their supply chains further enhance or undermine the national
institutional conditions of regulatory complementarities. While some corporate
73 This difference pertains to the divergent modes of insertion of developed and developing nations in
transnational production regimes. Even though this is slowly changing, the international division of labor in
the global architecture of the electronics industry fits this distinction relatively well (UNIDO, 2009).
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governance efforts towards labor regulation rely more extensively on interactions with
labor unions, others remain more business driven (Brammer et al, 2012; Anner, 2011;
O'Rourke, 2006). These divergent governance approaches than provide different types of
opportunities for regulatory complementarities to emerge in divergent national contexts.
The influence of the transnational corporate governance institutions is however only
secondary to the importance to the national labor relation institutions that workers are
embedded in.
The analytical framework I used to examine the processes driving regulatory
complementarities from different national institutional contexts was informed by the
political economy literature on incremental, endogeneous change in advanced
industrialized economies. Building on this body of work (Streeck&Thelen, 2005), I
showed that national institutions set incentives and influence the strategic behavior of
domestic labor organizations to use the transnational regulatory approaches to
compensate for the deficiencies in domestic regulation. In this process, labor
organizations convert corporate programs to serve as instruments to promote labor
regulation in their domestic context. Domestic unions at in Hungary and Romania, for
example, used the transnational corporate social responsibility program of the lead
corporation to improve regulation of temporary agency workers and collective
redundancies.
Conversely, transnational actors also used domestic regulation to legitimize their
demands and strengthen their positions in the process of combining the alternative
regulatory approaches. At a facility in Hungary, for instance, private auditors used
references to state regulation to legitimize their claims and exert additional pressure to
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improve working conditions for temporary agency employees. Transnational regulatory
initiatives were relevant as they shaped the ability of domestic actors to access them and
direct them towards improved working conditions and employment relations. These
processes that result from the incentives, opportunities and incentives set by domestic and
transnational institutions can be seen as part of an incremental countermovement to the
expanding forces of global markets, a phenomena initially described and analyzed by the
great political economist Karl Polanyi.
Finally, I suggest that regulatory complementarities are more likely to emerge
around labor concerns that are extensive and politically salient in a particular national
context. These two aspects influence the objectives and interests of domestic and
transnational organizations to promote improvements in labor regulation. The differences
in the prevalence and political salience of particular practices across national settings can
be understood from a historical perspective that considers the industrial policies and
institutions during essential phases of integration into global industries.
Integration into transnational production regimes puts significant pressure on
manufacturing practices to rely on cheap and flexible labor everywhere (UNIDO, 2009,
Barrientos at al, 2008; Bormann&Plank, 2010). The manifestations of these pressures are
then influenced by industrial policies of national governments and filtered through labor
relation institutions in a particular context. The demand for flexible labor in globally
integrated economies is often accommodated by national governments through
deregulation and weak enforcement (Bohle, 2006; Frynas, 2005; Banerjee, 2009). The
institutional conditions during key phases of integration can facilitate or undermine the
abilities of labor organizations to limit these state strategies and employers' demands.
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Government strategies to promote integration in global industries and labor relation
institutions therefore have important implications on the practice and politics of flexible
employment practices, with implications on strategic actions to build regulatory
improvements. While there is considerable overlap across the prominence and political
salience of various forms of practices, they don't always go hand in hand together. In the
case of Slovenia and Romania, for example, even if temporary agency employment has
been rising in the electronics industry, union efforts continued to focus on other forms of
labor concerns.
The historical perspective adopted in this thesis therefore serves the purpose to
identify the critical points in regulation of labor in electronics sectors across the three
national settings, rather than to emphasize path dependency and institutional legacies in
Eastern Central European societies. This approach is consistent with a tradition set in the
comparative political economy literature on advanced industrialized societies that
identifies the critical issues in a particular institutional context and uses them as reference
points to conduct cross-national analysis (Locke&Thelen, 1995; Streeck&Thelen, 2005).
This thesis contributes to existing efforts to extend this approach to comparative studies
of labor regulation in emerging and transition economies.
Practical Implications for a Broader Context
Further efforts to improve regulation of precarious employment practices in
global production regimes will have to rely on both transnational private and domestic
public institutions and efforts. Transnational corporate social responsibility initiatives
over the last years have made relatively little effort to involve domestic actors and
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institutions in regulating labor practices throughout manufacturing sites in emerging
economies. A common assumption among policy makers and scholars of global labor
governance has been that domestic regulatory institutions - particularly state regulation
and industrial bargaining, are so weak in developing countries that they can essentially be
assumed away. My dissertation draws attention to the fact that improvements around
critical areas of labor concerns are often contingent on complementary interactions across
transnational corporate and domestic state and union efforts. This study, therefore,
contributes to the growing literature that claims that transnational corporate regulation is
not a substitute, but rather a complement to state regulation and collective agreements
(Rodriguez-Garavito, 2005; Amengual, 2010; Locke et al, 2012).
How does Eastern Central European fit in the broader context of emerging
economies with weak regulation of employment practices in globally integrated industrial
sectors? Are the findings of this dissertation particular to this region or relevant for
developing and transition societies from other parts of the world? Notwithstanding
membership in the European Union, Eastern Central Europe still represents the periphery
of Europe (Bohle&Greskovits, 2012). The collapse of the socialist heavy industries and
the eastward relocation of manufacturing in several industries from Western Europe and
Northern America, deepened the gap between the Western and Eastern parts of Europe.
Similarly to many East Asian societies, and to some extent, Latin American countries,
economic and social development in Eastern Central Europe is highly dependent on
foreign trade and international (in)flow of capital (Fabrizio et al, 2009). This creates
significant structural vulnerabilities and a subordination of social regulation and
protection to economic competitiveness. Membership in the European Union and
250
transposition of more democratic institutions were not able to counterbalance these
trends. The promotion of social dialogue institutions by the European Union had limited
effects on increasing the voice of employees in employment relations and national
politics (Cox&Mason, 2000; Meardi, 2004). In fact, several scholars emphasize the
neoliberal effect of the European Union as it weakened the strength of social democratic
forces and increased pressures towards more liberal labor regulation (Bohle, 2006;
Meardi, 2007). Because of the external, often coercive, influence on domestic
institutions and policies, the new rules were written into law but have not been
consistently implemented in practice (Bandelj, 2004; Schimmelfenning&Sedelmeier,
2005).
In many respects, Central Eastern European countries struggle with similar
structural and institutional challenges as emerging economies from Asia and Latin
America. These include both a high degree of dependence on foreign trade and foreign
direct investments (Fabrizio et al, 2009) and significant institutional weaknesses (Wiarda
et al, 2009). Within the limits of other major divergences that pertain to differences in
legacies of historical experiences, geopolitical power relations, and cultural affinities, the
main practical implications of the empirical findings on public-private regulatory
complementarities in Eastern Central Europe could apply to other national contexts
relatively well. The main practical implications of the study refer to the potential role of
labor unions as key drivers of regulatory complementarities, the relevance of legitimacy
and stability of state laws to compensate for weak state enforcement through corporate
power, the importance of transnational corporate regulatory efforts that empower and
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include labor unions, and the value of context-sensitivity in global labor governance
efforts.
1) Labor unions as key protagonists in building public-private regulatory
complementarities
Domestic labor unions played an essential role in driving regulatory
complementarities in Eastern Central Europe. In addition to monitoring labor practices
and signaling problems at their facilities, local unions used transnational corporate
regulatory efforts to put pressure on local management and improve working conditions
for vulnerable groups of workers. This draws attention to the fact that freedom of
association is not merely an important labor standard in and of itself, but is also essential
for corporate and state regulation. The strength of company level unions was sometimes
really constrained by power asymmetries and institutional constraints in particular
national contexts. In Hungary, their role was limited to industrial relations at the
company level and their strength was overpowered by the national importance of foreign
corporations. In Romania, company unions have also become increasingly marginalized
by domestic politics and economic coordination system. Nonetheless, their legitimate
existence and ability to coordinate and cooperate with various national and transnational
institutions and actors were essential for driving improvements.
Labor unions could become important allies in improving labor conditions in
transnational production regimes. In developing nations, however, the rights of unions are
often very limited (von Roozendaal, 2002). State policies to promote freedom of
association and provide more political space for the operation of unions is therefore
essential to enable them to participate in global labor governance. To some extent, similar
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reforms have already started in countries like China with the labor contract law that went
into effect in 2008, and with recent union and labor legislation changes in Guangzhou
and Shenzen (Liu, 2010). There has been significant progress also in the ability of labor
unions in India to organize and resist economic reforms over the last decade (Uba, 2008).
Similarly, several countries from Latin America have experienced a resurgence of labor
unions in recent years with the rise to power of left governments (Cook, 2012).
Nevertheless, major concerns persist and further political efforts are needed to broaden
the space for the establishment of independent trade unions and their relatively
unrestrained activities in less advanced societies.
2) Legitimacy and procedural predictability of state regulation is essential
As the administrative capacities and political will of national governments to
enforce labor regulation remain deficient, state legislation nonetheless remain an
important source of legitimacy for regulatory pressures. A major source of labor concerns
in emerging economies from around the world is that even if most developing countries
have laws to protect workers on the books, they are often violated and weakly enforced in
practice (Amengual, 2011). This was also the case in Eastern Central European countries,
where the enforcement of regulation concerning flexible employment practices was
almost completely absent. The legitimacy and reliability of national regulatory
institutions, however, played an important role in the ability of domestic and foreign
actors to mobilize complementary enforcement power. In the context of political
institutions that conferred legitimacy and stability to state regulation of labor, as in
Hungary, private auditors used references to state legislation to compensate for the
relative lack of legitimacy and accountability of corporate codes of conducts. Similarly,
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local unions also frequently relied on state regulation, as in Hungary, or on direct
interventions by the state, as in Romania, to justify demands and strengthen pressure on
corporations manufacturing in the region.
The good governance model promoted by international organizations such as the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund, give a great deal of attention to issues of
the good quality of state governance institutions to promote social and economic
development (Khan, 2006). While the promotion of effective institutions and absence of
corruption are important goals to pursue, my argument is somewhat different. The
empirical evidence emanating from Eastern Central Europe suggests that even in the
absence of effective institutions with considerable divergence between the letter and
practice of the law, state institutions can be important resources for global governance
mechanisms, especially when adopted through accountable and transparent political
processes. By the same token, whenever state regulatory guidelines are overly
ambiguous, complex or lack consistency in other manners, these can be used to justify
exploitative practices. The emphasis on establishing and maintaining legitimate,
transparent and stable institutions is therefore important. Legitimacy and stability of rules
were necessary, although not sufficient, conditions for regulatory improvements.
3) Participatory approach of transnational corporate social responsibility efforts
Institutional designs that facilitate the inclusion of countervailing voices and
strategies of domestic organizations are desirable to promote corporate social
responsibility in global production systems. The local unions have extensive familiarity
with labor practices at their facilities and considerable localized knowledge. They can
play essential roles in both monitoring labor standards and devising solutions to address
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concerns. At one of the facilities from Hungary, for instance, in an effort to improve
working conditions for contracted labor, the union initiated a certification program of
labor agencies that operate in the region. Its local connections with other unions and state
agencies were crucial ingredients to gain further support and help with the
implementation of its efforts. Other research on the implementation of transnational
corporate social responsibility efforts in Central and Latin America have also found
similar synergistic interactions across domestic actors and transnational institutions in the
electronics and apparel industries (Locke et al, 2012; Rodriguez-Garavito, 2005).
The ability of labor unions to participate in efforts to build regulatory
developments is however contingent on the mode of implementation and institutional
design of transnational corporate social responsibility efforts. While stakeholder
engagement oriented transnational corporate efforts provide some institutional space for
the empowerment of local unions, interactions across the lead corporations and domestic
actors on a regular basis are generally marginal or completely absent. Compliance
oriented corporate social responsibility efforts often completely exclude local unions
from the monitoring and corrective action process. During onsite visits the main contact
persons who would facilitate the administration of audits were mostly representatives
from the human resources and quality management departments, with no interaction with
labor union representatives. Many lead corporations perceive unions as a source of
division and conflict that is harmful in highly competitive global markets. However, local
unions are also a resource to protect themselves from significant risks regarding their
brands and reputations. While there have been some attempts to experiment with new
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forms of local participation and processes of collaboration with local actors, these have
been rather limited in their extent (O'Rourke, 2006; Anner, 2011).
4) A broader focus on labor standards has to be combined with sensitivity
towards context-specific concerns
Pressures for cheap and flexible labor emanating from the global economy often
manifest themselves in different forms of precarious labor practices through the national
settings integrated in global production regimes. Relying solely on a standardized set of
procedures to identify and correct labor concerns at different manufacturing sites from
around the world is therefore problematic. Corporate monitoring efforts with respect to
the regulation of collective dismissals of workers in Romania, for example, were largely
overlooked by monitoring efforts of lead corporations. The broad focus of corporate
social responsibility efforts has to be complemented with sensitivity towards labor
concerns that are specific to a particular national context. Most of the times, the
differences in the prominence of labor concerns pertain to the different industrial
strategies and institutional conditions driving integration in the global economy.
Inclusion of domestic actors that are more familiar with the pressures and institutional
weaknesses that exist in a particular setting could then provide the necessary awareness
and skills to signal and address these concerns.
Conclusions
This dissertation has suggested that regulatory improvements in global production
regimes are often contingent on synergistic interactions across private transnational and
public national regulation, and specified a set of institutional conditions that facilitate the
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emergence of public-private regulatory complementarities. The empirical cases of
electronics manufacturing sites in three Eastern Central European countries demonstrated
the importance of national labor relation institutions for setting incentives and constraints
on strategic efforts to build regulatory complementarities. The labor relation institutions
of particular relevance included industrial relation and tripartite institutions, and to a
more limited extent, political affiliations between state and unions. On one hand, these
institutions influence the incentives for domestic unions to use corporate regulation in a
strategic manner. On other hand, they shape the ability of domestic unions and
transnational actors to use state regulation as a source of legitimacy for their demands for
improvements. I further argued that these favorable conditions are more common in
labor market oriented, than state-directed and coordinated labor relation institutions. I
also suggested that different types of transnational corporate regulatory efforts generate
opportunities for two types of regulatory developments, including union and compliance
driven regulatory complementarities. This dissertation makes an essential contribution of
our understanding on how regulatory complementarities are built around particular issue
areas in different national contexts and provides a set of valuable policy implications.
There are two main limitations to this study that create opportunities for future
research. The first limitation pertains to limitation of time. Given the relatively short
history of the increasing prominence of transnational regulatory efforts in the electronics
industry, the dynamic approach towards analyzing the emergence and persistence of these
regulatory complementarities is somewhat limited. Institutions in emerging markets
change relatively quickly and this provides further opportunities to test the validity of my
arguments on regulatory complementarities over the course of time. The ongoing
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Eurozone crisis and new political developments in the current decade in several Eastern
Central European countries, set some general trends towards a more state-directed
approach in Hungary and more market-oriented approach in Romania and Slovenia.
Furthermore, in some countries new legal amendments were adopted at the national level
with unclear implications for practices on ground. These might have important
repercussions on the emergence and extent of regulatory synergies in the future.
The second limitation pertains to limitation of geographical focus. Considering
the primary focus of this dissertation on the importance of national contexts on the
implementation of transnational private regulatory efforts and their interactions with state
regulation, the extent of research on private regulation in the private-public mix was more
limited. The vast literature on transnational corporate social responsibility provides
different explanations for the existence of different types of transnational corporate
regulatory efforts. Some suggest a connection with the nationality of lead corporations
and their host institutions, while others connect it to the type of insertion in the global
production regime and the production profile of the specific manufacturing sites. These
aspects, however, were not the main focus of my dissertation and explored merely the
implications of the implementation style as a possible proxy for this larger set of factors.
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Appendix:
Table 1A.: Electronics sector in Eastern Central Europe: Share of electronics
activities in total manufacturing output in 2010
Country Percentage
Bulgaria 1
Czech
Republic 2
Latvia
Lithuania
Hungary 3
Romania I
Slovenia I
Slovakia 2
Source: Eurostat, 2013
(%)
1.39
1.62
7.83
5.94
2.98
5.25
).60
3.69
Table 2A.: Electronics sector in Eastern Central Europe: Share of employment in
total manufacturing employment
Country Percentage (
Bulgaria 13.82
Czech
Republic 24.58
Latvia 10.48
Lithuania 10.34
Hungary 26.10
Romania 16.08
Slovenia 23.79
Slovakia 22.28
Source: Eurostat, 2013
Table nr 3A.: Share of electronics
Share of electronics
industry exports in
total exports
Hungary 27.57
Romania 14.14
Slovenia 10.59
For reference: 23.94
Mexico 25.78
China 27.57
Source: UNCTAD, 2010
industry exports in total exports in 2008
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Table nr 4A.: Stock of foreign direct investment in 2010
In USD per capita Share in GDP
Hungary 8473.42 60.36
Romania 3280.74 37.68
Slovenia 7442.33 30.58
For reference:
Mexico 2633.50 26.27
China 528.21 10.08
Source: UNCTAD, 2011
Table 5A.:
countries
Dominant level of collective bargaining in Eastern Central European
Dominant level of collective bargaining
Bulgaria X
Czech
Republic X
Estonia X
Hungary X
Latvia X X
Romania X (until 2011) X
Lithuania X
Poland X
Slovakia X
Slovenia X
Source: EIRO, 2012
Table 6A.: Trade Union Density in Eastern Central Europe
Trade Union Density
Bulgaria 19%
Czech
Republic 16%
Estonia 8%
Hungary 11%
Latvia 12%
Romania 32.8%*
Lithuania 10%
Poland 12%
Slovakia 16%
Slovenia 29.7%*
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National Sectoral Enterprise
Source: EIRO, 2012
Note: * indicates that estimates are from 2008 and the source of the
the Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labor Studies (AIALS).
data is from
Table 7A: Governance Indicators for Hungary, Romania and Slovenia
Government
Effectiveness 1996 80 34 80
2002 82 48 80
2007 78 45 80
Regulatory Quality 1996 78 56 84
2002 89 55 76
2007 85 65 75
Rule of Law 1996 78 50 82
2002 80 46 80
2007 77 52 82
Control of
Corruption 1996 76 50 88
2002 70 42 78
2007 72 56 80
from 0 to 100, higher
Hungary I
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Bank
Note: The quality of indicators is measured on a scale
values indicating superior quality of institutions.
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